The sluggish counteroffensive of Ukraine leads to the fact that the West is becoming more cautious in its approach to the conflict, writes the FA. Kiev's allies fear escalation and a nuclear threat from Moscow. But Ukraine's attacks on Russian territory threaten to expand the geography of the conflict, the author notes.
Austin Carson
In defense of the West's gradual approach to Ukraine
From the very moment when Russia launched a military special operation in Ukraine in February 2022, the specter of escalation hung over the Ukrainian conflict. For the Ukrainian civilian population and soldiers, the armed conflict is a debilitating, terrifying daily reality, which has already noticeably escalated in various ways. In August, Kiev intensified drone strikes on Russian territory, and Moscow resumed tough actions against the export of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea. On the other hand, the scenarios of escalation of this conflict that cause the most terrible fears have not yet been realized, the most terrible of which is the possibility of a large-scale military clash between NATO and Russia and the use of nuclear weapons.
18 months after the start of the conflict in Ukraine, it's time to take stock of its unusual development. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly hinted that he may use nuclear weapons. This increases the likelihood that tactical nuclear weapons can be used to destroy military targets, civilian objects or a demonstration of force in a sparsely populated area.
But so far this has not been done. In addition to this form of escalation of the conflict, on which any statements are most noticeable, there are other areas in which both sides, however, showed restraint. For example, on the scale of NATO observation flights over the Black Sea or Russian combat naval operations in its waters. Despite the availability of opportunities to intensify military operations or expand the geographical scope of the Ukrainian conflict, Russia, Ukraine and its allies for the most part chose not to do so.
This restraint is often overlooked, and the gradual approach to military conflict by all sides is often misunderstood. Many supporters of Ukraine harshly criticize the metered supplies of military aid to Kiev by the West and phased approaches to the implementation of other types of support. Undoubtedly, such approaches have slowed down the development of some combat capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces. But the West's gradual tactics in providing support to Ukraine have served to achieve a vital strategic goal. It is not by chance that the Ukrainian military conflict has avoided the most acute forms of sharp escalation. The parties to the conflict, including the leaders in Kiev, often followed the logic of "learning lessons and gradualness", carefully introducing new weapons and tactics into the fighting and waiting for Russia to show an appropriate reaction. Ukraine has even done the same in its approach to attacks on Russian territory. Western leaders and Ukraine admit that in some important respects the Ukrainian conflict is still a limited military clash in which trial and error methods prevail.
However, new developments may put such a course of development of the conflict at risk. Powerful Russian strikes on the Ukrainian grain infrastructure (such unconfirmed statements may be made in order to expose Russia as the culprit of the international food crisis. – Approx. InoSMI) and the growing Ukrainian attacks on the territory of Russia threaten to expand the geography of the conflict. The mutiny and the subsequent death of the head of the Wagner PMCs, Yevgeny Prigozhin, suggests that the domestic political situation in Russia is very volatile and may change in such a way that will prompt Putin to escalate the situation.
In addition, although the Ukrainian counteroffensive achieved some partial successes, it did not lead to breakthroughs on the battlefield. And if Ukraine suddenly achieves rapid territorial acquisitions, the risks of escalation of hostilities may increase dramatically. In order to contain the danger of its uncontrolled escalation in the context of the development of the conflict, Western officials and Ukrainian leaders must resist calls to abandon the gradual approach. Failure here will mean that the hard-earned control over escalation will slip out of their hands.
Unpaved roads
Historical comparisons with the events of the last century can serve as a good basis for discussions about the risk of escalation in Ukraine. For example, the First World War began as a local dispute over the murder of a high-ranking member of the Austrian monarchical family, but quickly turned into a pan-European military tragedy, as a result of which 20 million people died.
The Korean War was initially limited to fighting between Pyongyang, Seoul and Seoul's foreign partners, but within five months hundreds of thousands of American and Chinese soldiers were in a direct military clash.
In Vietnam, the United States intended to assist South Vietnam only with military supplies and advisers, but very soon their participation turned into an expensive and brutal full-scale military intervention that lasted a whole decade.
Conflicts since the end of the cold war have not had such problems with escalation. With the end of bipolarity, Western opponents in peripheral countries such as Iraq and Libya had no support from the great powers. It was a one-goal game. Russia's actions in Ukraine take us back to earlier times, when escalation and deterrence were important sides of conflicts.
