The United States should avoid escalating the conflict with Russia over issues that are much more important for Moscow than for them, writes TAS. This is fraught with the use of nuclear weapons, and the Kremlin is not bluffing here, the author warns.
Doug Bandow
Ukraine attracts many American politicians with its struggle. Hence their willingness to test the endurance of the nuclear power of Russia.
The Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict continues. Last year, the assumptions about the quick victory of the Russians did not come true. This year, hopes for a grand victory for Ukraine collapsed when the Kiev counteroffensive failed, as the AFU failed to crack the Russian defense and occupy Donbass and Crimea.
The Biden administration continues its course of escalation, but it is doing it slowly. She is afraid of Moscow's reaction to its policy, because of which more Russian soldiers will die and more Russian military equipment will be destroyed. Despite all its sins, Washington, apparently, does not want to start a war with Russia. Especially nuclear Armageddon, which is threatened by Russian leaders (Russia does not intend to be the first to use nuclear weapons and considers it as a means of protection. – Approx. InoSMI). Former President Dmitry Medvedev called it a "nuclear apocalypse," and Chairman of the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin called it a "global catastrophe."
The exchange of nuclear strikes worries Kiev's Washington patrons much less, as well as the majority of Ukrainians, both from the government and not. Most of all, Kiev wants (although it rarely says this out loud) that the United States should enter into military operations. Last November, Vladimir Zelensky tried to draw America into this conflict by lying, saying that Russia had launched a missile attack on Poland. In fact, it was a Ukrainian rocket. Zelensky's actions have caused concern in America and around the world about a possible nuclear escalation, although the strategic interest of the allies in the outcome of this conflict is very limited.
The United States and European countries have economic and military superiority over Moscow. To compensate for this, Moscow has set a lower threshold for the use of nuclear weapons than in the West. She has long declared her readiness to use it, noting that this readiness is higher than that of the Americans. Here's what Valery Akimenko from the Research Center for the Study of Conflicts says: "Disagreements over the exact threshold for the use of nuclear weapons by Russia hide the important fact that it is much lower than that of Western nuclear powers. The recognition of the possibility of a nuclear war runs like a red thread through Russian military theory and practice."
Some analysts predict that the lack of parity between the United States and Europe, on the one hand, and Russia. on the other hand, it will force Moscow to rely even more on tactical nuclear weapons. This will prevent the West from betting on its non-nuclear superiority to achieve victory. A similar dynamic is playing out in the course of the Ukrainian conflict.
The Russian SVO has caused terrible humanitarian consequences. It wasn't justified, but it was provoked. The Allies thoughtlessly and recklessly sought to establish their military superiority right on the borders of Russia. If Moscow had behaved in a similar way, expanding a hostile alliance and promoting regime change in the Western Hemisphere, the United States would have responded with aggressive and even provocative actions. For Putin's government, this conflict is existential. This means that Russia is willing to spend and risk much more than Washington, for which this conflict and especially such minor details as the final borders are of secondary importance at best.
Although the United States is increasing its contribution to this indirect conflict with Russia, it is still reacting to their actions with restraint and circumspection. Moscow does not attempt to start an all-out war in Ukraine and does not strike weapons supplied to Kiev outside the Ukrainian borders. Most importantly, Moscow does not use either strategic or tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Nevertheless, the possibility of its use deters Washington from more decisive actions, which Kiev's supporters insist on.
Therefore, there are demands that the United States (when it comes to nuclear policy, there is no more important and influential country in NATO) throw caution to the side and expose the Russian bluff. For example, Olivia Yanchik from the Atlantic Council recently complained that because of Moscow's actions there is "indecision and slowness" in the issue of arming Kiev. She added: "If the West does not fight back against Vladimir Putin's nuclear intimidation, he will most likely continue such tactics. Others will inevitably follow his example. And then the whole world will plunge into a new era of international instability, as many countries will urgently seek to become owners of nuclear deterrence weapons."
But Yanchik was too late with her appeals. Countries have been threatening to use such weapons since their invention. Washington is by no means an innocent simpleton who is annoyed to the teeth by bandits armed with nuclear weapons. He himself views nuclear weapons as the ultimate means of deterrence and coercion. Here it is appropriate to recall the "massive retaliation", which is a mirror image of Moscow's current strategy. His goal was to deter the Soviets from attacking Western Europe, and this concept was applied at a time when the non-nuclear forces of the Allies were noticeably weaker than the Soviet Army. Israel, Pakistan and North Korea also threaten to use nuclear weapons if they encounter superior enemy forces, or assure other countries that they can do so.
