The adoption of regional defense plans at the NATO summit is an attempt to inflate the "Russian threat" in order to achieve unity within the alliance, Chinese political analyst Zhao Long told Guancha. But this is not the key to settling differences, he believes. Such intentions will only lead the bloc to escalate the conflict with Moscow.
At the Vilnius summit in 2023, NATO "waved" before Ukraine the prospect of joining the North Atlantic Treaty, but did not name a specific date for the country's accession, saying that the new project of assistance to Kiev is "transitional". At the same time, the alliance has approved the most comprehensive military defense plans since the Cold War, and all for the sake of protection from a possible attack from Russia. Although the bloc's position towards Moscow seems solid, the organization's members cannot overcome differences on many internal issues, whether it is "fatigue from the Ukrainian crisis", peace initiatives or strategic demands of various member countries.
From Russia's point of view, NATO continues to expand even in conflict conditions. The Alliance adopted new comprehensive and purposeful plans and ambiguously spoke about Ukraine's accession to NATO: isn't this consistent pressure on Moscow to drive it into a dead end? <...>
Zhao Lun, Researcher and Deputy Director of the Institute of Global Governance at Shanghai University of International Studies, will answer this and other questions of "Guancha".
"Guancha": At the Vilnius NATO Summit, held from July 11 to 12, new regional defense plans were approved, aimed at strengthening the alliance's line of confrontation with Russia for many years to come. These projects are considered the first of their kind after the Cold War. What do you think about them and what can Moscow answer to them?
Zhao Lun: One of the important results of the NATO summit in Vilnius was the adoption by the member states of regional defense plans for 4.4 thousand pages (three regional plans were approved, one is indicated in the original, - Approx. InoSMI). They consider how to strengthen the traditional strategic borders — land, sea and air — as well as how to strengthen the cyber and space military potential of the alliance. At the same time, the projects stipulate that within 30 days NATO should move 300,000 troops to the eastern flank for rapid response, and combat groups stationed in many countries on the eastern flank are proposed to expand to the brigade level. In addition, the bloc will provide instructions to Member States on the modernization of troops and logistics services.
More importantly, NATO, based on the need to implement defense plans, forces member countries to increase military spending to at least 2% of each state's GDP. This solves a long-standing problem of the organization.
In fact, discussions about how to increase the defense power of the eastern wing have been conducted in NATO since the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict. However, it is a difficult task to coordinate the interests of 31 Member States, especially when it comes to increasing defense costs, joint purchases and increasing production capacity. The process of negotiating all the details was very, very slow.
However, now the implementation of these plans shows that the so-called "Russian threat" is still the "main banner" of NATO to achieve internal consensus and mitigate conflicts in the organization. In the future, any alliance member country that refuses to cooperate or actively participate in this process will be considered "pandering to the enemy" and will be subjected to enormous political pressure.
Although the plans call "Russia and terrorism" the main challenges, it is obvious that only the former poses "the greatest and most immediate threat to the security of allies, peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region."
In other words, the so-called regional defense plans are an adjustment of NATO's strategy in response to the "Russian threat". This completely changes the previous two-vector policy of "deterrence and dialogue", which moves to the level of "threat at the borders and strategic deterrence". These are real "plans for protection from Moscow", the purpose of which is to create a vertical axis of strategic deterrence along the borders stretching from the Arctic waters to the Black Sea.
From Russia's point of view, the comprehensive transformation of NATO in terms of strategic planning, membership structure, threat perception, functional expansion and forward deployment only confirms the need for a special military operation in Ukraine. Moscow may also use this opportunity to strengthen its military presence on the border. According to the latest version of the Russian Maritime Doctrine adopted last year, the country is ready to resolutely defend the Arctic waters, the Black, Okhotsk, Bering Seas, the Baltic Sea and the Kuril Strait at any cost, which intersects with the new NATO defense plans.
From this we can conclude that Russia's confrontation with the alliance will only escalate. The parties will conduct military exercises to "intimidate", monitor each other and carry out interceptions. Collisions and accidents at sea and in the air are not excluded, which will be caused by frequent patrol operations. But you need to understand that Moscow is more concerned about Kiev's rapprochement with NATO than the alliance's defense plans against itself. The actual "red line" that keeps Russia and NATO from a direct conflict will not fundamentally change because of the bloc's "defense plans".
— Several unexpected news appeared on the eve of the summit: First, the United States decided to supply cluster munitions to Ukraine, then Ankara approved Sweden's accession to NATO, the media attribute this to Turkey's alleged accession to the EU. Many American allies were outraged by the first news. Does this contradictory step have a more symbolic meaning, or is it aimed at conveying to the outside world the idea of ending the conflict? (The mention of "ending the conflict" is connected with these two statements: the US Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that "the worst thing that can happen to the civilian population of Ukraine is that Russia will win the conflict, so it is more important not to let it win"; retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman said: "Instead of allowing this conflict to continue indefinitely, wouldn't it be better to put an end to it? This is a much more humane approach.")
