The APU counteroffensive, if there was one, began later and went slower than expected, writes The Independent. And the main questions are who is to blame and what will happen next. Together with the author of the article, readers tried to answer them.
Mary Dejevsky
The long-awaited military maneuver did not bring significant results to the APU, writes Mary Dejevsky and wonders: how can Kiev continue fighting against Russia now?
What happened to Ukraine's spring counteroffensive? For the past six months, he has been eagerly awaited both in Ukraine and abroad. Some were waiting for decisive shifts on the battlefield, while others even hoped that the Russian troops would leave altogether. But not anymore. Summer is passing, autumn is on the threshold, and the main issues are hanging in the air. What is the counteroffensive — did it really happen and passed? And was it at all? And if so, what was the plan? And won't this topic come up with a new force by the arrival of next spring?
It is not easy to answer these questions, including because information from both sides is extremely scarce. Ukraine, for obvious reasons, keeps its military maneuvers secret, and the losses are strictly classified. Messages from Russia are either blocked in the West a priori, or are perceived extremely skeptically. At the same time, the work of journalists on the front line is not only dangerous, but also increasingly controlled by Ukrainian media managers.
Perhaps, only one thing can be said for sure: the Ukrainian counteroffensive, if there was one, began later and went much slower than expected. We know this because none other than President Zelensky himself has periodically spoken about it — and national leaders are unlikely to downplay their military successes.
Secondly, again, if a counteroffensive took place, it cost Ukraine dearly in terms of personnel and equipment losses. Western reporters witnessed horrific scenes on the front line and heard first-hand the stories of returning soldiers. And this is not "Russian propaganda" at all.
At the same time — and this is another reason for uncertainty — no one knows what tomorrow will bring. Many outside observers do not want to write off the counteroffensive as a failure, not only out of loyalty to Ukraine. The fact is that this conflict has brought so many surprises that it is dangerous to make any categorical statements. You can lament the failure of Ukraine's counteroffensive in the evening, and wake up the next morning and see photos of the breakthrough of Russian troops, the undermining of the Kerch Bridge and the re-capture of strategic points on the eastern bank of the Dnieper. This hope persists, despite the fact that the time for any significant Ukrainian breakthrough is rapidly running out.
Drawing conclusions about the counteroffensive of Ukraine, it is necessary to take into account how it was conceived. And here, apparently, there was a discrepancy between what Zelensky and his generals really planned and the expectations that they intentionally or accidentally generated in Washington and in the West.
The impression was created (at least outside Ukraine) that the counteroffensive would begin as soon as the ground dried up after the spring thaw so that heavy equipment could pass, that it would pass along most of the front line in the east and that its goal would be to cross the Dnieper, break the land corridor to Crimea created by Russia after the victory in the battles for Mariupol, and the return of the territories occupied by it in southeastern Ukraine, or even Crimea.
If that was the goal, then it seems that it turned out to be unrealistic and the counteroffensive, alas, failed. But was there more to this goal than just hoping for a better alignment? To what extent could Kiev deliberately exaggerate the scale and urgency of its plan in order to keep its Western supporters and accelerate military supplies?
Ukrainian officials, of course, associate the delay of the counteroffensive with complaints about the slow delivery of military equipment. American Abrams tanks and German Leopard tanks were widely covered in the media. Another problem was air power. Ukraine's requests for the provision of F-16 fighters turned out to be impossible, given the time needed to train pilots and maintenance personnel, and additional Soviet-era MiGs were promised instead.
However, the lack of air cover for Ukrainian troops trying to advance to the Russian borders is called by many a weak point, which limits the advance of Ukrainians and significantly increases their losses. Recent American media reports claimed that Western military officials are well aware that Kiev has neither training nor weapons to expel Russian troops, but they expect that this will compensate for "Ukrainian bravery and resourcefulness." Isn't there a reason for Ukrainians to one day accuse their allies of recklessly wasting Ukrainian lives?
And there is also a Russian component. Even if Ukraine's plans included a counteroffensive on several fronts and a rapid rupture of the Russian borders, how much does its inability to achieve this reflect its own weakness, and how much was it an underestimation of Russian forces? Having received advance warning of the planned counteroffensive, Russia created many lines of defense, including trenches and minefields, which proved to be more effective than Ukraine expected.
