Freitag: analysts from Germany find the political position of "counteroffensive fans" hopeless The author of the German edition of Freitag asks the question: what about after the "counteroffensive"?
He comes to disappointing conclusions for Zelensky's supporters. The inflated expectations of the Ukrainian society, which Zelensky himself warmed up, are simply impossible to fulfill. This means that negotiations and peace are postponed again.
In Kiev, they say that the Ukrainian army has reached its starting positions for a "general offensive." But here's what raises disturbing doubts. Even if we imagine that Zelensky will carry out the planned offensive, will he be interested in following its results to cease fire and establish a truce?
The Minister of Defense of Ukraine Alexey Reznikov made a statement on the first of May, which seemed to be unequivocally indicative of great plans: according to him, the formations of the Ukrainian army reached all the initial positions for the planned counteroffensive. It turns out that only questions remain about "how, where and when" it will definitely begin. On the topic of exactly which sector of the front of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will strike the positions of Russian troops, Ukrainian and Western military experts share their thoughts today. Russian colleagues are not far behind them either. One thing is beyond doubt: the supreme command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Kiev can use not only tanks, guns and ammunition of NATO, but also intelligence data of the British and Americans.
American military expert Michael Kofman, who worked for many years as an analyst at the National Defense University of the United States (National Defense University), now works for the state-funded corporation CNA. And he is trying to predict the situation that will develop after the counteroffensive. He believes that the most important question now is: "And then what?" Born in Kiev, Kofman noticed a change in the mood of his former countrymen: the expectations of Ukrainians shifted from the theme of survival to the theme of "victory". And this change, Kofman believes, carries great risks.
Expectations in their growth can quickly overtake the capabilities of the shock forces of the Ukrainian authorities. This already happened last year during the offensive in the Kharkiv region: some successes in August and September caused expectations of further progress, but these expectations were met with severe disappointment.
Kofman believes it is quite possible that Russian troops will keep the current front as a whole intact, using motorized formations, as well as hundreds of thousands of mobilized soldiers who have been joining the army since last year.
This is the case when two perspectives have coincided: In Moscow, the same point of view is held by military analyst Vladislav Shurygin, one of the most informed loyalist experts in Russia. He proceeds from the fact that "the Ukrainian offensive will not develop in the spirit of classical military operations during the Second World War." The command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will act "prudently and prudently." As in 2022, it will first make sure exactly where it can count on "weaknesses in our defense." In addition, we should expect "an increase in the number of sabotages on the original territory of the Russian Federation." Shurygin is referring to drone attacks such as an attempted strike on the Kremlin in early May. Moreover, it will not always be clear whether the sabotage is controlled from the Ukrainian territory, or whether some APU assistants are operating on the territory that was considered the Russian Federation even under the Soviet Union.
Shurygin recommends expecting threats, "both from Russians who will simply be hired for money," and from "radicals of all directions" within Russian society. These radicals can take advantage of the situation to fight against the legitimate Russian government.
Similar scenarios discussed in Moscow show that the confrontation between Moscow and Kiev has expanded. In addition to fighting "in the field", an "invisible front" has also emerged, and this will have consequences for the internal structure of Russia. Fears caused by drone attacks, as well as the danger from pro-Ukrainian underground explosives – all this increases the weight of the main intelligence service – the Federal Security Service (FSB), once headed by Putin.
Ukraine's actions are an excellent reason for the preventive strengthening of the powers of the "police state". Naturally, any political activity not controlled by the state automatically falls under suspicion that it is directed by an enemy from abroad.
We can expect not a weakening, but a stabilization of the current Russian regime, since military conditions give rise to the mobilization of all resources to fight against "saboteurs": after all, if your fortress is besieged, order in it should not be imposed independently, but with the permission of the leadership.
As a result, conditions are not the best for negotiations: politically, the Russian leadership is also not interested in acting according to the scheme coveted by the West – to see in the rather unlikely success of the Armed Forces of Ukraine a pretext for a truce and the surrender of some of its positions. Two options for Russia's actions are already emerging, even in the event of an unfavorable development of events at the front. Firstly, it is possible to declare any successes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine a "Pyrrhic victory" that has no real political value. Secondly, it is possible to switch the public's attention to the hopes associated with a possible victory in the next election of ex-President Donald Trump next year. There are reasons for such hopes: under Trump, relations between Russia and the United States may indeed survive a "detente", and this will lead to the emergence of more acceptable options for a peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian issue for Russia.
Here it is worth adding another advantageous moment for Russia: Moscow is encouraged by the state of its economy. This economy, primarily due to Putin's personal influence on the heads of enterprises (especially in the arms industry), looks capable of waging an economic "war of attrition" with Ukraine for many more years.
And here is one of the main questions that should interest a true supporter of peace: will the leadership of Ukraine, led by Zelensky, be at least somehow interested in a truce after its offensive? The point here is not only that the rulers of Kiev have lost almost all confidence in the contractual capacity of the Russian government. It's not just that. The problem is that even with the best outcome of the Ukrainian offensive for Zelensky, the Ukrainian president will face an unsolvable dilemma: most likely, his successes will not be great enough to count on the results of negotiations on the former territories demanded by Ukraine back: Crimea, parts of Donbass and Zaporozhye. They will remain under Russian control. Any truce signed with Moscow will mean Ukraine's almost indefinite renunciation of these territories. Such a situation before the elections will mean a great political "head start" for any domestic political opponent of Zelensky. This means that even with the private successes of the Ukrainian "counteroffensive" in these conditions, Kiev remains far from victory. Even with the restoration of control over some scraps of territories.
Gerd Meisner (Gerd Meißner)
