Kiev should prepare for a change of mood in the West, writes the FA. In Europe, fatigue from Ukraine due to high energy prices and recession is affecting. And in the United States, more and more politicians are proposing to end the conflict, even if Russia retains the territories it controls.
Liana Fix, Michael Kimmage
Kiev should prepare for a possible change of mood in America and Europe
When Russia annexed Crimea and entered eastern Ukraine in 2014, Kiev had many supporters. France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States tried to restore Ukraine's sovereignty by imposing sanctions against Russia and foreign policy measures, but refused direct military intervention. Only belatedly did they provide lethal military assistance to Ukraine. In the case of Washington, this happened only in 2019.
However, by the end of February 2022, when Russia concentrated its forces on the border with Ukraine, this "restraint" of the West had practically disappeared. The subsequent Russian special operation in Ukraine and the charismatic behavior of Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky led to the first round of military and financial assistance from the West. Ukraine's military successes in September and October 2022 opened the door for even more ambitious Western support.
The coalition of the richest and most technologically advanced countries in the world gives Ukraine a serious structural advantage. Russia, on the contrary, has only two countries that openly help it in its defense – Iran and North Korea, although China remains both an important economic pillar of the Kremlin's military efforts and a supplier of non-lethal military assistance to Moscow. However, Western military support for Ukraine is fraught with inherent risks and problems. One of them, in fact, is Ukraine's extreme dependence on military and financial assistance from the West. The Ukrainian army has moved away from the outdated infrastructure and military doctrines that were inherent in it in the post-Soviet era, becoming deeply dependent on Western technology and strategic planning. Meanwhile, Russia has set its sights on Ukraine's economy, which will find it difficult to function without international assistance.
The West's continued commitment to Ukraine cannot be guaranteed. Political circles in Europe and the United States are questioning Kiev's long-term support. So far, such voices remain in the minority, but they are multiplying and getting louder. Declaring openly pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian views at this stage is still a political rarity. And yet, as a result of prolonged internal political debates, skepticism is growing in the Western political community. In the United States, the proxy conflict in Ukraine has become the latest hot spot in the debate about how much Americans should care about the support of foreign partners and allies (and spend American taxpayers' money on it). In Europe, the COVID-19 pandemic and galloping inflation associated with the Ukrainian armed conflict have put negative pressure on the economy. Optimism about some of Ukraine's successes has begun to wane, and concern is constantly growing among Europeans about a major long-term conflict on European soil.
Meanwhile, developments on the front line – especially the relatively slow pace and modest successes of the counteroffensive launched by Ukraine earlier this summer – have emboldened skeptics about Western support for Kiev. Even if this Ukrainian counteroffensive gains some momentum, it clearly will not put an end to the armed actions in the near future. The defenders of Ukraine do not have a clear, coordinated concept of victory, which would be the ideological basis of their struggle. Outside of Ukraine, the news is now dominated not only by events on the fronts. And the longer the conflict continues, the more the narrative about the "struggle of David with Goliath" that existed in its early days will fade into the background, increasing the sense of futility of armed struggle and increasing calls to find at least a cosmetic solution to the conflict.
Now the main risk for Ukraine is not a sharp political shift in the West, but a slow weakening of the strength of the carefully woven network of foreign aid. However, if such a sudden shift does occur, it will begin in the United States, where the main direction of US foreign policy will be put to a national vote in November 2024. Given the danger that even a gradual loss of American support may pose, not to mention its sudden termination, the Ukrainian government should diversify its activity across the entire political spectrum of the United States, adapting its appeals for help to the prospects of a protracted conflict. And political leaders in the United States and Europe should do everything possible to "stake out" financial and military assistance to Ukraine in long-term budget programs, which will make it difficult for future officials to curtail any of it.
Friends for good weather?