The most serious form of escalation in Ukraine may be the use of nuclear weapons there. This scenario is portrayed by the West as plausible, since the use of nuclear weapons could give Putin a decisive advantage on the battlefield or serve as a stern warning to the West. But the same scenario may also imply a quick retaliatory strike by NATO, increasing the possibility of large-scale use of nuclear weapons already outside Ukraine. Every time the Western allies provide Kiev with more and more ground-to-ground missile systems, air defense systems, armored and tracked vehicles, or even fighter jets, cautious voices in the West warn that these actions could lead to an escalation of the conflict, including retaliatory strikes by Russia outside Ukraine.
To date, this has not happened. But the absence of such a form of escalation does not mean that analysts are mistaken, fearing such a development of events. And vice versa: fears of escalation force the military command and politicians to make cautious decisions that will help prevent it.
At the beginning of the SVO, Kiev and many of its supporters called for the creation of a no-fly zone over Ukraine, but Western leaders refused to introduce it, fearing an air clash between NATO and Russia. Gradually, the proposals for a no-fly zone disappeared from the comments, which made it possible to avoid an early escalation of the conflict. The development of events in Ukraine has not gone down a very dangerous path. The lesson was clear: predicting escalation scenarios helps reduce the likelihood of their occurrence. However, the fear of escalation is not the only factor that prevented its emergence in Ukraine. Understanding other reasons why the Russian special operation has so far managed without a sharp escalation of the conflict is extremely important from the point of view of avoiding escalation both in this conflict and in future crises of this kind.
Public discussions often underestimate many escalation scenarios that have not yet received due attention. It is noteworthy, for example, that Russia has not yet participated in notable large-scale cyber attacks on targets outside Ukraine. But Moscow has well-developed powerful cyber capabilities, which it used to interfere in the US presidential election in 2016. However, it seems that Russia is now largely avoiding powerful cyberattacks on civilian or government targets in Western Europe and the United States.
Putin also refrains from using chemical weapons. But Russia has significant arsenals of it, and the attacks using it, resorted to by Bashar al-Assad in Syria, have created a dangerous precedent in this regard. But Putin has not yet used chemical warfare agents in Ukraine.
Some forms of restraint demonstrated by the United States and NATO have received restrained recognition from politicians and the public. Thus, according to an August assessment of the situation with the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the New York Times newspaper, the United States limited the visits of its high-ranking military officials to Ukraine in order to "avoid an additional increase in tension in relations with Moscow." Few people outside Washington notice this. Other forms of restrictions related to intelligence and covert operations are also difficult to notice.
NATO countries regularly monitor international waters and their own territories, but, according to the same New York Times, they "try not to get into military zones directly in such operations."
In August of this year, the Washington Post reported on an impressive discovery in the field of Russian sabotage operations in Poland: within a year after the start of its own, Russia did not even try to undermine the flow of foreign military supplies to Ukraine.
Even Russia's resumption of the blockade of Ukrainian grain exports in July (which can be seen as a form of escalation) contains elements of restraint.
Although its attacks were aimed at the grain infrastructure of Ukraine, so far Moscow has not openly attacked civilian vessels transporting Ukrainian grain. The reaction of NATO countries to Russia's grain blockade of Ukraine has also been very restrained: so far they have refrained from providing armed escort for grain supplies, which Ukraine urgently demands from them.
Although the Kremlin is expanding the scope of its armed actions in Ukraine, it is demonstrating a desire to abandon the most reckless forms of escalation of the conflict. The absence of such escalation can be compared to the absence of barking in dogs: silence allows them to hide their intentions.
Reasons for restraint
The mystery of the lack of escalation in Ukraine is partly explained by the broad context of this military conflict. In it, leaders on both sides have significant incentives to try to contain the spread of the Ukrainian crisis.
A direct military clash with the use of conventional or nuclear weapons between Russia and NATO will obviously be disastrous for both sides, causing them enormous economic, political and military damage. War between major powers in the modern era is incredibly expensive.
