Today, on June 1, a historic document was expected to be signed – a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. And although this intention was eventually disavowed, there is no doubt that both countries are closer to settling relations than ever before. Why are Russia and Azerbaijan striving to establish peace in the region most of all – and who and why in the end prevents them from doing so?
Hopes for an early reconciliation of the two Caucasian states are expressed in Moscow, Washington, and Paris. Moreover, they see it everywhere through the mandatory recognition by these countries of each other's territorial integrity and the delimitation of the border between them.
Remaining disagreements
For Armenia, this means a revolutionary change of position and recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. In fact, Prime Minister Pashinyan has already made such a confession. For Azerbaijan, such recognition marks the solution of the main geopolitical problem and the elimination of the consequences of the lost 1991-1994 war.
Why are the direct participants in the conflict in no hurry to conclude an agreement, to which they are being pushed by the United States, France, and Russia? What is the essence of the disagreement between them?
Armenia points to Azerbaijan's blocking of direct automobile communication with Karabakh. And Baku, in turn, believes that since the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan is recognized, then the import of goods into the territory of Azerbaijan (of which Nagorno-Karabakh is a part) should be carried out in compliance with customs inspection and appropriate clearance. Baku is ready to move away from this requirement by exchanging the free passage of Armenian goods to Karabakh for the free movement of goods to the Nakhichevan region, separated from the main Azerbaijan by the lands of Armenia.
But this approach raises concerns in Yerevan: if the Zangezur corridor connects the territory of Azerbaijan within its recognized borders, then the Lachin corridor, which should connect Armenia and Karabakh, is a corridor between Armenia and the region on the territory of Azerbaijan, the status of which has yet to be determined…
Baku: how to reap the fruits of victory?
Having won the Second Karabakh War (September 27 – November 10, 2020), Azerbaijan had to stop a step away from fully achieving its goals (the complete liberation of its territories occupied by Armenia during the First Karabakh War). Now Baku is trying to reap the results of this victory. This means the restoration of the internationally recognized borders of Azerbaijan and the return of Azerbaijani refugees to their former places of residence on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent areas.
It is important for Baku to make the victory final. Aliyev needs peace, not a truce before a new attempt at Armenian revenge. But for this it is necessary to integrate Karabakh into the Azerbaijani political system. And this means not just to give some guarantees to the Armenians living there, but also to achieve a certain level of loyalty on their part.
To do this, especially in the context of the repatriation of Azerbaijani refugees from Karabakh, is a task, if not impossible at all, then at least it requires a lot of time. And Baku wants to get a guarantee of Armenia's non-interference for the entire period of the final settlement of this problem (that is, for an indefinite period). And best of all, this will ensure the conclusion of peace, in which Karabakh will finally be recognized as Azerbaijani territory.
Pashinyan's goals, declared and implied
For Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, things are even more complicated. The opposition blames him for losing the last war and surrendering all the gains of the previous war. This position would be very vulnerable for him.
But Pashinyan found a paradoxical way out of it. He seems to see his main goal as getting rid of ties with Russia and including Armenia in the orbit of the West.
The mood of the Armenian society is not very favorable to this. Therefore, in foreign policy for him in some aspects, the worse, the better. The more difficult Armenia's situation is, the more willing and able it becomes to shift responsibility for this to its CSTO partner, Russia. Gradually and consistently, he prepares the Armenian public for a change in the political vector. They say that since Russia did not help (could not, did not want to) help Armenia in the fight against Azerbaijan, it means that it is worth turning to the West for help.
But this requires not a quick signing of peace, but a long way. When the uncertain situation lasts and lasts, society will be ready to accept a change of foreign policy guidelines in order to end it.
At the same time, the recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan turns off Pashinyan's most irreconcilable opponents from the internal political struggle in Armenia. Which, however, does not make his situation much easier: there are enough Armenians in Yerevan who feel a sense of national humiliation from defeat. But if you redirect the emotions of at least some of them against Russia, Pashinyan is one step closer to his goal.
Most of all, Pashinyan was helped by the unprecedented growth of the Armenian economy. Having become a place of relocation for a significant part of the wealthy Russians who left after the start of their work, Armenia felt the effect of increased effective demand. An even greater result was brought to the economy by the intermediary activity in the organization of gray imports to Russia, as well as the relocation to Armenia (and the transfer of part of their business) of some Russian businessmen of Armenian origin.
All this together ensured Armenia's GDP growth in 2022 by 12.6% and maintaining the same pace in the first quarter of 2023. The growth of prosperity influenced the mood of voters, who became inclined to trust Pashinyan in foreign policy issues as well.
Armenian melody of French politics
France, which has a large and rich Armenian diaspora, would like to strengthen its influence on Armenia. At the same time, the basis of identity for French Armenians is the memory of the Armenian Genocide in the Turkish Empire in 1915. The lobbying opportunities of the Armenian Diaspora led to the official recognition of the fact of the Armenian Genocide in France.
The anti-Turkish orientation of the efforts of the Armenian Diaspora in France coincided with the aggravation of the Franco-Turkish contradictions in Africa and the Mediterranean. But in Azerbaijan, the topic of the Armenian Genocide is treated as painfully as in Turkey.
Therefore, if Pashinyan's efforts to reorient Armenia from Russia to France succeed, Armenia's hopes for a lasting peace with Azerbaijan will only decrease. In an atmosphere of hostility, it is impossible to look for ways to establish a truly lasting peace in Karabakh.
