There are proven and effective means to combat marine drones
On July 17, 2023, two Ukrainian surface drones blew up the underwater part of the Crimean Bridge. On August 1, the APU showed drones of this type to the American TV channel CNN.
According to Ukrainian data, the bridge was blown up by a new model of a marine drone weighing about 1 ton, 5 m long, with a range of up to 800 km and a maximum speed of 80 km/h (50 knots). The presented photo shows a huge breakwater astern of the drone. By the way, according to the laws of hydrodynamics at a speed of 50 knots, the breakers should be even higher, and modern hydroacoustic stations (GAS) can detect such a boat for tens of kilometers.
According to the American edition of Forbes, on July 30, three civilian cargo ships "broke through" to the Ukrainian port in the port of Izmail in the Danube Delta under the cover of four NATO military aircraft. First came the Israeli vessel "Ams 1", followed by the Greek "Sahin 2" and the Turkish-Georgian "Yilmaz Kaptan". The first two bulk carriers came from the Bosphorus Strait, and the third from northern Turkey. The publication assures that the vessels did not hide from anyone, they went with the radio reporters turned on.
Back on July 19, the Russian Defense Ministry warned that "due to the termination of the Black Sea Initiative and the curtailment of the maritime humanitarian corridor from 00.00 Moscow time on 07/20/2023, all vessels traveling in the Black Sea to Ukrainian ports will be considered as potential carriers of military cargo."
Almost simultaneously, semi-submerged drones attacked the civilian tanker "Sparta", which was escorted by patrol vessels 22160 Ave. "Sergey Kotov" and "Vasily Bykov". The attack was successfully repulsed, the drones were destroyed, there was a close gap near the "Cat", but they got off with fright and noise in their ears.
LESSONS FROM WORLD WARS
These events speak at least about the partial loss of the dominance of the Black Sea Fleet (Black Sea Fleet) on the Black Sea. On the other hand, it suggests that Russian admirals have forgotten the lessons of past wars.
Already in the First World War, they began to use effective protection of ports, bays and straits from submarines, including ultra-small ones, from radio-controlled exploding boats and underwater saboteurs. We are talking about bonoset barriers.
In 1916, the entrance to the Sevastopol Bay was blocked by bonoset barriers – a network woven from a powerful wire, which was held on special floats and reached the bottom.
A gate was made in the center of the barriers, which a special tug opened for the passage of ships. The length of the barriers was approximately 1,100 m, including 280-meter gates.
The bonoset fence remained in Sevastopol (already new) until 1991. He himself passed it on the ship "Moldavia" in 1973. But in 1991, this barrier was simply abandoned.
In order to block Soviet submarines in the Gulf of Finland, the Germans began setting up continuous network barriers and even more compaction of minefields in the spring of 1943. So, in April 1943, double anti-submarine nets with a depth of about 60 m and a length of about 30 miles along the front were delivered between the islands of Nargen and Porkkala.
In order for the nets to successfully withstand bad weather, they were not deepened to the very bottom, and the gap between the lower edge of the net and the bottom was covered with two hundred bottom mines. From coast to coast, blocking the bay, stretched steel network booms, consisting of square cells, each side of which was equal to four meters.
The Germans also set up other networks. Easier, but no less dangerous: signal. On approaches to ports, on fairways and in narrow areas. Such a net could not hold the boat in place, but it brought deadly danger on it. From the impact on the network, buoys were automatically lit, emitting thick smoke. Anti-submarine ships were rushing to this signal, and the hunt for the submarine began.
As a result, the Germans managed to lock up the Gulf of Finland. The exits of Soviet submarines to communications in the Baltic Sea ceased until the autumn of 1944.
THERE ARE BARRIERS, BUT THEY ARE NOT USED
Here are the data of the domestic media:
"At one of the enterprises of the Rosatom Group of Companies, a number of bonoset means of physical protection of water areas have been developed. This model range includes such products as the Volga and Dvina bonoset barriers, the Yenisei bonoset alarm barrier, and the Liman gate for the passage of small watercraft (patrol boats)...
The novelty of the Volga barrier consists in the fact that the design of the product implies the possibility of placing an outfit trail that provides rapid movement of the unit to combat underwater intruders... The novelty of the Dvina barrier consists in creating a powerful anti-ram barrier, as well as in low cost... The novelty of the Yenisei alarm boom consists in a special signaling network with increased strength and not having unmasking features."