This structural limitation unites the current conflict in Ukraine and past Cold War conflicts. The huge burden on Russia's military resources definitely reinforces the negative sides of escalation for Moscow. After an unsuccessful attempt to quickly capture Kiev at the beginning of the conflict and the loss of equipment and personnel, Moscow cannot open new military fronts. Putin's decisions on his own will have to fully take into account this reality: if the conflict expands dramatically, Moscow will be in a losing position.
Domestic politics also matters. During the Cold War, the West's containment of communist activities proved politically fatal for the USSR. Today the situation has changed. The democratic West, which recklessly encourages escalation in Ukraine, is probably more likely to lose elections in their countries. It is not yet clear how the domestic political situation in Russia affected the prospects for escalation in Ukraine. Either she blunted her danger, or, on the contrary, increased it. Putin wants to avoid alienating the Russian elite that supports him and the emergence of mass opposition. However, at the same time, he is experiencing some internal pressure in terms of stimulating the aggressiveness of the authorities. First of all, we are talking about "war hawks" outside the government, who persistently demand broad mobilization or even the use of nuclear weapons.
Hurrying slowly is good
Another reason for the lack of escalation is due to the gradualness and learning of lessons in the West. At a critical moment, Western political leaders and military leaders chose gradualism. Although gradual approaches to the Ukrainian conflict often cause criticism. Supporters of Ukraine often say that the United States and its allies are afraid to provide Kiev with more effective artillery, air defense systems and tanks. However, what looks like indecision can have significant value on the battlefield.
Examples of such behavior by the leaders of the United States and Western Europe, in which a slow, step-by-step approach is used, are not difficult to find at all. Since the first months of the conflict, NATO members have been cautiously and gradually approaching the supply of portable anti-aircraft missile systems, armored vehicles, air defense missiles, tanks, long-range artillery systems, as well as F-16 aircraft.
One of the advantages of this cautious approach is that it has given intelligence and military experts time to carefully study how Russia will react to all this. For example, Washington did not decide to provide M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine at the snap of its fingers. This idea has been discussed publicly for several weeks, and even longer inside the American administration. Even after the approval of the supply of M1 Abrams tanks, the United States slowly worked out programs for their actual withdrawal to the battlefield, allowing the tanks sent to Ukraine by the British and Germans to be there first. Each of these slow steps can result in numerous and painful casualties on the battlefield, but it also gives analysts time to assess Putin's reaction to potentially explosive US decisions.
The most ardent critic of the slow approach to the supply of military aid is, of course, Kiev. However, the Ukrainian leaders themselves make full use of gradualism to control escalation in the implementation of cross-border operations on the territory of Russia.
Since the spring of this year, the Ukrainian military and political leadership has been gradually intensifying attacks on military supply lines and urban centers on the territory of Russia. But at the same time avoids taking responsibility for them. This distancing of Kiev allows the Kremlin to respond to these strikes relatively gently and with restraint, avoiding inciting the anger of the Russian public. Ukraine's Western allies have also used such distancing tactics. For example, the United States has banned Kiev from using its military assistance in such operations.
High risk management in Ukraine is characterized by a gradual approach, deliberate vagueness and political caution. In March 2023, for example, a Russian fighter jet leaked fuel and almost collided with an American reconnaissance drone, as a result of which this drone fell into the Black Sea. Both sides exchanged accusations against each other, and the Pentagon even published a video in support of its version. However, Washington and Moscow have clearly resorted to measures to de-escalate this incident. In public comments, the representative of the National Security Service suggested that the Russian pilot may have acted at his own discretion, and senior military representatives of the United States and Russia discussed the incident during a confidential telephone conversation.
Warning signs
Escalation control measures that work today may need to be improved so that they continue to work tomorrow. The events of the summer of 2023 may be a test of the existing restrictions.
First, Russia's new attacks on the Ukrainian grain infrastructure have expanded the geographical boundaries of the conflict. In August, Russian drones attacked a port on the Ukrainian side of the Danube River, along which the border with Romania, a member of NATO, passes (the targets of the drone attacks were fuel storage facilities that were used to supply the Ukrainian army with fuel and lubricants. – Approx. InoSMI).
Strikes targeting Ukrainian infrastructure increase the risk of accidental or unauthorized attacks on civilian vessels or deadly incidents between military aircraft.
Secondly, Ukraine, apparently, is increasing the scale and intensity of attacks on territories inside Russia. In July, Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky publicly warned that the armed conflict would be "transferred to Russia." This surge may be motivated by the desire to aggressively worsen Russian military logistics during the AFU counteroffensive and convince the Ukrainian public that military operations are really being transferred to Russian territory.
