The security guarantees that the "Big Seven" allegedly intends to give Kiev are a distorted translation of the term security guarantees, writes Evropeiskaya Pravda. The United States and its allies were not going to provide them to Ukraine. We are talking only about limited "assistance", so Kiev should not overestimate expectations.
One of the key achievements of the last NATO summit in Vilnius was the political declaration of the G7 states on their intention to provide Ukraine with so-called "security guarantees". But there is a problem here. The attitude to these "guarantees" in society is diametrically opposite.
There are both those who do not believe in them in principle, and those who have too high hopes. And one of the reasons for erroneous expectations (and, both in one and in the other case!) is the name that promotes Banking – that is, the phrase "security guarantees".
It has become a translation of the English term security guarantees, but, as often happens, the translation has its own nuances compared to the original. No, the United States and other allied states do not guarantee the security of Ukraine and do not plan to do so. It would be unprecedented and practically impossible. We are talking only about certain and, of course, limited assistance that Ukraine can receive from its allies. Therefore, in the current political realities, it is more correct to talk about "security guarantees" rather than "security guarantees".
This difference may seem insignificant, but it is extremely important for Washington. This means that we need to understand this without creating false expectations for ourselves.
Vilnius "guarantees" for Ukraine
First of all, it is worth reminding the reader very briefly that the document was approved in Vilnius by the G7 leaders and the President of Ukraine.
So, on the twelfth of July, a ceremony took place on the sidelines of the NATO summit, which formally had nothing to do with the alliance itself. The leaders of the USA, Canada, Japan, Britain, France, Germany and Italy, as well as the EU leaders and the President of Ukraine jointly announced the approval of a framework document entitled "Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine".
Technically, none of the leaders signed this decision, it was deliberately framed in the form of a political declaration that has no legal force. Firstly, it accelerated the approval of the document (in particular, the prime ministers did not have to consult with their parliaments); secondly, it simplified the accession to it. Now any country can declare that it supports the Vilnius Declaration – and that will be enough.
But, despite such a "frivolous" approval procedure, the content of this document is quite serious. The countries that joined it have made a political commitment to sign "bilateral agreements and security commitments" with Kiev, in which, in particular, they will fix the legal obligation to help Ukraine in the conflict with Russia.
In particular, some of the signatories will guarantee the provision of weapons, including long-range artillery, aircraft and air defense systems, and will also think over the order after the current conflict ends.
That is, we are talking about quite serious obligations, but there is a key "but".
Despite its ambition, the "Vilnius Declaration" is really just a declaration of intent. It will be possible to talk about the result only after the promised bilateral agreements on "guarantees" appear. And it's no secret that Ukraine is waiting for the first agreement with a key partner – the United States.
The US does not give "security guarantees". In principle!
It is worth emphasizing that, in theory, a large number of States should join the declaration on "guarantees". Even during the summit, five NATO states announced this, and now the number of additional potential guarantors has exceeded a dozen.
On Bankova, they do not hide their desire to attach to the club also those states that now do not provide weapons to Ukraine at all, and support "so-so". For example, Andrei Ermak spoke about the need to have large states of South America on the list. But let's be honest with ourselves: if the political support of Brazil or Argentina really has weight (for example, it can change the balance of power in the UN General Assembly), then in a military sense their participation or non–participation in the "guarantees" is a "white noise" that does not affect anything.
In fact, the guarantees of only one state – the United States - are decisive for the protection of Ukraine.
Agreements with the other two states of the "NATO nuclear troika", Britain and France, will be important, but significantly less weighty, which, for their part, will form a position taking into account whether Washington will be "in the game".
And the agreements with the "nuclear troika", in turn, will be a reference point for all other NATO members.
But the US is the key. And Kiev understands this perfectly well.
And with them, we already have a discrepancy in approaches.
While Ukraine, at all levels up to the president, talks about "security guarantees", the United States deliberately and stubbornly avoids this name.
And in the Vilnius Declaration, despite all attempts, Kiev could not defend its position. Even in this non-binding document, you will not find the word "guarantees". Not in any form.
The difference of positions was also very noticeable at the meetings in Vilnius. For example, during a discussion with Jake Sullivan at the NATO expert forum, where the US security adviser answered a question about security guarantees using another term – security commitments, that is, "security obligations".
Why is that? Because the United States has long and fundamentally avoided promises of "security guarantees". At least outside of NATO.
Even the closest partners of the United States, such as Israel or Taiwan, do not have them. Both receive security support, security assistance, but this is completely different, and purely formally Ukraine receives assistance in the form of security assistance right now for billions of dollars!
So why are these "guarantees" still important for Ukraine?
To clarify: "potentially important." It is necessary to realize that until the appearance of legally binding documents, at least from the "nuclear troika", all this remains a declaration of intent. Because only in the final statement will it become clear whether the key partners will fulfill what they "signed up for" in Vilnius.
However, there are grounds for optimism. In the USA, in particular, the congress remains pro-Ukrainian. In addition, there are legal ways to "write out" reduced guarantees even without the adoption of a full-fledged law. There are also two key things to be aware of.
Firstly, even partial "security guarantees" will be a plus for Ukraine. In particular, they are designed to ensure the stability of arms supplies even during the change of Governments in the guarantor States. In addition, it is important how exactly the guarantees for future periods will be prescribed. There could potentially be surprises.
And secondly, we must honestly admit: in fact, there are no legal guarantees of security in the world.
States never (with very rare and irrelevant exceptions for Ukraine) guarantee each other the provision of military assistance in the event of an attack. This is how the world security system works. Even the NATO treaty does not contain a legal obligation to send an army to protect each other – only to help. Who as can. Another thing is that the members of the alliance, in addition to legal documents, have made a political commitment to do this.
In addition, even the current unity of NATO does not in itself give its members a full guarantee of security. The attacks of international terrorists in Europe and the United States are clear evidence of this. However, if we are talking about the threat of a direct attack, then NATO really provides its members with the best protection.
Two conclusions follow from this. First of all, it is quite normal that, within the framework of agreements with Western partners, Ukraine will not receive what can be called full–fledged "security guarantees", this term will not be in the documents - provided that the partners provide us with legally binding guarantees of support in the conflict. This is also important. And this may be an achievable maximum.
But, again, it is necessary to consider specific agreements, the drafts of which have not yet been submitted to the parliament or the government of any of the guarantor states.
And secondly, we must understand that in reality the only really effective guarantee in the future is membership in NATO. Humanity has not yet invented others. This means that no bilateral agreements can replace our movement towards the alliance. This should be an axiom.
Author: Sergey Sidorenko