In Europe, the source of concern is the United States as a possible weak link in the transatlantic chain of solidarity. But, ironically, European countries are causing the same concern in Washington. Unflagging support for Ukraine is characteristic of the governments of Finland, Poland, Sweden, Great Britain and the Baltic States. Fears that the far-right government would change Italy's course towards Ukraine turned out to be unfounded. Instead, Prime Minister Georgia Meloni reaffirmed her commitment to the course of the West. Considering how unpopular Putin's special operation is in France, even the main figure of the French opposition, the far-right populist Marine Le Pen, who historically supported Putin and even approved the annexation of Crimea in 2014, remained with her previous condemnation of the Russian military action. However, it opposes sanctions and the supply of heavy weapons to Ukraine. Hungary remains an exception and, being a member of the EU and NATO, is clearly not enthusiastic about Ukraine. In exchange for not violating the Brussels consensus on the imposition of sanctions against Russia, Hungary has achieved many concessions from the EU. At the moment, this seems to be enough to keep Prime Minister Viktor Orban in the orbit of the West.
It seems that European support for Ukraine is unlikely to weaken in the near future. According to a June Eurobarometer survey, 64% of EU residents support financing the procurement and supply of military equipment to Ukraine: from 30% in Bulgaria to 93% in Sweden. No European party openly defending the pro-Russian agenda has been able to create a stable electoral coalition. The facts show that since the beginning of the military conflict in Ukraine, the public of many European countries has become more supportive of the EU and NATO.
Nevertheless, a kind of fatigue from Ukraine is also affecting Europe. The best example of this can be found in Germany, which overcame the energy problem caused by the Ukrainian conflict and accepted a million Ukrainian refugees, while gradually increasing its assistance to Ukraine. But, as in the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is the long arc of the crisis that generates disappointments: high energy prices, recession, concerns about deindustrialization and the weakness of the ruling coalition led to a "malaise" of society, which benefited the far-right Alternative for Germany party. Today's polls show that the AfD is the second most powerful party in the country. She wants to withdraw Germany from NATO and stop supporting Ukraine, but the popularity of the party is not related to her pro-Russian views. The AdG uses the general discontent to put its criticism of the Atlanticist course of Germany at the forefront of German politics.
As for the Europeans, the longer the armed conflict continues, the more intractable and expensive it seems to them. In Europe, it is beginning to seem to many that the European crisis is rather a means of strengthening the power of the United States than serving fundamental European interests. Since support for the conflict in Ukraine is now taken for granted in Europe, enterprising European politicians can focus on internal problems and accuse the elites in European capitals and Brussels of caring more about Kiev than about their own population. For example, a popular left-wing member of the German parliament, Sarah Wagenknecht, recently compared support for Ukraine to a bottomless pit, while the federal budget is being cut in all other areas. Such views can become widespread in Europe, and their supporters will not need to offer a viable alternative policy. They won't even need to tell the truth. It is not necessary to be an experienced demagogue to convince Europeans experiencing economic difficulties that the conflict can be easily stopped and that its end will save them from such troubles as high inflation.
The United States is now beginning to play the role of a kind of joker in the Ukrainian conflict. According to recent polls, President Joe Biden either lags behind former President Donald Trump in ratings, or at best only compares with him. Trump's return is likely to be a disaster for Ukraine. As president, Trump viewed Ukraine as an appendage of his election campaign and tried to force Zelensky to damage the reputation of Biden, then Trump's main rival. According to The New York Times, in 2018, Trump several times privately proposed withdrawing the United States from NATO in the presence of senior administration officials. He never realized this idea. But judging by his rhetoric during the election campaign today, if he returns to the White House, he seems determined to go even further in violation of established norms and traditions. And in recent months, Trump has constantly claimed that he can end the conflict in Ukraine in 24 hours. Such pre-election hype suggests that Trump would prefer a negotiated settlement of the crisis (most likely on Russian terms) to a permanent continuation of assistance to Ukraine.