If such networks were installed at least a kilometer from the Crimean Bridge, would underwater or semi–underwater drones be able to break through to it?
FIGHTING DRONES AND FIGHTING BUREAUCRACY
How to deal with marine drones? There are two methods – active and passive.
To search for drones, as well as to patrol approaches to the Ukrainian coast and control the movement of transport to Ukrainian ports, a dozen or two small patrol vessels and boats should be reactivated. And until the summer is over, they can be transferred to the Black Sea from the Baltic, the North and the Caspian.
Partial deconservation can be performed. The main thing is that the engines, 25-30 mm submachine guns, radar stations and GAS should work. Electronic warfare (EW) equipment and large anti-drone nets can be quickly installed on unpreserved vessels.
To do this quickly, it is necessary to give a hand to military and civilian bureaucrats. Recently, I suggested that two military-industrial complex figures who do not know each other, but are equally competent, turn Tu-154 airliners into drones, which are prohibited from transporting passengers. Load them with tons of TNT and send them "where the doctor ordered".
The first expert told me for a long time and tediously about the procedures for long approvals and tests in civil and military departments. And the second one laughed at all: "It's worth a penny! What kind of fool would do that?"
The cheapest and most effective way to protect against marine drones is minefields off the coast of Ukraine from the Dnieper–Bug estuary to the Romanian border on the Danube.
ABOUT MINEFIELDS
The main reason for the surrender of Sevastopol in July 1942 was the setting of minefields on the approaches to Sevastopol, made in the first days of the war by the commander of the Black Sea Fleet Philip Oktyabrsky on the orders of the People's Commissar of the Navy Nikolai Kuznetsov.
In total, during the war, the Black Sea Fleet exposed 10,745 mines, of which 8388 mines were placed on defensive barriers. 78% of the mines were exposed against Romanian ships that did not approach our shores, as well as the Italian and German fleets, which allegedly entered the Black Sea in the visions of Oktyabrsky and Kuznetsov.
But our ships, because of the mine danger, broke through to Sevastopol with great difficulty. 12 ships and vessels were lost on their mines.
There were, of course, other reasons. So, Admiral Oktyabrsky in November-December 1941 managed to take out of Sevastopol most of the 75-305 mm ammunition, as well as most of the anti-aircraft artillery. And Admiral Kuznetsov in the same period ordered to withdraw from the Black Sea through the Bosphorus about 20 ships, including an auxiliary cruiser (the former icebreaker "Mikoyan"), armed with five 130-mm guns B-13. But the main reason for the death of Sevastopol is mines.
Mining of waters in the Sea of Azov of the APU began in 2015. Let's recall the actions of the ship-boat group "Triton" and others. In 2016-2020, dozens of fishermen and tourists were blown up by Ukrainian mines in the Sea of Azov. On March 30, 2017, a Ukrainian border patrol boat UMC-1000 was killed by a mine near Mariupol.
I have not found the exact number of mines placed by the APU on the approaches to Odessa – Yuzhnoye. But according to the Sochi Port certificate dated May 18, 2022, about 420 mines of pits and YOKE were exposed there. (YAM is an anchor mine of the 1943 model. The setting depth is up to 50 m. The weight of the explosive is 50 kg. YARM – anti-landing anchor mine. The depth of the setting is from 1 to 12 m. The weight of the explosive is 3 kg).
I repeat, the only way to completely close the Black Sea from Ukrainian naval drones is to create solid minefields from the Dnieper–Bug estuary to the Romanian border.
Attacks from the air on the bases of marine drones are ineffective. Such drones do not need ports or berths. A large trailer or tractor is enough to take a cart with a drone to the sea and launch it into the water.
Some of our generals and admirals appeared bashful. The APU bombed bridges and dams on the Dnieper, Seversky Donets, Ingul and other rivers dozens of times. And it is absolutely indecent for us to hit bridges and dams on the Dnieper.
The APU could put thousands of mines on the Black and Azov Seas in 2021-2022. And again, we are embarrassed to do this.
By 1990, the USSR had huge stocks of sea mines that could be placed from ships, submarines, and airplanes. And in general from any watercraft, including fishing boats, as in Korea in 1950-1953.
