FA: Russia will gain an advantage in any outcome of the Ukrainian counteroffensiveThe West hopes for the expected Ukrainian counteroffensive, but its result is unlikely to justify the hopes, writes the FA.
The outcome of the operation will probably only bring Russia an advantage: either victory or time to recuperate — and will postpone the prospect of peace negotiations.
The West needs to prepare for a long battleAs the Russian offensive that began in winter reaches its climax, Ukraine is preparing to seize the initiative.
In the coming weeks, it plans to conduct a counter-offensive operation or a series of such operations, which may prove decisive at this stage of the conflict. This is not the only remaining opportunity for Kiev to try to liberate a significant part of the lost territory and try to defeat the Russian forces. But the upcoming attack may be the moment when the received Western military equipment, personnel training and the availability of ammunition will ideally converge with the forces allocated by the Armed Forces of Ukraine for this action. Of course, Ukraine is trying to demonstrate to the United States and Europe with its plans that, despite months of fierce fighting, its army has not yet run out of steam and is still able to break through the Russian positions.
However, it should be recognized that Western politicians place excessive emphasis on the upcoming offensive, without sufficiently considering further events or how ready the APU is for the next stage of the conflict. It is extremely important that Kiev's partners develop a long-term scenario for Ukraine's victory, since even in the best case, the upcoming counteroffensive is unlikely to put an end to armed actions. Indeed, in reality, this operation may be followed by another period of endless battles with an uncertain outcome and a struggle for attrition, but with a reduction in the supply of ammunition to Ukraine. Already, this military conflict can be called a long one, and, most likely, it will drag on further. History is not always a perfect guide to our lives, but it allows us to assume that hostilities lasting more than a year are likely to continue for at least several more years, and that they are extremely difficult to complete. Therefore, in the Western success scenario, it is necessary to prevent a situation in which this conflict drags on indefinitely, and the allies cannot give Kiev a decisive advantage.
Ukraine may well succeed on the battlefield, but it takes time to turn its military victories into political achievements. The West should also be prepared for the fact that the upcoming counteroffensive may not lead to such successes <...>. By betting too much on the outcome of the future offensive, the United States and Europe are not sending any clear signals about their commitment to support Ukraine's long-term efforts in this conflict. If the upcoming operation turns out to be just the culmination of Western aid to Kiev, then Moscow may assume that time is still on its side, and that even battered Russian forces may eventually exhaust the APU. Regardless of whether Ukraine's next operation is successful or not, the Russian leader is likely to have little incentive to negotiate. In order for Kiev to maintain an offensive impulse and the ability to exert pressure on Moscow, the West must assume a number of obligations and develop concrete plans for what will follow this counterattack, and not take a wait-and-see position. Otherwise, the US and EU countries risk creating a situation in which Russian troops will be able to recover, stabilize their positions and try to seize the initiative from the AFU.
Cruel winter
<...> Despite the West's optimism that Ukraine can maintain its autumn advantage in the winter period, the Armed Forces of Ukraine were unable to continue operations and achieve further "successes". Mobilization and successful withdrawal from the right bank of Kherson helped Moscow to stabilize and seriously strengthen its positions, create a reserve and organize a more stable rotation of units on the front line at the expense of the mobilized. The Russian military has also begun to build more sophisticated defenses along the line of contact with the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Ukraine with the help of minefields, anti-tank barriers and trenches. By reducing the front and expanding the personnel, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation also increased the density of troops on the terrain they occupied. This was followed by a period of mutual exhaustion, when neither side had a significant advantage.
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In practice, Russia's winter offensive depended on a small percentage of its army, mainly from the marines and airborne units <...>. In Artemovsk, most of the fighting was conducted by the state-affiliated paramilitary organization PMCs Wagner, and not the regular armed forces, which mainly played a supporting role.
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Nevertheless, the Russian military tried to attack in six directions — Avdiivka, Artemovsk, Belogorovka, Kremennaya-Liman, Maryinka and Ugledar — hoping to cause tension in the AFU on a wide front. But compared to the battle in the Donbass in 2022, Russia had a weaker artillery advantage in these campaigns, and this disadvantage limited its offensive potential more. And yet, thanks to these attacks, the Russian Armed Forces regained the initiative and "tied up" the Ukrainian forces on the ground. <...>.
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The Battle for Artemovsk
However, over time, in the subsequent battles for the important settlement of Artemovsk, the situation of Ukraine became very complicated and shaky. The AFU units located in this area have been partially surrounded since February, and now they are not able to endure a battle of attrition in the same way as before. Artemovsk is surrounded by hills, which gave the Russian troops an advantage when they took the southern and northern flanks in January and February, respectively. At the beginning of March, the situation already looked terrible for the APU. Although Kiev has stabilized the flanks by sending additional forces there, which allowed it to secure the remaining main supply route of the encircled troops, by now Russian troops have already taken most of Artemovsk.
