Erdogan's goal at the meeting with Putin was to revive the grain deal, CGTN writes. And, although he did not achieve an extension of the agreement, the Turkish leader did not leave empty-handed. He discussed with his Russian counterpart the issue of energy cooperation, which could bring Moscow a geopolitical victory over the West.
It seems that for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the extension of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, also known as the grain deal, is one of the priorities in relations with Moscow. But for his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, Turkey's transformation into a regional gas hub is probably much more important than an agreement allowing Ukraine to freely export its agricultural products through the ports of the Black Sea.
Since Moscow suspended its participation in the grain deal on July 17, Erdogan has been trying to convince Putin to renew the agreement. It's no secret that this initiative — initially aimed at delivering products from Ukraine to international markets via the Black Sea and mitigating the global food crisis — has de facto turned Turkey into a "grain hub". As a result, Ankara became one of the main beneficiaries of the agreement signed in Istanbul on July 22, 2022 by Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and the United Nations.
Thus, Moscow's potential decision to extend the deal or sign a separate grain agreement with Ankara will undoubtedly have a positive impact on the crisis-stricken Turkish economy. But Putin seems determined not to do that, at least for now. It was the West, according to the Russian leader, that actually forced Moscow to freeze participation in the initiative without lifting sanctions on the country's agricultural exports.
"The West deceived us about the grain deal. But we are ready to return to it immediately as soon as the promises made to us are fulfilled," Putin said on September 4 after meeting with Erdogan in the Black Sea resort city of Sochi.
After US and European sanctions closed access to the SWIFT international payment system to most Russian financial institutions, Moscow repeatedly demanded that the Rosselkhoznadzor be re-connected to it. But the West does not want to make any concessions to the Kremlin, because it considers it a sign of weakness. Nevertheless, this does not mean that in the end Moscow and Ankara will not sign a bilateral grain agreement.
Meanwhile, Ukraine may unilaterally try to continue the implementation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, ignoring Russia's statements that any ships approaching local ports will be considered as potential military vessels.
Turkey will also, without any doubt, continue to put pressure on Russia to find a way to bring the grain deal back to the table. According to media reports, Erdogan said he would share the Kremlin's "new recommendations" with the UN, which suggests that the president does not intend to simply abandon the revival of the Black Sea initiative.
However, it was the Western powers, not the UN, that imposed sanctions on Russian banks. Thus, the United Nations can do little to help in this matter. Meanwhile, Erdogan believes that Moscow and Ankara will be able to "come to a decision in a short time that will meet expectations."
Nevertheless, although a new grain deal, which was most likely Erdogan's main goal, has not yet appeared in the foreseeable future, the Turkish leader is unlikely to return home empty-handed. The fact that he discussed with Putin the construction of a new nuclear power plant in Sinop — on the northernmost edge of the Turkish side of the Black Sea coast — clearly indicates that the two states are looking for ways to expand their energy cooperation.
The Russian corporation Rosatom is already involved in the construction of the Akkuyu NPP in Mersin province. If the company, despite the conflict in Ukraine and Western sanctions against Moscow, starts building another nuclear facility in Turkey, a NATO member country, the Kremlin will almost certainly present this as a significant geopolitical victory over the West.
At the same time, after the Russian energy company Gazprom presented a draft roadmap for the creation of a gas hub in Turkey, it became obvious that Moscow no longer counts on the potential restoration of the Nord Stream pipelines that were undermined in September 2022. In other words, it now considers Ankara, not Berlin, as its main energy partner in Europe.
But for Russia, the main problem is that Turkey, despite Erdogan's pragmatic approach towards Moscow, remains the most important ally of the United States. Therefore, there is no guarantee that the energy cooperation between the two countries will be as smooth as the Kremlin hopes.
One thing is for sure: although Russia and Turkey are traditional rivals and have opposing views on many geopolitical issues, while Putin and Erdogan are in power, Moscow and Ankara will remain situational sworn friends and will continue to implement their course of strategic rationalism.
Author: Nikola Mikovic is a special CGTN current affairs columnist, an independent journalist from Serbia. Mainly covers foreign policy issues of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, writes for several online magazines.