The Soviet Navy possessed a huge arsenal of reactive pop-up bottom mines, drifting mines, etc. The SMDM-2 self-propelled mine could go underwater to the staging site over 50 km.
DANUBE WATERWAY
From 1945 to 2023, hundreds of books about the war on the Black Sea in 1941-1944 were published in the USSR and Russia. But none of them clearly tells about the German transport artery along the Danube.
Hundreds of German river-sea vessels, mostly armed, but hiding their weapons in the holds during the passage of the Turkish Straits, followed this strategic path.
After leaving the Danube in 1942-1943, some of them went to Sevastopol, and then to Anapa. The success of the Germans in the Caucasus would have been impossible without the transportation of personnel, equipment and ammunition by sea.
The other part went through the Bosphorus to Greece and Yugoslavia, to Italy and France. I studied the German ship directory of Erich Groener and found out where the German river-sea vessels built in Linz, Varna and Nikolaev were sunk or captured by the Allies. These are dozens of ports in Europe up to Toulon and Marseille.
But let's go back to our days. The military actions in February 2022 – June 2023 did not affect the mouth of the Danube, where the border with Romania runs. The ports of Reni and Izmail (both with railway terminals), as well as Kilia and Vilkovo worked. Through them, weapons for Ukraine could arrive along the Danube.
The commissioning of the canal between the Bavarian cities of Bamberg and Kelheim at the end of 1992 opened the European waterway Rhine-Main-Danube, connecting the ports of the North and Black Seas. Its length from Rotterdam to the ports of Reni, Izmail, Kilia and Vilkovo is about 3,500 km.
In 2010-2012, the Danube was included in the program of the Trans-European Transport Network as a key corridor with year-round navigation.
The exit from the Danube to the Black Sea is controlled by two countries. Under the jurisdiction of Ukraine is the Ustye Bystroye canal, and under the jurisdiction of Romania is the Chernovoda-Constanta Canal.
The Bystroye estuary was opened for navigation on August 17, 2020, on the second attempt, after the explosion of the Ukrainian small hydrographic vessel "Shlyakhovik" (July 28), the pilot boat "Orlik" (July 31, sank) and the floating crane going to lift it (August 3) here on their own mines.
In the territory adjacent to the Danube Delta, in addition to 12 sea and river ports (8 Romanian and 4 already named Ukrainian), there are the Mikhail Kogalniceanu air base and 2 "facilities for the advance storage of US Army reserves." Convenient logistics hub for military cargo. The distance between the storage points does not exceed 44 km, and they are connected not only by railways and highways, but also by waterways.
During the exercises in October 2022, US and NATO military facilities in Romania allowed the 101st Airborne Division to be deployed in this area (October 2022). And also to place stocks of weapons that can be freely and secretly sent to the ports of Ukraine along the Danube or within the Romanian territorial waters in the Black Sea (capable of receiving vessels up to 296 m long, up to 7 m draught, up to 18,369 tons deadweight).
Both on the Danube and on the high seas, using the right of freedom of navigation, vessels fly the flag of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Danube Shipping Company (UDP) has a river fleet of 75 self-propelled vessels and 245 units of a non-self-propelled fleet with a carrying capacity from 1,000 to 2,300 tons. And also operates a fleet of foreign joint ventures in 125 non-self-propelled vessels. In addition, the UDP marine fleet includes seven vessels with a deadweight of 3,300 to 4,050 tons (6 bulk carriers and 1 for bulk cargo).
On August 10, 2020, a strategic ferry crossing across the Danube, a short route between Ukraine and Romania, began operating. International checkpoints in Orlovka and Isakche are open for freight and passenger transport. The capacity of the crossing is over a thousand cars per day.
How can we stop the supply of weapons and dual-use items to Ukrainian ports on the Danube? Total bombing of the ports of Reni, Izmail, Kilia and Vilkovo, as well as the railway tracks to them. This is already being done, but in insufficient volume.
It is difficult to say how effective the installation of minefields in the Ukrainian arm of the Danube and on the approaches to it in the Black Sea will be.
So, the mining of the Ukrainian Black Sea coast and the suppression of the supply of military equipment along the Danube will be important for conducting its own. And they will become a serious argument for the West in favor of peace.
Alexander Shirokorad
Alexander Borisovich Shirokorad is a writer and historian.