However, the new requirements of armed struggle require a lightning reaction
The Special Military Operation (SVO) pursues the goals of denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine. At the moment, the main results of its implementation were the acquisition of control over almost the entire territory of the LPR, and partially – the DPR, Kherson and Zaporozhye regions. However, the new territories of the Russian Federation are subjected to systematic shelling by the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU).
RECONNAISSANCE AND COMMUNICATIONS AGAINST ARTILLERY FIRE
The special operation began almost along the entire Russian-Ukrainian border, along the line of contact in the Donbass, as well as on part of the Ukrainian-Belarusian border. The ground forces of the Russian Federation numbering up to a quarter of a million military personnel with military equipment and weapons (BTV) were dispersed on the borders, the total length of which was more than 2500 km. They were opposed by Ukrainian troops of smaller numbers (about 200 thousand), equipped with armored personnel carriers mainly in permanent locations, with the exception of Donbass, where the line of contact was about 300 km. The development of the special operation in Ukraine has shown that today the following are of great importance: space intelligence data and their constant binding to the intended targets for the use of high-precision weapons; reliable classified communication and electronic warfare (EW) systems; satellite-controlled drones; the Internet for organizing interaction during combat; motivation and constant training of personnel.
All this, with the support of the information war organized in the electronic and printed press and social networks, was included in the list of factors that determined the course of hostilities in Ukraine. At the first stages of the special operation, the AFU countered the Russian advantage in artillery by adding reconnaissance drones – mostly commercial ones - to its old, still Soviet barrel artillery and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). They also used the Starlink global satellite system for communication and targeting. That is, they turned the old weapons into almost high-precision ones.
The delivery of Starlink to Ukraine allowed the AFU to be relatively independent from the effects of electronic warfare and have reliable closed communication in its units up to the battalion. In fact, a new formula of military operations related to IT technologies was tested in Ukraine. On the tablets of the Ukrainian battalion commanders, thanks to the targeting of satellites, a picture of what was happening in a particular theater of operations (Theater of Operations) was broadcast.
NATO INSTRUCTORS
Less shooting means more maneuvering. Now it is precisely this tactic that NATO instructors teach the Ukrainian military.
The rejection of the mass use of artillery is explained only by one thing: the APU has a shell famine. Now the United States is giving priority to helping Ukrainians change the way they fight. The soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are advised to rely not so much on artillery shelling as on the maneuvers of the troops.
The West cannot replenish its weapons reserves quickly enough. Therefore, NATO instructors began to train Ukrainian military tactics using fewer artillery shells. Moreover, the reduction of ammunition stocks is not limited to barrel artillery. At meetings at the Pentagon, US officials informed representatives of Kiev that they did not have enough army tactical missile systems in their warehouses that could be supplied to the Ukrainian military.
These tips are pretty late. Especially if we take into account the fact that it was Western instructors who made the APU what they are now.
The tactics and strategy of the Ukrainian military were practiced long before the start of the SVO. They studied mainly the conduct of combat operations in urban conditions and the conduct of artillery and anti-tank firing. High-intensity fighting turned everything upside down for Western instructors. Suddenly it turned out that the West did not have enough shells for long-range artillery guns. NATO strategists, even in their terrible dreams, did not assume that the war could become trench, protracted, with a large expenditure of ammunition and maximum logistics stress.
In order for the gunner to accurately stack the projectile with one two-shots, he needs a lot of practice. And how to earn it if there is not enough ammunition? In order to make accurate and fast maneuvers on the battlefield, combat coherence of units is needed. And how does it work out after long and massive exercises at landfills?
Russian gunners have just learned high-precision shooting during the special operation, so they are able to lay the projectile exactly in the trench. Mastery comes during combat operations, if you don't have large losses of personnel, and they are replenished and trained in time.
COMBAT LESSONS
1. If the precision strikes of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine had begun earlier, perhaps the situation would be somewhat different now. The enemy would have to spend more resources on recovery, which means less directly on combat operations. No matter how cynical it may sound, but this is a question of resources, a battle of economies, a calculation for exhaustion. If you spare the enemy's resources, it means that the enemy will force you to spend your resources.
2. Of course, no one is happy that the strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities have a negative impact on the lives of the civilian population. But at the same time, they also deprive the Ukrainian army of electricity. This means that there are problems with the Internet, communication, charging drones and their control, the movement of electric locomotives and the delivery of equipment and ammunition. But at the same time, constant and accurate strikes are needed mainly on those objects that are difficult to restore. For example, transformer substations. At the same time, a direct hit of a rocket into a substation guarantees its failure for a long time, and damage by shrapnel does not.