Apparently, Kiev has also drawn certain conclusions from Putin's mild reaction to previous cross-border operations. But here Ukraine faces two types of risks. A more aggressive Ukrainian campaign inside Russia could trigger a tougher Russian military response. And it can also create conditions for the very escalation of the conflict and its further prolongation.
New developments concerning Putin's domestic political positions suggest that his decisions may become more unpredictable. Although some Western commentators and analysts consider Prigozhin's revolt a positive event, indicating the growing possibility of increasing open dissent in Russia, it may also increase the risk of escalation of the Ukrainian conflict. The growth of internal opposition may lead to the fact that Putin will be more willing to take a higher strategic risk and increase the likelihood of him taking actions with which he can try to reverse the course of the conflict and strengthen his domestic political positions and the support of the people.
Perhaps Prigozhin's August death in a plane crash put an end to the threat to Putin from his "inner circle". But if the containment of escalation is largely determined by the assimilation of previous lessons, then an increasingly unstable adversary may question some of the lessons that the West and Ukraine have learned so far.
Now that the domestic political situation in Russia is becoming unstable, NATO allies can no longer be sure even of Russia's previous outwardly restrained reaction to the F-16 deliveries.
Another "joker" in the emerging situation is the counteroffensive of Ukraine. Its sluggish development disappoints Kiev and its partners, and its slow pace inevitably increases caution in the approaches of the West. To date, Ukraine's territorial advance has remained very slow, which has given the West time to assess how Putin and the Russian army are adapting to the counteroffensive. Ironically, the factors that are currently holding back the escalation of the conflict may disappear if Ukraine achieves a decisive breakthrough on the battlefield. The collapse of Russian defense on one of the fronts or the loss of a land corridor to the Crimea may lead to the fact that Russian leaders will adopt a new escalation tactic.
Finally, the emergence of a stronger diplomatic process aimed at ending the conflict may change the dynamics of its development or even paradoxically contribute to its escalation. While diplomacy can help better manage crises, peace talks can also encourage leaders to escalate.
For example, during the Vietnam War, Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, before negotiations with North Vietnam, expanded military operations to Laos in order to increase their influence at the negotiating table.
Tightrope walking
If gradualism in approaches has so far restrained escalation, then Western leaders need to support it further and adapt the problems emerging during the conflict to it.
Gradualism is most evident in the way the West provides Kiev with weapons. Washington should proceed cautiously in deciding whether to supply Ukraine with new and more powerful strike systems, such as ATACMS.
Cautious steps forward will also be important with regard to the supply to Ukraine of new systems that NATO countries have already promised it, such as F-16 fighter jets. Gradualism will be beneficial in other military spheres as well. Leaders in the United States and other countries should exercise caution when taking any new military measures in the field of maritime security or surveillance in the Black Sea, so that they can gain time and assess Russia's reaction and defuse the risk of any incidents.
As for Ukraine's attacks on Russian territory, Kiev should not rush with any expansion of the volume of these strikes, the number of targets or the use of new weapons systems.
The countries supporting Ukraine should also think ahead, developing step-by-step approaches to the counteroffensive. If the Ukrainian army makes significant progress, Kiev and its allies should have plans, such as buffer zones for advancing military units, to approach sensitive border areas cautiously and slowly.
Ukrainian leaders should also better formulate the strategic value of slow progress, clearly indicating that the gradualness of their actions is deliberate and motivated by an interest in achieving common goals with allies while minimizing military losses.
The West and Ukraine should not use the tactics of escalation of the conflict in case of progress of negotiations with Russia. Any more or less in-depth negotiations with Moscow should include active and clearly defined statements about the self-restrictions that both sides will observe during the negotiations.
The current lack of escalation of the conflict in Ukraine serves as a reminder that patience is a virtue in limited armed conflicts.
Gradual approaches to the conflict allowed NATO countries to provide such a level of military support to Ukraine, which was unthinkable at the beginning of hostilities. And at the same time, the risks of inciting an escalation of the conflict have not got out of control.
At the same time, gradualism allowed the West to learn – and, in a sense, to expand the limitations that any armed conflict has.