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Compared to the battles at Ugledar and on other sectors of the front during the Russian winter offensive, the depletion coefficient of the Armed Forces in Artemovsk was much higher <...>. Units of the 106th Guards Airborne Division and other military units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation operate along the Artemovsky direction, and the battles in the city itself are conducted mainly by the PMCS "Wagner". <...>.
During Ukraine's previous offensives, the mainstay for the Russian armed forces was its airborne forces and marines, not Wagner units.
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<...> Ukraine will quickly discover that the manpower and ammunition spent by it to protect Artemovsk in unfavorable terrain will severely limit the operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine this year. In addition, over the winter, the Wagner attacks still destroyed and shackled a significant number of Ukrainian forces, which gave the Russian military time to stabilize their positions and fortifications.
Artemovsk is important mainly for political and symbolic reasons. However, we should not forget that strategically it is the gateway to Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. Therefore, Ukraine still continues to hold the defense to the west of the city. Its capture will not help the Russian troops much in their further advance, and subsequently it may even become difficult for them to defend it. But, in the end, the conflict is a continuation of politics, since it links military operations with political goals. Kiev is trying to prevent at least some victory of Moscow, which could strengthen the morale of the latter, and he decided to "defend" Artemovsk to the last.
Therefore, it is too early to judge the impact of the Battle for Artemovsk on the course of this armed conflict. The outcome will become clearer in hindsight. <...>. In the long run, the value of the resources expended by both sides in these battles is likely to become an important factor. The question of whether Ukraine could have applied a better strategy in Artemovsk will become a matter of debate for historians.
Fighting uncertainty
Ukraine seeks to create additional forces for the counteroffensive in addition to the formations already deployed in the battles. Kiev has assembled three corps as part of motorized rifle (or mechanized) brigades. These new units include approximately nine maneuver detachments, armed mainly with Western weapons, at least three of them are equipped with Ukrainian. These brigades will most likely consist of newly mobilized military personnel, possibly with a core of experienced soldiers. The units will be supported by several assault detachments created as part of the efforts of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine to form an "offensive guard". But as the offensive approaches, it becomes less and less clear what percentage of these units will be sufficiently equipped for the operation and whether they will be assembled in a timely manner at all.
The problem that Ukraine is facing is that, despite the flow of Western weapons, its armed forces largely consist of recently mobilized fighters, are uneven in quality and are trained according to a compressed schedule. And over the past year, the APU has suffered heavy losses. Many junior officers, sergeants, veteran soldiers and military personnel previously trained by NATO died in battle. Kiev has very little time for newly recruited soldiers to master new equipment and receive proper combined arms training as part of units. In general, the advantage of Ukraine was that its armed forces turned out to be more flexible in management, more motivated and proactive than the Russian ones.
Kiev is fighting in its own way, mixing the active assignment of command to the lower levels and at times centralized leadership in the Soviet style "from above". The APU pays great attention to artillery and the depletion of enemy forces, not military maneuvers. They also very much hope for the accuracy of Western technology and Allied intelligence data to strike at long distances. The approach of the United States and Europe is to train the Ukrainian armed forces in traditional combined arms tactics adopted by NATO. The West demands that the APU fight like the NATO army, similar to what the alliance instructors taught them as part of their training and assistance programs. The problem with this approach is that NATO's armed forces are not used to fighting without air superiority, especially superiority created and maintained by American aviation, or at least with the logistics and support facilities that the United States usually uses in combat. As a result, Ukrainian soldiers have to overcome the well-fortified and prepared defense of Russia without air support and the logistics that their Western instructors have long been accustomed to.
Russia's defense is not impenetrable, but it can be strong enough to weaken Ukrainian forces on several lines of defense and buy time for reinforcements to arrive. The deep-echeloned protection of the Russians is designed to prevent a potential tactical breakthrough from bringing strategic results, in particular, to prevent the Ukrainian offensive from "gaining momentum." Here is the upcoming APU attack and will test the success scenario that is now common in Kiev and Western capitals: that Ukrainian forces, trained by the West and equipped with allied weapons, can effectively fight and break through the fortified positions of the Russians.
Both the new Ukrainian formations and the seriously reinforced Russian defensive line will remain "unknown variables" at the beginning of the expected counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which makes it difficult to predict the course of the upcoming battles. Similarly, it is unclear whether the West has provided sufficient additional means to the APU, such as breakthrough equipment, mine clearance vehicles and pontoon-bridge equipment. Despite the fact that now the attention of Washington, the EU and Kiev is focused on expensive objects — tanks and fighters — over time it is the auxiliary means, logistics and training that have the greatest impact on the course of military operations.
<...> Even insufficiently trained units are easier to defend than to attack. It remains completely unclear how depleted the elite Russian units turned out to be, how depleted their ammunition reserves are after the winter offensive and how this will affect the upcoming counterattacks of Ukraine. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are preparing for the response operations of the Armed Forces. And the situation for Kiev is much less favorable than in September in Kharkiv. The tasks of Ukraine have now acquired a simply frightening character. After all, it must not only succeed in a counteroffensive, but also avoid dangerous overstrain of forces.