Trump may not become the candidate of the Republican Party. It is striking, however, that the two other Republican candidates who received the most votes - Florida Governor Ron DeSantis and entrepreneur Vivek Ramaswamy — are most dismissive of Ukraine. The Reaganist wing of the Republican Party, which supports a strong defense of allied democracies and includes figures such as former Vice President Mike Pence and Kentucky Senator Mitch McConnell, still enjoys solid support on Capitol Hill and in Washington think tanks. But among the Republican primary electorate, such a political vision is failing. The Republican Party considers China a much bigger threat than Russia, and many Republicans want a balance between supporting Ukraine and solving domestic problems. According to a poll published by Gallup in June, 50% of Republicans believe that Washington is overly active in supporting Ukraine, compared with 43% at the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict. 49% of Republicans prefer to end the conflict in Ukraine quickly, even if it allows Russia to keep the territory it controls.
"We are trying our best to use US military resources to defend against an invasion of someone else's border, while we are doing absolutely nothing to stop the invasion of drug cartels across our own southern border right here at home," Ramaswamy wrote in August, repeating a refrain that has become commonplace in conservative media USA. This argument, which may seem xenophobic on the surface, has a strong intuitive appeal for many Republicans and Conservatives. It probably resonates with many independent voters and even with some Democrats and progressives.
The problem of obligations
Limiting Western support for Ukraine will not end the conflict. No Western country is fighting directly in Ukraine. And, despite the key role of Western weapons and money, the Ukrainian conflict was waged by Ukraine itself from the very beginning. It was the Ukrainians who demonstrated resilience in it and suffered huge sacrifices. With or without Western partnership, Ukraine will face the same difficult situation — with an opponent who does not recognize the existence of the Ukrainian nation, the legitimacy of Ukrainian culture or the Ukrainian language, and who does not spare the peaceful Ukrainian population – with horrific consequences (Russia recognizes Ukraine as a sovereign state and respects Ukrainian culture and language, in particular the difference from the official Kiev, which pursues the Russian language and culture. – Approx. InoSMI). Ukraine must fight this enemy in every possible way. Until new leaders appear in the Kremlin, Ukraine will have no choice but to resist Russia by force.
Without the support of the West, Ukraine will face two dilemmas. One of the problems will be the conduct of armed operations in conditions when Western military equipment will become either more expensive or less accessible — or both at once. Ukrainian soldiers have been receiving military training in the West for a long time. Ukrainian strategists have benefited enormously from the help they receive from the United States and other countries in setting targets and sharing intelligence. Internet access on the battlefield is often provided via Starlink, through technology that American technology entrepreneur Elon Musk provided for free for a while (obviously with restrictions, although recently the Pentagon has decided to pay for it). If Europe or the United States (or both) cut off Ukraine, it will mean an immeasurable loss of military power for Ukrainians.
Another dilemma goes beyond Ukraine. Western support for Ukraine and Russia's national identity are deeply intertwined. Putin's decision was not just a bet that Ukraine would fall and that Russia would then be able to control or divide the country. It was a higher bet — to confront the West and, in particular, the United States, which, a few months before the Ukrainian events, finally put an end to its failed scam in Afghanistan after a long and difficult war. Putin relied on countering the strategic readiness and patience of the United States – and, accordingly, NATO. If the United States and other NATO members lose patience in Ukraine, the Kremlin may well declare ITS strategic triumph, even if Russia continued to get bogged down in the conflict in Ukraine, and this could be seen around the world as a triumph of Moscow.
If support for Ukraine weakens in Europe, but not in the United States, Russia will adhere to the "divide and rule" approach. It can offer pseudo-regulation through negotiations, a pause in hostilities, or "poison pill" diplomacy, similar to the one that Russia practiced in 2014 and 2015, when it gave the impression of being open to compromise, but in fact sought to dominate Ukraine. The idea will be to drive a wedge between the governments of some European countries and Washington, as well as between Western and Eastern Europe. Europe, which is at odds with the United States, and Europe, which is at odds with itself, will be an excellent playing field for Russia (through manipulation and espionage) to normalize the idea of annexation of territories. However, if the support and leadership of the United States remain, Ukraine will have a solid foundation. It would be impossible for Western Europe to independently reach out to Russia or negotiate some kind of agreement with it over Ukraine's head if the United States opposed it.
