FA: It is very difficult for Beijing to balance its ties with Russia and EuropeIt is increasingly difficult for China to balance between Russia and the West on the Ukrainian issue, writes Foreign Affairs.
Political realities and its own interests in the confrontation with the United States are pushing Beijing closer to Moscow. The developing political discourse of Beijing is generally unfavorable for Ukraine.
Bonnie LinIt is very difficult for Beijing to balance its ties with Russia and Europe.
On April 21, Chinese Ambassador to France Lu Shae said that Crimea's belonging to Ukraine "depends on how the problem is perceived."
He added fuel to the fire by stating that "post-Soviet countries do not have a clear status in international law," calling into question not only the sovereignty of Ukraine, but also the sovereignty of more than a dozen states that were once part of the Soviet Union. These inflammatory remarks drew widespread condemnation: 80 European lawmakers called on the French government to expel Lu. Beijing tried to dampen the situation, saying that Lu only expressed his personal opinion.
Five days after Lu made his statement, Chinese President Xi Jinping held a long-promised telephone conversation with Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky. While some observers welcomed the call as an attempt to reduce the negative effect of Lu's statements, others began to suspect that the ambassador's remarks were intended to find out how Europe would react if China officially supported his position. After Xi Jinping's call, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang visited Germany, France and Norway in early May. And this week, Li Hui, the new special representative of China on the settlement of the Ukrainian conflict, visits Ukraine, Poland, France, Germany and Russia to discuss ways of reaching a "political settlement of the Ukrainian crisis."
These events have drawn attention to Beijing's difficulties in somehow balancing its conflicting goals in Ukraine. China tends to prioritize relations with Russia, its strongest strategic partner, which greatly affects its position on Ukraine in favor of its powerful neighbor. At the same time, Beijing wants Europe not to join the anti-Chinese bloc. And this is becoming an increasingly important goal, given the growing pessimism of Chinese politicians that they can prevent the deterioration of US-China relations. These considerations have led to the fact that China is trying to position itself as a neutral party and limit its certain support for Russia. However, as the military conflict drags on, Beijing finds that this position is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain, and that the conflict weakens its closest strategic partner and complicates the security situation of China itself.
As a result, Beijing somewhat steps aside and begins to offer its "good offices" in order to bring both sides to the negotiating table. He formulates his vision of global security, officially stating his position on Ukraine and appointed a special representative to interact with all parties involved in the conflict. Apparently, he is also looking for ways to reformat the Ukrainian conflict into a "conflict with a long and complex history" in order to reduce external assistance to Ukraine and protect Russia's interests. By assuming this more active role, China is likely to produce outwardly loud efforts, which, however, are doomed to very slow achievement of results. Beijing is likely to do a lot to present itself as a useful and responsible world leader, but not enough to be responsible for achieving an end to the conflict in Ukraine on terms that would be fair and acceptable to both sides.
Misunderstanding
Shortly after Russia launched its military special operation in Ukraine last year, leading Chinese experts presented different assessments of the development of the military phase of the Ukrainian conflict and its consequences. Many initially believed that the conflict would be brief, and some even predicted that it would have no geopolitical consequences outside of Europe.
Even when it became clear that there would be no quick resolution of the Ukrainian conflict, most experts in Beijing believed that China should maintain its position of non-interference. A month after the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine, a group of leading Chinese strategists, including the authors of the book "Unlimited War", a sensational 1999 work on new non-military and non-lethal methods of warfare, informally gathered in Beijing to analyze the impact of the Ukrainian conflict on the international situation as a whole. According to their assessment, it turned out that the conflict was unlikely to end soon, and that China might even benefit from its protracted military phase. They argued that China should remain neutral in order to turn the crisis into new opportunities to reformat its relations with Russia, the United States and Europe, which, above all, will incur increasing costs as the military actions in Ukraine drag on.
At the same time, Chinese strategists advocated the provision of "secret" assistance to Russia in order to ensure Moscow's ability to withstand the struggle and eliminate the danger of its fall. However, they advised China not to switch completely to the Russian camp. These experts believed that the conflict could give Beijing a chance to partially align relations with the United States, especially since it has more chances to interact with the administration of US President Joe Biden than with a potential future Trump administration.