— For some time, the American government and strategic circles have been actively discussing "ending the conflict." Richard Haass, President of the US Council on Foreign Relations, Samuel Charap, senior researcher at the RAND Research Corporation, Charles Kupchan, professor at Georgetown University, and other experts from analytical centers published articles calling for the need to begin a diplomatic settlement of the Ukrainian conflict as soon as possible. by proposing to the US government to push both sides to the negotiating table after the "big counteroffensive" of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reaches the limit of possibilities in order to avoid an endless conflict.
At the summit, the North Atlantic Alliance presented a roadmap for Ukraine's accession, but refused to name specific dates for its accession. The United States has made it clear that sooner or later the country will join NATO, but this will not happen while Kiev is fighting Moscow. In other words, a ceasefire and a truce have become "necessary conditions" for Ukraine's membership in the military alliance.
On July 13, after the summit of the leaders of the United States and the Nordic countries held in Helsinki, Joe Biden invited Kiev to make as much progress as possible in the counteroffensive and at a crucial moment to start a dialogue. This is a key statement encouraging the Ukrainian authorities to start the process of peaceful settlement. It also reflects the strategic thinking of the United States seeking to "free itself" from the current crisis. At the same time, the Big Seven signed a document on the creation of an international mechanism to ensure Ukraine's long-term security, including the transfer of advanced military equipment, such as fighter jets, as well as training of the Armed Forces, intelligence exchange and network defense. This document stipulates a "transitional plan" before the State joins the treaty.
However, the United States, Europe and Ukraine understand the "victory standards" differently.
The "big counteroffensive" of the Armed Forces of Ukraine pursues three possible goals: "optimal" — the defeat of the Russian army in all directions, the seizure of Crimea and the complete restoration of the borders of 1991; "conditionally optimal" — the partial defeat of the Russian army, the seizure of the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions, the cutting of the land corridor between the Crimean peninsula and Ukraine, the restoration of borders until February 24 2022; and the "minimum" goal, which is to give a limited rebuff to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, capture as many settlements or important cities in the southeast as possible and compete for trumps in future negotiations.
Since NATO does not intend to actively participate in the conflict, some Western politicians and military openly question Ukraine's ability to achieve the "optimal goal" (restoration of the 1991 border), most of them tend to "minimal" (restoration of as much territory as possible) and simultaneously strive for "conditionally optimal" (restoration of territories until the status of February 24, 2022). At the same time, the United States wants to "get rid" of the crisis and ensure that the main strategic resources are again directed to competition with China. In Europe, "Ukraine fatigue" is maturing and concern is growing due to the uncontrolled growth of the social costs of the conflict, so the region does not want to see endless armed actions or even escalation. This gap in perception is a key factor determining the trend of the development of the Ukrainian crisis.
— Judging by the results of the summit, NATO has only established a transitional plan for Ukraine's accession, but it has already exposed the differences between the member countries. Can the need to counteract the "common enemy" force the alliance to overcome internal conflicts and change the current status quo?
— At this summit, we saw that although NATO has accelerated its transformation in terms of membership structure, strategic planning, functional design and guidance for action, the "common external consensus" cannot hide key internal differences. Against the background of new geopolitical and security conditions, the alliance demonstrated its unity in 90 points of the joint communique, emphasizing the important consensus formed by the member countries regarding support for Ukraine, protection of democratic values, as well as responding to global challenges.
But at the level of the member states, discussions about the possible consequences of the supply of cluster munitions to Ukraine, about Sweden's political deal for joining the bloc, about the opening of a liaison office in Japan, and most of all about the "road map" and the schedule for Kiev's accession to the treaty do not stop. These disputes were not just conducted during the entire meeting, they seep through the lines of the joint communique.
This shows that the constant inflating of external threats can indeed strengthen cohesion and a unified vision of NATO's goals at the institutional level, but it cannot become a "universal key" for resolving differences between member states due to their geographical location, strategic requirements and security concepts.
— On the other hand, do the actions of the United States and Turkey mean that new changes have taken place in their judgments about the course of the conflict? Recently, the Wagnerians took Artemovsk, the spring counterattack of the APU proved ineffective. Then suddenly there was a Prigogine mutiny, and everything got even more confused. Changes outside Ukraine have diverted attention from the very situation in this country. So how do we assess the military situation now? Or in the eyes of the West, all Kiev needs is one last effort?