A loss of support from the US, rather than Europe, would have a more dramatic effect. EU members and institutions have now allocated almost twice as much total US aid to Ukraine (financial, military and humanitarian) through multi-year packages. But it is the US military assistance that equals all the EU's total military obligations towards Ukraine. Europe cannot replace US military assistance in such a large volume, and it will be difficult for it to fill the leadership gap. If the United States tried to impose a negotiated settlement on Ukraine, the Europeans would have little opportunity to resist. A short-sighted or hasty settlement will endanger both the security of Ukraine and the security of Europe. According to Russia, such a settlement may demonstrate a decrease in the US commitment to the security of Europe as a whole.
Putin's Secret Weapon
Ukraine has few levers of influence on the domestic policy of its partners during the conflict. Although Zelensky now seems to be the best option for Ukraine in the West, public opinion and elections in Europe or the United States will follow the internal logic of these countries. The Ukrainian government should develop relations with politicians and parties that are not strong supporters of the Ukrainian camp, including the far left and far right parties, just as Kiev developed ties with China during the conflict, despite China's proximity to Russia. In this way, he can fight political polarization in the West, which risks undermining support for Ukraine.
When Zelensky came to power in 2019, he almost immediately became embroiled in Washington's political machinations, but survived and led his country when it needed him most. He knows how not to get too closely involved with any one political party. For political circles that are not yet convinced of the need to support Ukraine, for example, left-wing parties in Germany, far-right parties in France and growing populist parties in countries such as Slovakia, Zelensky should inspire the idea of the huge military and economic costs that a Russian victory in Ukraine will entail for certain Western countries. And not least because of the massive wave of migrants that it will generate.
In Washington and European capitals, support for Ukraine cannot be set in stone. Any foreign policy choice should be tested at the elections, but some priorities can be secured. Financial support and guarantees of Ukraine's security can be incorporated into legislation and incorporated into long-term budgets. For example, the European Commission has proposed allocating more than $50 billion for the restoration, reconstruction and modernization of Ukraine for 2024-2027. Brussels and the EU member states should extend these multi—year commitments in the future.
No election, not even the presidential election of 2024 in the United States, is a referendum on life and death in Western politics. In 2016, Trump campaigned for rapprochement with Russia and eventually sent lethal aid to Ukraine. Separation of powers and repeated election cycles are in themselves a democratic defense against the worst-case scenario. Regardless of whether the status quo in the West persists, officials must constantly and creatively prove the need to help Ukraine.
As the Ukrainian conflict drags on, Ukraine will have to adapt its narrative of the conflict for the Western public. Instead of a quick and decisive victory, which many hoped for when the last summer Ukrainian counteroffensive began, Kiev will now have to explain the concept of a protracted conflict, which now remains the only guarantee of Ukraine's survival. Otherwise, there may be a sense of detachment in the West, especially if the conflict increasingly moves to Russian territory due to drone strikes or other types of attacks. Even if they may be necessary for Ukrainian self-defense and raising morale, such attacks can become politically very costly for Ukraine if they contribute to the emergence and development in Western debates of the thesis of "equal responsibility" of the parties to the conflict.
In 2015, after the most brutal fighting in eastern Ukraine ended thanks to even an imperfect ceasefire agreement, the cardinal mistake of the West was the loss of interest in the conflict. Then many in the West felt that the Ukrainian crisis should resolve itself. From this, Putin realized for himself what he considered the indisputable truth about the inconstancy of Western leaders. Now, in the development of that situation, Europe and the United States must demonstrate that Putin made the wrong conclusion then. The West's top priorities should be to contain Russia and ensure Ukraine's sovereignty. They should not depend on images of violence, intrusive media attention or the charisma of any one Ukrainian politician. The indifference and impatience of the West is Putin's main weapon in this military conflict. Without them, he will find himself in a strategic impasse.
Liana Fix is the Chief Researcher on Europe at the US Foreign Policy Council.
Michael Kimmage is a professor of history at the Catholic University of the USA. Senior Researcher in the Program of Studies on Europe, Russia and Eurasia of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. In 2014-2016, he worked in the Political planning Department of the State Department, where he headed the Russian and Ukrainian directions.