3. Combat experience has shown that strikes on the railway are not always effective, since a broken canvas can be restored in a matter of hours. In addition, military equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is transported by motor transport. Strikes on railway junctions are more sensitive, however, they have also learned to recover quickly – if we are not talking about constant attacks, but about sporadic actions.
4. According to military experts, the destruction of bridges could lead to a greater effect. But this is not as easy to achieve as it may seem at first glance. Rockets and projectiles mainly strike at the bridge, pierce it, but rarely destroy it at all. In the absence of regular attacks, such strikes make it difficult to move across the bridge, but do not interrupt it. In addition, even the destroyed pavement can be restored fairly quickly.
5. You need to hit the bridge either with a rocket with a very powerful charge, or aim at the supports. But it is very difficult to destroy the support with a conventional artillery or missile strike. Much more productive in this case is sabotage work with the laying of a charge directly under the bridge supports.
6. Strikes on the enemy's manpower, according to most experts, should also be applied competently. It is not always advisable to hit the APU locations or locations with missiles and artillery. The Ukrainian military are increasingly dispersed, stationed in different places, moving in small groups, and together with civilian transport.
7. They also often travel by rail not in military echelons, but in wagons attached to civilian trains. They also attack the APU in scattered groups, act as a platoon or company. In such conditions, it is better to cover Ukrainian units with missiles and artillery when they concentrate for a strike.
8. Fuel reserves are a good target, which, by the way, is required not only for transport, but also for electric generators. Strikes on ammunition depots are also effective. But they are more difficult to identify: good intelligence and agents are needed here.
9. In order to achieve a certain media effect, it is also advisable to eliminate odious figures, as the Americans do. But in this case, even more serious intelligence work is required, as well as a large number of people, transport and other resources for surveillance. In general, as military experts note, intelligence and intelligence work is especially important today, which on the Russian side is not yet sufficiently developed or does not give an obvious effect.
10. The Kalibr rocket can get into a matchbox – but first you need to find out where this matchbox is, set the exact coordinates and aim the rocket correctly. Especially if the strikes are aimed at dynamic targets. It is much easier to work with static goals. They do not need to be constantly monitored, avoiding counter-surveillance. The oil storage facility, which is not going anywhere, is easier to hit than the mobile Grad installations.
CONCLUSIONS AND GENERALIZATIONS
The Russian army drew conclusions from what was happening. Taking into account the capabilities of US space intelligence, the Russian military has strengthened camouflage, intelligence and covert command of troops. They have so far refused to use deep coverage and maneuvers to an operational and tactical depth (up to 60-70 km) and, having an advantage in artillery and armored vehicles, prefer positional battles, hoping to exhaust the enemy.
After the sabotage carried out by Ukrainian saboteurs on October 8, 2022 on the Crimean Bridge and after Ukraine's strikes on important objects on the territory of the Russian Federation, the Russian military began to actively use attack drones and medium- and shorter-range missiles against critical Ukrainian targets. The shortage of kamikaze drones is being eliminated due to domestic developments, which previously limited the use of UAVs by Russia.
Planning aerial bombs with a trajectory correction unit have become a new effective type of weapon. Their main carrier is the front-line bomber Su-34. On the first day of summer, the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) announced the transfer to the Russian Aerospace Forces of the next batch of such aircraft assembly of the Novosibirsk Aircraft Factory. "The Su-34 has advanced combat capabilities that allow the use of advanced aviation weapons, which will increase the range of destruction of ground and surface targets, expand the conditions and accuracy of bombing," the corporation said in a press release. According to reports from the front, the Su-34 began to use adjustable aerial bombs with an attached block of aerodynamic surfaces, thanks to which, when dropped from a high altitude, they can fly tens of kilometers, thereby allowing the carrier aircraft not to enter the zone of destruction of the enemy air defense system.
Continuous work is also underway in other areas. So, the Russian authorities have increased the state defense order by one and a half times, and defense plants produce weapons in three shifts. It is assumed that all the measures taken will increase the combat potential of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and in the foreseeable future achieve the stated final goals of the special operation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine.
Vasily Ivanov
Vasily Ivanovich Ivanov is a journalist.