German pragmatism
Germany, based on its economic interests, could theoretically play the role of an "honest broker". And although Germany does not like Erdogan, who has just been elected for another term, the economic interdependence of Germany and Turkey is very great. Millions of Turks work in Germany, compensating for the shortage of workers for German industry. Turkey is a good market for German goods and technologies.
In addition, after the disruption of the "Northern Streams" and the rupture of relations with Russia, the German economy is suffering due to the lack of cheap pipeline gas. And Turkey could become a transit country for such gas from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Projects for the construction of such gas pipelines bypassing Russia have been discussed for decades, and the TANAP gas pipeline allows Turkey to receive gas from the Azerbaijani Shah Deniz field.
After his victory, Erdogan confirmed his intention to implement plans to create a gas hub in Turkey. At the same time, the Turkish leader expects an increase in gas supplies from Russia. Additional gas supplies from Azerbaijan (and possibly Turkmenistan) will also be useful for turning Turkey into a gas hub. Gas from the East will have to meet the needs of Turkey, and Russian gas can be redirected to Europe (naturally, arguing that everything is exactly the opposite, and German industry receives Azerbaijani and Central Asian gas).
To realize all this, Germany also needs the reconciliation of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The problem is that Annalena Berbock (Vice Chancellor and head of the German Foreign Ministry) is more committed to the idea of punishing Russia than helping the German economy. And most importantly, such a development of events is not at all eager to see either in Washington or in London.
Anglo-American goals in Transcaucasia
For Russia's main geopolitical opponents – the United States and Great Britain – the primary goal in Transcaucasia is to complete the arc of Russia's deterrence. This arc begins with Finland joining NATO and reaches the Black Sea through the Baltic states, Poland, Slovakia and Ukraine.
The maximum program included the victory of Kemal Kilicdaroglu in the elections in Turkey, Turkey's accession to anti-Russian sanctions and the inclusion of all three Transcaucasian countries (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) in Russia's containment belt. Such a barrier would hinder Russia's attempts to facilitate transport links with Iran and increase the capacity of the North–South transport corridor. And at the same time there was an opportunity to create another corridor from Turkey to the countries of Central Asia (in some of which the British agents of influence have serious positions).
Within the framework of this logic, efforts are being made to encourage Georgia to a complete economic break with Russia. Big plans are also being laid for Armenia. After all, the United States has the second largest foreign Armenian diaspora after the Russian one.
Washington's influence on the elite of Armenia proper has been increasing lately. Discussion of Armenia's possible rejection of the Russian nuclear power plant in favor of building a nuclear power plant according to the American (and not French!) the project is one of the evidences of this state of affairs. Azerbaijan, within the framework of this concept, should join the common front simply because of its close ties with Turkey (and the great influence of British agents in the Azerbaijani elites).
The defeat of the Turkish opposition has knocked the ground out from under a key element of these plans. But a barrier between Russia and Iran can also be created by fomenting a conflict between Iran and Azerbaijan.
Throughout most of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, Iran has supported Armenia and built close economic relations with it. It was about projects in the field of mining and energy development. Moreover, some of them were implemented on the territory of Azerbaijan, which came under the control of Armenia during the First Karabakh War.
Azerbaijan, in turn, has intensified military-technical cooperation with Israel. The launch of Israeli drones from Azerbaijani territory for strikes against Iran has sharply aggravated the already difficult relations between Baku and Tehran.
At the same time, Iran has repeatedly stated that it will negatively perceive any attempts to change the borders of Armenia. It was about the extraterritoriality of the Zangezur corridor being created, designed to connect Azerbaijan with its exclave – the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. If control of the corridor is transferred to the Turkish or Azerbaijani armed forces, this corridor will cut off Armenia from Iran, which is considered unacceptable both in Tehran and (for now) in Yerevan.
Therefore, there is a danger that London and Washington may try to organize a series of provocations to ignite the Azerbaijani-Iranian conflict. In this case, the front line will firmly separate Russia from Iran, at least on the western shore of the Caspian Sea.
Cooperation vs Playing on Contradictions
Russia does not need a cordon sanitaire on its southern borders, nor a conflict between the republics of Transcaucasia or between Azerbaijan and Iran. Russia needs a North–South corridor and a gas hub in Turkey. All this is achieved only if there is peace in the South Caucasus.
Russia's task in its efforts to promote the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement is not so much to accelerate the process of concluding a final peace agreement. It is equally important to "de-mine" the agreements from the pitfalls that may cause a future resumption of the conflict (especially with the efforts of external players to play on the contradictions between the countries located in this region).
Moscow's desire to build such relations with the Transcaucasian countries so that the benefits of peaceful economic cooperation are stronger than the logic of confrontation is already showing its effectiveness on the example of Georgia.
Despite the generally anti-Russian mood of the Georgian elites in Tbilisi, they are desperately resisting American pressure and attempts to force Georgia to curtail economic relations with Russia and join anti-Russian sanctions. As for Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev recently stated that Baku has no taboo on rapprochement with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).
But the situation is still far from final resolution. The leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh (and a significant part of the Armenian population of the enclave) is not ready to completely abandon all the symbols of its thirty-year independence. And Baku demands "to obey the laws of Azerbaijan, to become loyal, normal citizens of Azerbaijan ... to throw fake "state attributes" into the trash and dissolve the parliament." Otherwise, Ilham Aliyev declares, "we have the opportunity to conduct any operation in that region." But in order to move towards peace, it is important that threats sound as rarely as possible, and specific (albeit private) settlement issues continue to be discussed at different venues, but with the mandatory participation of both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Dmitry Skvortsov