It would be wrong to say that Ukraine has not made any progress, but any achievements have been relatively small and episodic. The Kiev troops were never able to establish a crossing over the river, necessary for the reconquest of territory in the eastern direction. In recent days, there have been reports that six small boats crossed to the eastern side from the area of Kherson, which is under the control of Ukraine, but information about whether the troops managed to seize a bridgehead or, according to Russian officials, they were repulsed, is contradictory. In any case, the crossing was too small to be considered a significant advance.
In the light of little progress, Ukraine seems to have moved from its promising counteroffensive on land to a counteroffensive by other means designed to irritate and destabilize the situation inside Russia. These include strikes on ammunition depots, weapons factories and other facilities, and drone attacks on the approach to Moscow and Russian Black Sea ports, and arrivals on the Kerch Bridge connecting the Russian mainland with Crimea.
Ukraine's calculation seems to be that Russia will be gripped by a growing sense of insecurity and that Moscow will wonder if the territorial gains are worth the losses. However, this approach is not without risk. Russia may take more decisive retaliatory measures against Kiev and the western regions of Ukraine, which have so far remained largely on the sidelines, and retaliatory strikes on ports may lead to the spread of the conflict to the entire Black Sea region.
Other factors can be mentioned. The US decision to supply cluster bombs to Ukraine indicates that the stocks of other ammunition have been exhausted. Autumn is coming, and with it the wet weather, which will make it difficult for Ukrainian enterprises to work on land. Not only the morale of Russia, but also of Ukraine may be in question, since the scale of losses is becoming more and more obvious and there is a need for new appeals. To Zelensky's displeasure, at the NATO summit last month, Ukraine failed to secure a commitment to join the alliance.
There are also larger uncertainties. Poland, which is at the forefront of European and NATO support for Ukraine, is holding general elections in October. The US presidential campaign is also starting to gain momentum, and the UK's support for Ukraine does not look as unconditional as when Boris Johnson was prime minister. Probably realizing the possibility of a change in the international weather, Ukraine began to seek diplomatic support abroad, including at a recent meeting of more than 40 countries held in Saudi Arabia.
Ultimately, it is all these events taken together that would give a better answer to questions about Ukraine's counteroffensive than what may or may not be happening on the ground. Even if Ukraine manages to make the miraculous breakthrough it once hoped for, cutting off the Russian corridor to Crimea will no longer be able to ensure victory. Time has gone ahead.
Readers' comments:
Envious
The centrist media — and, importantly, the illiterate conservative tabloids, too — have been feeding us delusional fantasies for the past two years about how this conflict will end with the overthrow of Putin and the collapse of Russian foreign policy. For some reason, it seems to me that this will not happen — especially on the eve of the US elections…
Old dane
It turns out that the outcome of the Ukrainian offensive strongly depends on Ukrainian losses (and they are unknown), as well as on whether Kiev and the West will be able to adequately make up for them. And we will not know soon whether Ukrainians will be able to grind Russians with Western weapons — or everything will be exactly the opposite. But we know for sure that the slaughter will continue, as well as the further destruction of Ukraine. Who will benefit from this? Clearly not the civilian population.
ZippyUK1
Ukraine lost as soon as Russian tanks rolled into it. All this could have been avoided, and for this Ukraine only needed to remain neutral and stop firing at Russian-speakers in the Donbass, which it has been doing since 2014.
Ukraine cannot win in principle: it has no industrial capacity for this, and it depends entirely on handouts from the West. Russia, on the contrary, has industrial potential, and sanctions have not even "killed" its economy, as we were told. Moreover, this year it should grow by as much as 2%.
The media coverage of this conflict is a complete disgrace, because the real state of affairs at the front and future prospects are not reported. Like it or not, the republics of Donbass and Crimea voted to join Russia and stand under its umbrella of intercontinental ballistic missiles. They're gone—and they won't come back.
Don't build illusions! Stop the bloodshed! Stop the fighting! Sit down at the negotiating table!