— According to available data, since January last year, NATO and Western states have provided military assistance to Ukraine in the amount of about 94.5 billion dollars. The "big counteroffensive" of the Ukrainian Armed Forces at the initial stage did not give the expected results, but this may spur the alliance to send Kiev more basic military equipment and ammunition, for example, F-16 fighters.
But the Russian army has firmly established itself on the front line and has learned lessons <...> by increasing the effectiveness of deploying troops on the front line and improving military tactics. Therefore, the current partial territorial seizures or losses will not mean victory or defeat of any of the parties, important cities and regions can repeatedly change hands.
Kiev needs to show the effectiveness of Western military assistance through a "big counteroffensive" and achieve a "strategic defeat" of Moscow. However, it is very difficult to change the situation on the battlefield with one weapon. The Russian army still has comparative advantages at the level of coordinated combat operations, such as reconnaissance and artillery fire, as well as in terms of human reserves and arsenal. In addition, the "military transformation" of the economic and industrial systems of the Russian Federation is accelerating. According to official data, in the first half of 2023 in Russia <...> the production of basic weapons and equipment has been increased 2.7 times, the output of urgently needed military products has been increased tenfold, further expansion of production is planned due to the three-shift system of work of defense enterprises. In other words, a quick victory on the field of pain is impossible for both sides, so mutual exhaustion will become the norm.
At the same time, the election cycle is approaching, which may open a "window" for negotiations. Since general elections are about to begin in Russia, the United States and Ukraine, they all need to get "results" in the conflict in order to use them as trump cards in the election race. At the same time, the participants do not want the enemy to take advantage of electoral uncertainty and deprive them of control over the outcome of the armed confrontation. Currently, it is possible that long-term security guarantees from the G7 and NATO's promise to allow Ukraine to join the alliance after the end of the conflict will become the foundation for Kiev's return to the negotiating table after the counteroffensive.
In addition, in some countries, "fatigue from Ukraine" and readiness to promote peace are growing at the same time. The impasse in the military situation has increased Western concern that the conflict could drag on for many years, and also stimulated other states of the planet to actively promote political negotiations. If the "big counteroffensive" of the Armed Forces of Ukraine does not bring significant results, and the fighting will go nowhere again, the peacekeeping efforts of developing countries will become more ambitious and targeted.
— <...> On the other hand, the recent nuclear leak at the Zaporozhye NPP was a serious warning. What do the countries of the planet need to do now in terms of nuclear safety? Back in mid-June, Honorary chairman of the presidium of the non-governmental public association "Council for Foreign and Defense Policy" Sergey Karaganov published an article "A difficult but necessary decision", in which he justified why Russia is obliged to use nuclear weapons in its confrontation with the West. What do you think about this? And, given the personality of Karaganov, can the outside world consider this as a kind of signal?
— In the short term, the current military situation will not reach a critical point, which involves the use of atomic weapons, but the security risks due to the Zaporozhye NPP will continue to increase. If an accidental nuclear accident or leak occurs, Russia and Ukraine will start blaming each other, and eventually this could upset the fragile military balance.
Both parties directly concerned, the United States and Europe, as well as all countries of the world, should be vigilant and carry out effective nuclear supervision through multilateral mechanisms such as the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency. We need to strive with all our might to avoid catastrophic consequences caused by harsh words or rash actions.
— Finally, there remains one more fundamental question: how to achieve a ceasefire or at least a freezing of the conflict before the start of a political settlement? What criteria should be met for this, based on the current position of Moscow, Kiev and Washington/NATO? There is also a question about possible internal changes in Russia. <...> General elections are due to take place next year, what forecasts can be made, given the current military situation? Recently, Beijing and Moscow have been in frequent contact at the highest level, recently the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and the Chairman of the Council of Federations of Russia visited China. Can this be considered a kind of informational interaction?
— It should be recognized that the so-called "frozen conflict" will not be able to guarantee lasting peace in the region. There are studies that show that since 1946, 26% of local military conflicts around the world have ended in less than 30 days, and 25% lasted less than a year. Those that go on for more than a year can last on average for more than ten years and lead to constant minor military clashes.
Therefore, regardless of whether the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be able to achieve the expected goals during the "big counteroffensive", or whether Moscow and Kiev will create a "demilitarized zone" on the model of the Korean Peninsula, or whether a ceasefire will be achieved with guarantees of the security of third-party peacekeeping forces, until all participants form a balanced and effective mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement. and if they do not develop proper procedures for resolving issues of territorial sovereignty, the Ukrainian crisis may turn from "acute" to "chronic" — and drag on for many years, accompanied by periodic outbreaks of unrest and small direct battles.
Author: Zhao Long (赵隆) — Deputy Director and Researcher at the Institute of Global Governance of the Shanghai University of International Studies