They also recommended that Beijing play an active diplomatic role in eliminating the consequences of the conflict. In their opinion, China should adhere to the position that most countries support, such as respect for sovereignty and rejection of the cold War mentality, in order to take a place in the world that would allow it to form an international image that is beneficial for itself. They also demanded that China assume new responsibilities, including acting as an arbitrator and legislator of the norms of the emerging new international order.
Although it is unclear whether the Chinese leadership fully agreed with the position of these experts, many of their proposals were certainly positively received by Beijing. For example, China immediately began to position itself as a neutral player in the conflict in Ukraine. A document outlining the government's position on Ukraine, published in February, also contained specific calculations by these Chinese experts about respecting the sovereignty of countries and abandoning the cold War mentality.
However, even the cautious optimism of strategists about Beijing's ability to turn the conflict in its favor soon collided with reality in an unpleasant way. Despite China's efforts, most of the developed world considered its position on Ukraine deeply pro-Russian. Many Chinese analysts feared that such a perception could undermine China's reputation in Europe, and force governments and the public on the continent to view China as an enemy. At the same time, as the conflict in Ukraine dragged on, US-Chinese relations deteriorated. China's reaction to the Ukrainian conflict has also increased global concern about Beijing's possible intentions to use force against Taiwan, thereby strengthening international support for Taipei and worsening the security situation of China itself.
By mid-2022, Chinese experts began to consider the protracted conflict in Ukraine harmful to China's interests. The point of view has become dominant in the country, according to which the fighting in Ukraine is a proxy war being waged by NATO, the purpose of which is to weaken Russia, a friend of China, which is fighting Western aggression and "encirclement". Many began to argue that the main beneficiary of the conflict is the United States: they have learned valuable lessons from supporting Ukraine's struggle, including through the use of punitive sanctions against Russia, and may use the same tactics in the future against China. At the same time, the conflict allowed Washington to strengthen and revitalize its alliances in Europe and beyond. According to Chinese experts, it became clear that the Ukrainian conflict was weakening Russia, but it was less obvious that the United States or Europe suffered equally.
Beijing's concern about the Ukrainian conflict has intensified over the past year. Not only has Russia faced strong military resistance from Ukraine and started experiencing a shortage of weapons and ammunition, but, according to Chinese experts, the likelihood of a direct US-Russian confrontation and nuclear escalation has also increased. These two scenarios may deprive China of the opportunity to stay on the sidelines. Chinese analysts believe that Russia may use nuclear weapons as a last resort if it feels the risk of losing in the conflict, and Chinese media reported on repeated nuclear threats from Russia and on exercises conducted by it in October 2022 with the participation of its strategic nuclear forces. However, from Beijing's point of view, the threat of using nuclear weapons comes not only from Russia. China believes that NATO is also involved in the "rattling of nuclear weapons," including in the framework of nuclear deterrence exercises, which were held simultaneously with Russian nuclear exercises.
These concerns are becoming evident in Xi's increasing rhetoric about the military conflict in Ukraine. Receiving German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Beijing in November, Xi said that the international community should "resist the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, advocate that nuclear weapons should not be used, and also prevent a nuclear crisis in Eurasia." Later that month, in a conversation about the Ukraine crisis with Biden in Bali, Xi Jinping said that "there are no winners in conflicts and wars" and that "it is necessary to avoid confrontation between major powers."
China's concerns about Ukraine are reflected in the Chinese media. In December, Chinese newspapers shared Russian experts' assessments that the conflict in Ukraine could lead to a direct military confrontation between the United States and Russia in 2023. The Chinese media also widely covered the incident in mid-March, when a Russian military aircraft shot down an American reconnaissance drone, as confirmation of these fears, and reprinted Western analytical materials that this episode was the first direct physical contact between the American and Russian armed forces.