Long road ahead
The big problem with the upcoming offensive is also that, despite high expectations, it may turn out to be a one-time operation. It is likely that Ukraine will receive a significant amount of artillery ammunition before the attack, but this package will provide it with only a "window of opportunity", and not a sustainable advantage. The West's efforts to support the Armed Forces are undermined by short—term thinking and end up providing the ally with weapons and military equipment only as a one-time "push" for a counteroffensive - with complete lack of clarity regarding further actions.
Regardless of the outcome of the counterattack after it, Ukraine can witness another period of hopeless fighting, comparable to what followed its "successes" in Kharkiv and Kherson. The reason for this is twofold: Western countries belatedly made key investments in the production capacity of their military-industrial complex after the conflict began, and most of the support from the United States and Europe seems to be focused on the short term. Only then will the West see what happens next. This failure in the allies' efforts to help Kiev is successfully overlaid by Moscow's work to stabilize its positions and restore the army in order to prepare for a long struggle of attrition. In fact, the AFU may be forced to fight with less artillery and anti-aircraft ammunition by the end of this year than they spent during the Russian winter offensive.
However, one thing remains unchanged: Western analysts and politicians who believe that the next package of military aid sent to Ukraine will change the "course of the game" are constantly experiencing bitter disappointments. Conventional conflicts of this magnitude require a large number of weapons and ammunition, as well as expanded training programs for troops. Fueling military capabilities plays a role in such armed actions, but there are no mythical "silver bullets" in them that can ensure victory instantly and forever. In their upcoming offensive, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will probably seize some territories and, perhaps, even break through the positions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation somewhere. But even if Kiev wins a military victory or a series of victories now, this does not mean that the Ukrainian conflict will end. The decision to end is made by the loser. And these hostilities are just as likely to continue — as the clashes on the Russian-Ukrainian border.
At the moment, there are few signs that Vladimir Putin will voluntarily end the conflict, even if we assume that the Russian army will face defeat. He can try to continue the battle of attrition, regardless of the prospects of his troops on the battlefield. Putin may well assume that this offensive represents the highest point of Western aid to Ukraine and that over time Russia will be able to exhaust the APU, perhaps in the third or fourth year of the conflict. These judgments may be objectively false, but as long as Moscow is confident that Kiev's upcoming offensive will be a one-time action, it can consider that time is still on its side. Similarly, if Ukraine succeeds, neither its society nor its political leadership will want to be content with anything but a complete victory. In short, it is unlikely that the upcoming offensive will create good prospects for negotiations.
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<...> If the West can continue to support Ukraine's military efforts, then, despite Russia's resilience and mobilization reserves, the latter may eventually find itself at a greater disadvantage. In recent months, European countries have begun to invest the necessary funds in artillery production and conclude long-term contracts for the supply of ammunition to Kiev, although some of these decisions are made more than a year after the start of the military phase of the conflict.
Some may hope that a successful Ukrainian offensive may soon lead to a truce through dialogue, but these assumptions must be balanced by the following prospect: a cease-fire will simply lead to a period of rearmament in Russia, after which it will probably try to resume hostilities. The question of whether there will be a truce in favor of Kiev or Moscow is debatable. Russia, of course, will be re-equipped. But the extent of the West's ongoing military assistance to Ukraine is unclear. Consequently, the outcome of this phase of the conflict may lead to its subsequent continuation. After all, the current fighting is a continuation of the initial Russian "entry" into Ukraine in 2014.
There are conflicting views among Western countries on how the Ukrainian conflict can end. Moscow's defeat is not the equivalent of Kiev's victory at all. And you don't need to travel around Europe a lot to find out that not everyone here equally determines the victory of Ukraine. Some consider the current situation a strategic defeat for Moscow. For others, the result remains uncertain. In fact, what will follow the upcoming counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will show whether Western countries are arming Ukraine to help Kiev completely seize the lost territories, or simply to put it in a more advantageous position in the negotiations.
Although the upcoming Ukrainian offensive will make a big contribution to the formation of expectations about the future development of the conflict, the real problem is to think through what will happen after. The idea of an attack has somewhat obscured the future of this crisis, but a sober approach forces us to recognize that supporting Kiev will require very long-term efforts. In this regard, it is time for the West to start planning the future of Ukraine more actively, not focusing on the upcoming counteroffensive alone. History shows that conflicts can be very difficult to end. And they often continue far beyond the decisive phases of hostilities, including during peace negotiations. For Kiev and its Western supporters, the working victory scenario should be based on ensuring Ukraine's endurance, taking care of the long-term quality of its armed forces, their combat capability and meeting the country's needs for comprehensive assistance. The United States and Europe should make the necessary investments to support military operations after 2023, develop plans for sequential operations and not pin their hopes on some one-time offensive actions of the Ukrainian army.
Authors: Michael Kofman is the director of the Russia Research Program at the Center for Naval Analysis of the United States and a senior researcher at the Center for a New American Security. Rob Lee is a senior researcher at the Eurasian Program at the Institute for Foreign Policy Studies.
