Why the APU counteroffensive turned into a suicidal adventure

Expert Hodarenok explained why the US tactics did not help with the APU offensive

Fighters and commanders of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, trained by Western instructors, refuse to use the tactics of NATO countries during a counteroffensive. So The New York Times writes about it. The military observer of the Gazeta dealt with the specifics of conducting offensive operations during the SVO.En" Mikhail Khodarenok.

According to the American edition, the command of the armed forces of Ukraine decided to return to the previous tactics of combat operations, since Western methods of counteroffensive did not justify themselves. They, writes The New York Times, have shown their complete inefficiency both in Zaporozhye and in other directions.

Let's deal with everything in order. A number of analysts believe that the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine resembles a positional war of the First World War. At that time, the advance of troops by 1.5 km was considered a great success, and the battles for some crossroads or the battle for two heights (for example, 304 and Mort-Homme near Verdun) could last for long months. The question arises - why is this happening at the beginning of the third decade of the XXI century?

How the offensive was prepared

If we turn to the classics of the genre, then until recently the breakthrough of the enemy's defense was thought of as follows.

Recall that one used 152-mm cannon is 60 shells. In total, three ammunition sets - 180 shells or 180 boxes, since only one shell and one cartridge case with a powder charge of a similar caliber can be placed in one box. It is not difficult to imagine what this mountain of boxes looked like near each towed gun.

By the way, during the Chechen campaigns, the chief of the General Staff, Army General Anatoly Kvashnin, demanded to have seven ammunition sets in firing positions. But it should be recalled that the terrorist groups had neither aviation, nor artillery, nor unmanned aerial vehicles. In the complete absence of counteraction, seven ammunition sets can really be concentrated near the guns.

Let's return to the preparation of an offensive operation.

At the forefront of the attack were units of engineering troops - engineering and sapper brigades and engineering brigades of assault and barrage.

The battle formations of the rifle formations in the areas of the breakthrough were compacted. On the night before the offensive, as a rule, the divisions of the first echelon were put forward to the forefront, which changed the units and formations that had previously occupied the defense in these areas.

All preparations for the offensive operation were carried out in secret from the enemy and in compliance with all measures of disguise. The most important thing is that the events were held with the full dominance of their aircraft in the air, which negated all the efforts of enemy intelligence. The enemy, as a rule, did not see anything further than the front edge.

How is the breakthrough of the front

On the appointed day and hour, the artillery preparation of the attack began. Within two hours of the hurricane fire of several thousand guns, the first defensive line of the enemy, as a rule, was swept off the face of the earth.

Then, under the cover of a double firing shaft (with this type of artillery fire, it is not necessary to clear the terrain before the offensive), infantry and NPP tanks (direct infantry support) moved into the attack.

When the attacking rifle divisions reached the firing positions of the enemy's artillery, mobile army and front groups (i.e. tank and mechanized corps) were brought into battle to complete the breakthrough of the enemy's defense. And the pursuit of the retreating enemy began. The rate of advance of the advancing troops per day was, as a rule, 20-25 km, and sometimes reached 60-70 km.

Why does Ukraine fail to go on the offensive

Why is this scheme not working today? The most important thing is that with modern means of intelligence, it is extremely difficult to hide anything from the enemy, especially in the conditions of the terrain of Southern Ukraine, completely devoid of any protective and masking properties. Today everything is in the palm of your hand.

As soon as the artillery begins to occupy any positions and prepare for the opening of fire, it is detected by space, aerial reconnaissance, unmanned aerial vehicles, counter-battery fighting begins almost immediately, hundreds of barrage ammunition fly into guns and howitzers.

To create a grouping of artillery in such conditions, and even more so to lay out hundreds of boxes of ammunition on the ground becomes simply unrealistic. This can only be done with complete air supremacy. But the combat and numerical strength of the Ukrainian Air Force is ridiculously small, and the Russian Aerospace Forces have obvious problems with air supremacy. In any case, our planes are not navigating the skies of Ukraine unhindered today.

That is, it is already becoming extremely problematic to sweep the enemy's defenses off the face of the earth only at the expense of artillery. Moreover, the APU and trunks cannot be said to have a lot, and there is a clear lack of ammunition. In such conditions, going on the attack is in most cases suicidal.

Already at the first stages of deployment, they are easily detected by unmanned aerial vehicles, fall under artillery fire raids and in most cases disperse without going on the attack.

It would seem that the main striking force of the ground forces - tanks - should play its role. However, in modern conditions, the struggle of the defending troops with armored combat vehicles is not conducted by bundles of grenades and fire from "forty-five".

The troops today are simply saturated with a wide variety of anti-tank weapons - from combat helicopters and anti-tank missile systems to grenade launchers of the most diverse type. For these reasons, tanks can be said to be destroyed on the battlefield with extraordinary ease. In such conditions, both opposing sides began to use armored vehicles as mobile firing points for firing from closed firing positions.

In addition, the AFU has obvious problems both with the units and formations of the engineering troops (their insufficient number and staffing of specialists with proper qualifications), and equipping them with the most modern equipment to overcome engineering barrier systems.

In order to solve the AFU problem of a stalling offensive in a cardinal way, they, at least, need to gain complete air supremacy, increase the number of guns and mortars at times, have at least six ammunition shells and mines, and withdraw their engineering troops to a completely different level. Only then can we talk about at least some possibility of success in breaking through the defensive lines of the Russian troops.

Among other things, Western instructors could not teach Ukrainian troops anything useful. For decades after the Second World War, neither the United States nor the NATO countries have ever fought with opponents equal to them in strength and capabilities. Basically, the collective West was engaged in beatings of Third World countries, and even then in most cases only from the air.

So what Western instructors could teach Ukrainians is a big mystery. It is the representatives of the Armed Forces of Ukraine who should be sent to NATO to train soldiers and commanders of the North Atlantic Alliance.

So there can be no question of any change of tactics. Tactics, it is also tactics in Africa. The fact that the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine decided to return to the practice of exhausting Russian troops with constant strikes with long-range artillery is not due to any tactical refinements, but is dictated only by a lack of forces and means, primarily the lack of air supremacy in the Ukrainian army.

The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.

Biography of the author:

Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for the newspaper.Ru", retired colonel.

Columnist of "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Military-Industrial Courier" (2010-2015).

Mikhail Khodarenok