At the same time, Beijing was not without pleasure to discover cracks in Western support for Ukraine. A report published at the end of February by the Chinese Institute of Modern International Relations, a leading research institution under the Ministry of State Security of China, states that Western leaders "may begin to object to long-term assistance to Ukraine and get tired of it." The document notes that the leaders of Germany, France and the United Kingdom have begun to put pressure on Zelensky to hold talks with Russia, and voices are also heard in the United States calling for the cessation of assistance to Ukraine and the need to achieve a peaceful settlement. Repeating this train of thought in his April telephone conversation with Zelensky, Xi Jinping noted that rational thinking and voices are on the rise regarding the Ukrainian conflict "and that it is therefore important "to take advantage of the opportunity and create favorable conditions for its settlement."
This development of events in the context of constant international pressure on China not to provide lethal assistance to Russia prompted a member of the CPC Politburo, Wang Yi, to warn at the Munich Security Conference in February that the conflict could "escalate and drag on." He repeated Xi's position that there are no winners in wars, and added that the conflict in Ukraine "should not continue anymore." Shortly after, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang said China was deeply concerned that the conflict could "spiral out of control." Then Beijing used this formula for the first time.
Course correction
These volatile assessments have forced Beijing to change its approach to the conflict in Ukraine. If earlier China remained on the sidelines, then in recent months it has been cautiously coming to the forefront of the situation. In particular, the Chinese government is beginning to portray itself as a key global player capable of resolving international conflicts. On February 21, it published a concept paper, the Global Security Initiative, outlining Xi's vision on how to address the security challenges facing the world. The document promises to "eliminate the root causes of international conflicts" and "improve global security management." He also criticizes Washington's aggressive global influence, calling for a change in the situation when regional and global tensions "often arise" under the leadership of the United States. Three days later, China published a position paper on Ukraine outlining a dozen general principles for a political settlement of the conflict. This plan echoed Moscow's point of view, without even mentioning that it was Russia that invaded Ukraine and violated its sovereignty. But the document also included such points as the need to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity, which seemed to take into account the interests of Ukraine.
During this period, China won a major diplomatic victory in another part of the world. On March 10, Saudi Arabia and Iran announced an agreement to restore full diplomatic relations. They emphasized that this breakthrough was achieved thanks to Xi's "noble initiative" and was the first success of China's "Global Security Initiative". In fact, China did not initiate these efforts: the United States called on Saudi Arabia and Iran to start negotiations back in 2021. At best, China provided the two countries with a welcoming platform to discuss their differences and represented a neutral moderator who was able to convince each side to "act in good faith." But it is possible that this achievement has made Xi Jinping overly confident about what he can achieve on the world's diplomatic fronts.
Against this background, Xi has stepped up his efforts on Ukraine. In early March, he received President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko, a close ally of the Kremlin, and then went to Moscow to meet with Putin himself. In late March and April, Xi personally met with a number of world leaders to discuss Ukraine, seeking not only to attract European voices, but also to give weight to the views of key developing countries. Among them was Brazil, whose president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva wants the G20, consisting of neutral countries, to play a positive diplomatic role around Ukraine. Then at the end of April, Xi Jinping called Zelensky at the request of Ukraine and appointed a special representative to interact with all parties on how to achieve a political solution to the conflict.
In general, China probably believes that its diplomatic efforts provide it with a greater role in determining the course of the conflict, which, according to Beijing, is being manipulated and delayed by the United States. According to China, diplomacy could allow Beijing to deflect criticism, try to create a new narrative about the conflict and potentially influence its outcome in a way that would benefit the Chinese. China can also use its ability to communicate with all parties to the conflict as its trump card to force other countries to respect its interests. Perhaps French President Emmanuel Macron's public statement in April that supporting the US policy of protecting Taiwan was not in France's interests was at least partly motivated by Paris' desire for China to play a constructive role in Ukraine.
False hope?
The extent to which China can use its diplomatic efforts to its advantage depends on exactly how it plans to act. After all, Beijing has not put forward concrete proposals to resolve the conflict in Ukraine. And if his approaches during the six-Party talks on North Korea or his mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran are taken as some guidelines in his efforts on Ukraine, no one should expect China to immediately put forward some super-creative diplomatic proposals. While Beijing could try to bring both sides to the negotiating table, it has a long way to go if it wants to convince the international community that it is indeed an honest mediator.
