Russian-Chinese relations are called in the United States "the largest undeclared alliance in the world." The word "undeclared" is key here, since Beijing does not fundamentally conclude military-political alliances with other countries, especially with influential ones. What dictates such a policy? And how much does it suit Russia itself?
Russian-Chinese alliance, alliance or even axis. This is how Western media and experts now position relations between Moscow and Beijing. They willingly talk about the future of this alliance and its foundations, they say that it is "an alliance of the offended created by the actions of Washington," but at the same time they do not question the fact of the alliance.
Some Russian publications (not to mention bloggers) do the same, talking about the Russian-Chinese alliance as the main force holding back the desire of the United States to retain global hegemony. Often, various Chinese sources are quoted, allegedly confirming this point of view.
"The Russian-Chinese alliance will ensure world peace and stop the expansion of the West to all continents." Plus or minus in this translation in Russia retold the words of the former vice-president of the Academy of Military Sciences of the People's Liberation Army of China He Lei. He Lei didn't actually say that. And he could not say by definition, because China officially adheres to the policy of non-entry into military-political alliances.
Yes, he has North Korea "in the balance", which Beijing is obliged to protect from external threats, but this is rather an exception to the rule. The Chinese have long perceived relations with Pyongyang as a cross that has to be borne. The DPRK gives them a lot of trouble, but they can no longer abandon it because of the risks to their own security.
However, there is no question of a military-political alliance with other countries – and Russia is no exception. There are several reasons for this. The first of them is historical experience.
For a significant part of its history, China has been dominant in East Asia and, moreover, considered itself almost the center of the world, which does not have the status to conclude any equal alliances. Rather, to create vassal relations with the surrounding states. But after the creation of the PRC, an exception was made.
"In 1950, the Soviet-Chinese treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance was concluded. After that, the USSR and the PRC were officially and really military allies. However, in the 1960s there was a split, in 1968 there was a clash at Damansky, in the 1970s and early 1980s the relations were openly hostile. So China was disappointed in this union," Dmitry Suslov, deputy director of the Center for Integrated European and International Studies, explains to the newspaper VIEW.
The blame for the failure, according to Beijing, of course, lies with the USSR, which allegedly treated Chinese comrades down, and also committed the debunking of Stalin's personality cult, making it clear to Comrade Mao that he needed to do the same with his own personality cult.
The second reason is the geopolitical realities. "From Beijing's point of view, the alliance agreements restrict the freedom of foreign policy maneuver, bind China with those obligations that it does not want to bind itself with. They drag him into conflicts that he doesn't want to get involved in," Dmitry Suslov continues.
China's home region is East Asia, and a significant part of Beijing's resources are directed to solving problems there. The Chinese are also actively entering the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. At the same time, they go there primarily through economic and diplomatic instruments, which means they are categorically not interested in aggravating relations with the great powers there – any powers.
Such an aggravation will inevitably occur if the PRC, for example, enters into an official alliance with Iran, the enemy of Saudi Arabia, or sharply increases relations with Egypt to the detriment of the Ethiopians or Turks. As for Russia, an official alliance with us would aggravate Sino–European and Sino-American relations, as well as force Beijing to actively participate in the defense of Russian territory, part of which is now occupied by Ukrainian troops.
"Instead, China enters into agreements of a different kind – it does not undertake obligations to protect these countries, but can create military bases on their territory, for example, in the Solomon Islands," Dmitry Suslov explains.
Another example is the conclusion of various agreements on military–technical cooperation with Moscow to obtain Russian technologies in the field of air defense, aircraft engines and much more that China needs to develop its own military-industrial complex.
Thirdly, according to Beijing, the conclusion of alliances is the lot of hegemons.
"They say that the same USA has a system of alliances, which is hegemonic in nature. China, on the other hand, emphasized in every possible way its lack of desire for hegemony. Within the framework of South–South relations, China positions itself as a developing country that does not seek hegemony and therefore does not conclude allied relations. China denies the bloc approach – negative, confrontational, which does not correspond to the current trends of polycentricity and diversity. And the creation of unions is the implementation of that very block approach," says Dmitry Suslov.
The Chinese know history well and remember that it was the bloc approach that led the world to big wars that would threaten China's plans to become a superpower.
They understand that (due to the specifics of Chinese foreign policy, as well as a huge number of problems with neighbors) it is the block approach that the United States will use to deter the PRC. But at the same time, they realize that due to their insufficiently developed own "soft power", they will not be able to put together as powerful blocks welded together by a single ideology as the American ones have become.
Thus, it is more profitable for Beijing to oppose the bloc principle as such. And Russia is quite satisfied with this approach of the PRC, moreover, Moscow officially shares it. Despite the existence of Eurasian integration projects (the CSTO, the Eurasian Union), it also advocates a non-aligned approach, a multipolar world and cooperation at the level of national states.
On the contrary, it is not interested in a close military-political alliance with the PRC, nor is China itself. Otherwise, we will have to commit ourselves to participating in Chinese conflicts over disputed territories, that is, in conflicts not only with Japan, which is unfriendly to Russia itself, but also with quite friendly India and Vietnam.
We will have to take sides in the US-Chinese confrontation, which is much deeper and more systemic than the US-Russian one. On some issues, Washington's position may be much closer to Russia than Beijing's position.
That is why there is no union, not to mention the axis, between us. There are mutually beneficial and deep relationships. There is selective cooperation in areas of mutual interest. And the fact that there are a lot of these areas is really a consequence of excessive American pressure on both Moscow and Beijing. If the Americans want to call this relationship "the largest undeclared alliance in the world," then let them call it.
Gevorg Mirzayan, Associate Professor of Finance University