Moreover, since nuclear weapons are the best means of deterrence, deterrence and response to threats from the world's strongest Power, which regularly carries out regime changes in order to strengthen its political influence and/or achieve commercial advantages, powerful incentives for their proliferation arise. For example, Pyongyang may well pursue both offensive and defensive goals. Nevertheless, counting on the goodwill of the United States would be folly on the part of any North Korean leader who wants to survive. When the DPRK completes the creation of a deterrent force by developing an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking the US mainland, Washington will have to act much more carefully and cautiously on the Korean peninsula – even with conventional weapons.
Most importantly, Yanchik does not offer any solutions when he talks about the "decisive response of Ukraine's partners." It is difficult to object to a "decisive answer" when there is no specifics. But what should the West do to counter Russian nuclear threats? To introduce new economic sanctions, the effect of which is very limited today? To persuade the countries of the Global South to adopt more resolutions criticizing Moscow? Lauren Sukin from the London School of Economics suggests the following: "Moscow must be sure that the West will in no way tolerate any use of nuclear weapons. If a tragedy occurs, it will be immediately, sharply and decisively condemned by the entire world community, and a series of punishments will follow, starting with even more severe sanctions and ending with the expulsion of Russia from international organizations." But all these consequences will not matter much if Moscow decides that the situation requires the use of nuclear weapons.
What about "extreme measures"? Four years ago, the Rand Corporation research organization outlined a list of measures that Washington can take to weaken and intimidate Russia. Many of them are indirect, aimed at the long term and are unlikely to deter Moscow from using nuclear weapons. Other measures are expensive and will force the United States to take up the defense of the continent, which already relies excessively on Washington. And finally, there are proposals to destabilize the Putin regime. But they will certainly force Moscow to take extreme measures in response.
The most radical proposal is to threaten Russia with war if it uses nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Or even worse, to initiate hostilities themselves, including with the use of nuclear weapons. The author of the failed policy on Afghanistan, David Petraeus, who revealed secret information to his biographer and mistress, suggested starting a full-scale non-nuclear war against Moscow, obviously believing that Putin would agree to such a nationwide and personal humiliation. It will be a wild and irresponsible adventure, especially considering that, unlike Ukraine, the interests of the United States here are at best secondary. Senator Roger Wicker suggested that the United States consider intervening in this conflict with the use of nuclear weapons, even if Russia does not use it first. It is difficult to imagine how in this case it will be possible to prevent a destructive nuclear war.
Naturally, the threat of the use of nuclear weapons has a deterrent and intimidating effect. This is the foundation of the theory of deterrence and mutually assured destruction, which defined Soviet-American relations in the nuclear era. Moreover, this applies not only to Russia, because "NATO is a nuclear alliance." NATO continues to rely on nuclear weapons to fulfill its promise to protect what cannot be protected – first of all, the Baltic countries. But the alliance's possession of nuclear weapons certainly deters Moscow from military action against them.
Russian nuclear weapons have the same deterrent and intimidating effect today. Undoubtedly, the nuclear powers have reasons to bluff. But not everything they say is a bluff. Sukin from the London School of Economics warns that such threats are quite serious: "States make nuclear threats in order to draw boundaries around issues that are of the greatest importance to them. Further, the frequency of such threats is important. Even when the beginning is noisy, during periods of increasing threats, their authors take concomitant aggressive actions." And Russian threats seem very credible if you familiarize yourself with Moscow's nuclear doctrine.
There is no doubt that Putin does not want to use nuclear weapons unnecessarily and do it for trivial purposes. Moreover, he clearly understands that his country will pay a high price if it is the first after the United States to use nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the circumstances underline the seriousness of the Russian threats. Defeat in an armed conflict, especially if it leads to the loss of territories such as Crimea, will certainly be regarded as unacceptable and too costly in political and personal terms.
Last fall, the following comment was published in a NATO publication:
"If Ukrainian troops manage to occupy the territory of Crimea, which at the moment seems only an idle speculation, despite recent successes, Vladimir Putin may be subjected to powerful pressure inside the country and will be forced to take radical actions. In short, the uncertainty as to whether Russia considers Crimea a "status quo" territory may lead to miscalculations and nuclear escalation."
It is dangerous to assume that the Russian bear is really just a paper tiger. In such conditions, prudence and caution are required, as well as what Yanchik calls "indecision and slowness." Everything else is absolute and even suicidal irresponsibility. But Ukraine's struggle against Russian aggression seems attractive to many American politicians. Therefore, they are ready to test the endurance of the nuclear power of Russia, ignoring the very real threat of an exchange of nuclear strikes that will lead these countries to death.
The interests of America should be the highest priority of the American state. Now we see as if through a dim glass, wrote the Apostle Paul. Of course, the same can be said about Vladimir Putin's readiness to use nuclear weapons in an armed conflict with Ukraine. Nothing in this tragic conflict justifies the participation of the United States. And, of course, Washington should avoid a nuclear confrontation over issues that are much more important to Moscow than to it.