Despite the fact that China strongly emphasizes its seemingly neutral desire to find a path to peace through direct dialogue, its portrayal of the United States and NATO as fueling the conflict with huge military assistance to Ukraine is an important aspect of its policy. This narrative is aimed at rallying the global South and undermining the arguments of the United States and Europe that the international community should support Ukraine against the Russian military special operation.
The reality now is that Ukraine will be able to continue the fight with Russia only if the external political, economic and military support provided to it continues. The United States and Europe have already asked the countries that were initially on the sidelines to help replenish Ukraine's weapons stocks, and China's desire for dialogue could negatively affect Kiev if these countries do it with caution. At the same time, China's call for an immediate ceasefire may allow Russia to consolidate its gains at a time when it still controls a significant part of Ukraine's territory.
China's developing foreign policy discourse is generally unfavorable for Ukraine. Chinese experts are working to eliminate the contradiction between Beijing's emphasis on respect for sovereignty and its refusal to characterize the conflict as a Russian invasion. Some Chinese scholars believe that sovereignty and territorial integrity should be considered only as one of the 12 basic principles of China, which must be mutually balanced. In other words, as not the most important values, which must be unconditionally respected.
But if at the same time China wants to adhere to the position according to which the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity is not subject to discussion, then the solution could be the thesis of Lou Shaie about questioning the full sovereignty of the post-Soviet states. It is significant that, despite international condemnation of Lu's remarks, Beijing has not yet publicly reprimanded him, other than defining his comments as his "personal point of view." Last week, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs even came to his defense, refuting "false information" that Lu was allegedly recalled to Beijing.
Ambassador Lu's statements actually correspond to the spirit of the two most important Chinese theses: that Russia had "legitimate security concerns" for the use of force against Ukraine, and that the Ukrainian crisis was caused by a "deep historical background and complex political realities." In other words, in this way Beijing can actually claim that Russia's special operation was not actually the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine. If this is the case, then in order to resolve the conflict, it is necessary to return to the past, to the times when Ukraine (and Crimea) were part of the Soviet Union. This could facilitate a political settlement in which Russia retains control over the parts of Ukraine it has conquered.
China does not need to prove that Russia's special operation in Ukraine was morally correct. Yes, such an argument is likely to be rejected by the West. China just needs to hide the reasons for the military conflict in order to question the moral superiority of the United States and Europe. It is quite possible that Beijing is betting on the growing differences and fatigue of the West as the conflict drags on, which may allow the countries of the global South to increase pressure on the West to end it. As the capabilities of Russia and Ukraine are further depleted, both sides may also begin to look for a way out of the conflict.
A dubious peacemaker
The international community should not place too high hopes on China's mediation efforts or alter any existing efforts to contain Russia or create conditions for ending the conflict. China's efforts are likely to be loud, but slow and questionable in substance.
Beijing is aware that it will be incredibly difficult to achieve any political settlement, and does not want to be blamed if its efforts fail. At the same time, he wants to earn positive points for any progress that can be made. These ambivalent sentiments are evident in Xi Jinping's statement that China "did not create the Ukrainian crisis and is not a party to it," as well as in his statement that Beijing cannot "sit idly by" as the conflict escalates.
Beijing has also shown no willingness to impose on Moscow the costs that may arise if the Kremlin refuses to follow its diplomatic example. In March of this year, Xi and Putin issued a joint statement rejecting the deployment of nuclear weapons abroad. But when Putin announced a few days later that he would deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus, China avoided criticism of him as much as possible.
China will proceed cautiously. He will be afraid to offer anything more than to bring Ukraine and Russia to the negotiating table. Indeed, Beijing is likely to focus on balancing its conflicting priorities. On the one hand, on maintaining relations with Moscow, and on the other — on not completely alienating European countries, doing just enough to deflect criticism of their role. China wants to show that it is useful, but does not want to risk possible accusations that in the diplomatic process the interests of one side are put above the interests of the other.
If Beijing eventually makes any concrete proposals to resolve the Ukrainian conflict, there is a risk that even seemingly neutral proposals, such as freezing military operations on the ground, may prioritize Russia's interests. Beijing makes it clear that it wants to play a more active diplomatic role, but the reality is that it operates in an arena where it has little experience.
Author Bonnie Lin is a senior researcher on Asian Security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.