In terms of security, Islamabad will benefit the most
The coincidence of the interests of states in the field of geopolitics creates incentives for cooperation and productive interaction. A turning point of this kind was the first trilateral consultation of China, Iran and Pakistan on security and counter-terrorism issues.
The recent trilateral meeting held in Beijing was the result of many years of efforts and patient policy of all its participants. The parties pledged to actively cooperate in the exchange of intelligence data, participate in joint exercises, as well as make collective efforts to combat terrorism and strengthen regional stability.
In this context, the following questions become relevant: what interests drive the mechanism that the whole trio of players have developed, and how the historical component provides a deep understanding of the interests that converge within the framework of this trilateral agreement.
INTERESTS ARE DIFFERENT, THE DIRECTIONS COINCIDE
For China, both Iran and Pakistan are important strategic partners whose stability and prosperity are of great importance. If one of them suffers from a terrorist threat, it will directly affect China: instability will affect its strategic and economic interests in the region. Multiple deals with Iran and billions of dollars invested in Pakistan's infrastructure facilities as part of the "One Belt, One Road" initiative indicate Beijing's long-term plans for Tehran and Islamabad.
From Tehran's point of view, any mutual understanding reached with the Pakistani military establishment and the government is likely to weaken the impact of economic sanctions on Iran, reduce the level of tension in the Iranian province of Sistan and Baluchistan bordering Pakistan, and also help expand its own presence in the region. The importance of maintaining neutrality by Pakistan may have decreased after the thaw that came in Iranian-Saudi relations with the participation of China. Nevertheless, this issue remains important for Shiite Iran, where popular support for the ruling clergy is inexorably declining.
For Pakistan, first of all, border security, economic activity in its province of Balochistan, cooperation with Tehran on the suppression of Baloch separatists, who, according to Islamabad, are hiding in shelters in Iran, as well as regional stability in general, are important. The transition from geopolitics to geo-economics mentioned by Pakistan is impossible without cooperation with Iran.
Thus, another question naturally arises: if trilateral consultations serve the interests of all parties, then why did it take so many years to start them?
BEIJING'S POSITION: TIMES ARE CHANGING, OPPORTUNITIES ARE GROWING
From China's point of view, the main factors were the principle of non-interference and unwillingness to take responsibility. Beijing's relations with both Iran and Pakistan can be described as friendly, but interference in their bilateral disputes has never been on the list of priorities of the Chinese authorities. Looking back, it can be assumed that Beijing's decision to take on a more active role in the process is only now due to three factors.
First, the Chinese leadership initially strained the presence of American troops in Afghanistan. After the end of the war and the withdrawal of the United States, Beijing was able to shift its attention to other important issues in the region.
Secondly, the success of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship project of the One Belt, One Road initiative, depends on stability in the troubled Pakistani provinces of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. The establishment of a trilateral forum with the participation of Iran and Pakistan seems appropriate, since China is already cooperating with Afghanistan and Pakistan under another trilateral agreement.
Thirdly, China's success in achieving a thaw between Iran and Saudi Arabia has strengthened Beijing's authority in the Middle East. Now China may be ready to mediate on other difficult issues – for example, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
TEHRAN'S POSITION: IT WON'T GET ANY WORSE, IT'S WORTH A TRY
From Iran's point of view, its interaction with Pakistan has deteriorated significantly over the past three decades. Despite expressing readiness to strengthen the partnership by easing restrictions on cross-border trade, providing electricity to areas of the Pakistani province of Baluchistan and participating in the construction of the Iranian part of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, Tehran did not get what it wanted in other aspects.
Pakistan's ties with the Persian Gulf powers, especially with Saudi Arabia, as well as its business alliances with the United States in the 1980s, support for the Taliban movement (banned in Russia) in the 1990s and further in the 2000s, as well as Islamabad's inability to eliminate the shelters of Sunni militants threatening the Iranian province Sistan and Baluchistan have created a lot of problems for Iran.
The internal political crisis brewing in Pakistan due to the fierce confrontation of political parties, with the exception of a few, such as the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), also hinder close cooperation between Tehran and Islamabad. In addition, as a defender of the Islamic Revolution and the leader of the Shiite world, Tehran expresses condemnation over Pakistan's alleged oppression of the Shiite population.
However, against the background of calls from both sides for joint counter-terrorism actions against Islamist militants, political and military cooperation between Iran and Pakistan has intensified in recent years. Tehran's growing cooperation with China and its rapprochement with Saudi Arabia have increased the importance of Iran's interaction with Pakistan. Which is still crucial to eliminate the threats posed by Baloch separatists and Afghanistan.
PAKISTAN'S POSITION: BALANCE IS BETTER THAN CONFRONTATION
In turn, Pakistan's position on Iran was also influenced by several factors.
Islamabad is seriously concerned about Iran's partnership with India in the context of regional dynamics. Islamabad is also outraged by what it considers Iran's interference in Pakistan's internal affairs, including support for religious organizations and the recruitment of young people into the Shiite Zainabiyun brigade. Financial dependence on the Persian Gulf countries and strategic partnership with them, especially with Saudi Arabia, also limit Pakistan's capabilities with regard to Iran.
Nevertheless, for many years Islamabad has been trying to balance and balance its relations with Riyadh and Tehran. These efforts began in the era of General Pervez Musharraf, when Pakistan took measures against anti-Iranian militants, an example of which was the transfer to Iran in 2008 of Abdul Hamid Regi, the brother of the leader of the Sunni extremist group Jundullah Abdul Malek Regi. After the inauguration of the PNP government, the interaction between Pakistan and Iran intensified. It was reported that in 2010, Pakistan helped the Iranian authorities to detain the leader of Jundullah.
Contrary to general expectations, the pro–Saudi government of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), having come to power, continued its efforts to maintain a balance in bilateral relations with Tehran. An example of this is the balanced response of the PML–N government to Iranian incursions into Pakistan's borders and shelling of border areas after attacks on Iranian troops in 2014, 2017 and 2019.
But the most surprising decision of Pakistan, perhaps, was the decision to take a neutral position in relation to the military operation in Yemen under the auspices of Saudi Arabia. The PML-N referred this issue to the Parliament, where the majority voted for neutrality.
Another important event: In 2019, General Qamar Javed Bajwa became the first commander of the Pakistani army to visit Iran in the last two decades. And then Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan visited Tehran in the same year, recognizing the need for more concerted efforts to counter the global anti-Iranian movement. At that time, Khan's government included a number of pro-Iranian supporters, including Shirin Mazari and Zulfikar Bukhari.
The next coalition Government of Pakistan, in which the TNG had considerable influence, further contributed to the warming trend in bilateral relations. The recent visits of the Commander of the Army of Pakistan and the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Iran testify to the continuity of this policy.
Over time, Islamabad's strategic perspective on Tehran seems to have undergone significant changes towards achieving balance. Pakistan recognizes the need to have Iran as an ally to ensure peace and stability in its rebellious province of Balochistan, as well as to counter the activities of the Indian intelligence network operating in unstable regions where anti-government paramilitary groups have united. Moreover, the well–being and development of the cornerstone of KPEC – the port of Gwadar - also partly depend on Iran. Tehran supplies electricity to this port city and many other districts of the province, and this scheme is likely to continue.
In the regional context, Iran acts as a more favorable partner for Pakistan compared to its other neighbors – India and Afghanistan. Unlike the latter, Iran has no territorial disputes with Pakistan (meaning the "Durand line" – an almost unmarked 2,640-kilometer Afghan-Pakistani border). Unlike Afghanistan, Iran does not harbor militants of the terrorist group Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, banned in the Russian Federation), which Islamabad considers one of the most widespread threats.
POSSIBLE BENEFITS
Both China, Iran, and Pakistan benefit from this agreement, but it took decades to implement it. Each side had its own reasons and ideas, which changed over time. If Member States seriously implement the trilateral initiative, expanding the scope of consultations to include military, intelligence and border services, they will receive unprecedented benefits. This tripartite structure will contribute to a higher level of cooperation in various fields, including the fight against terrorism, economic integration and cooperation in the field of energy.
Iran and Pakistan can effectively solve bilateral problems and expand trade, if necessary involving China as an intermediary in the process. In addition, any improvement in the security situation in troubled Balochistan could be a catalyst for foreign investment in the port of Gwadar. For Pakistan, the formation of such a forum implies significant advantages, ranging from strengthening its own authority in the regional arena and ending with economic development. Given the interests, efforts and future prospects of the three countries, Pakistan is likely to be the main beneficiary of successful trilateral cooperation.
Moreover, in conditions of political uncertainty and institutional weakness, cooperation with neighboring States in countering anti-government elements can give Pakistan a temporary respite.
The trilateral consultation process is likely to be the first step in building mutual trust, especially between Iran and Pakistan, and pave the way for increased cooperation in various fields.
Larisa Shashok
Larisa Aleksandrovna Shashok is an expert at the Institute for Advanced Strategic Studies of the Higher School of Economics.
