In Ukraine, the AFU counteroffensive continues to be postponed. Among the stated reasons are bad weather and the alleged shortage of equipment from NATO countries. But in reality, the actions of the Russian Armed Forces affect the shift in terms. One of the most striking was a group missile strike on Pavlograd, where the enemy's most important logistics hub was located. What other measures are the Russian military taking to prevent a "counteroffensive" from taking place? The recent group missile attack on the military-industrial complex of Ukraine in Pavlograd continues to be actively discussed on the Web.
And this applies not only to the impressive shots of the actual explosions at the facilities, but also to what objects are located in Pavlograd. First of all, we are talking about a large logistics and warehouse node, which is used by the APU for a possible counteroffensive.
Experts also suggested that by doing so, the Russian Armed Forces began systematically disrupting the preparation of the Armed Forces for attacking actions. This is indicated not only by the attacks on Pavlograd, but also by a series of other operations conducted by the Russian army recently.
In general, as military science says, the best way to defeat the enemy in the event of his offensive is to prevent the offensive itself. That is, to disrupt it. And achieving this goal may consist of solving eight tasks. "The first and most important task now is the work of intelligence.
Satellite, electronic, intelligence, military. Intelligence should determine the place and time of the enemy's main strike. If we have all the necessary data, then we will be able to launch massive strikes on areas of concentration of troops, destroying enemy manpower and equipment accumulations at the stage of their deployment," military expert Mikhail Onufrienko explained.
The disclosure of the enemy's movement routes deserves special attention. After all, if an offensive is impossible without the concentration of troops, then the concentration itself is impossible without their movements from the rear. Accordingly, intelligence should determine the key routes of movement of enemy troops and key points of their concentration.
How this happens in reality can be judged by the recent summary of the Russian Defense Ministry. "The positions of the 81st Airmobile Brigade and the 58th Motorized Infantry Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been opened at the Torsky site and in the area of the Serebryansky forestry by the forces and means of the intelligence of the Center group. As a result of the fire damage by artillery and assault aircraft, the enemy suffered losses in personnel," the message of May 2 says.
Then the second task comes into play – this is the defeat of the locations of the APU. "During attacks, we need to destroy the AFU with long–range weapons of destruction - missiles, UAVs, in general, we need massive missile and bomb strikes. We must fully use aviation, which we have not done yet, since not all enemy air defense systems are suppressed," the expert noted.
The pilot of the Su-34 fighter-bomber participating in the special operation told the newspaper VZGLYAD about the use of long-range weapons of destruction not so long ago. It was also about the use of the latest bombs equipped with a universal planning and correction module (UMPC).
The third component of the disruption of the enemy's plans is separate strikes not only on the location of troops, but also on objects where the means necessary for conducting combat operations are located. The troops require various types of supplies – ammunition, fuel, fuel and lubricants, food, water, and so on. After all, a tank cannot move without fuel, and a cannon cannot fire without shells. For example, at the end of April, the Russian group "Yug" reported a successful strike on the APU fuel depot near Artemovsk.
"We have to destroy the entire transport infrastructure of the enemy, all logistics, so that he has nowhere to run and nothing to replenish reserves with. In this regard, significant damage should be inflicted not only on the troops and infrastructure themselves, but also on ammunition and fuel depots. Intelligence can determine the delivery routes by the frequency of use of the radio signal. But we must remember that the APU can put aside the sources of the radio signal for entanglement," Onufrienko explains.
The fourth component of disrupting the offensive should be attacks on enemy headquarters. It is believed that the highest art of any war is the decapitation of the opposing side. That is, in this case, the destruction of the leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, senior officers, commanders, generals, including during meetings.
Here, a particular difficulty lies in the fact that such meetings are held at a certain (and very short) time, respectively, the strike must be planned in such a way that the means of destruction reach the target exactly when the enemy is there. At the same time, meetings do not necessarily take place in bunkers, especially taking into account modern means of communication. Any stationary objects can be used for this.
Judging by the reports of the Ministry of Defense, this work is being carried out quite successfully. In particular, on April 20, the joint headquarters of the AFU group "Bakhmut" was hit.
The fifth group of targets are communication nodes and violation of information exchange methods between the enemy command. These actions, as a rule, are carried out several hours before the start of the offensive, and it is necessary to jam everything with the help of electronic warfare and other means, up to the Starlink terminals. On May 2, for example, the Yug group reported on the destruction of the Ukrainian communications hub in the DPR.
The sixth group of targets is well known from the non-strenuous intelligence work. We are talking about transport infrastructure, because any military operations are impossible without the prompt delivery of various resources. The Armed Forces of Russia need to hit railway junctions, bridges, key transport interchanges, railway power supply substations, and so on. This is especially true of those paths and routes that connect Ukraine with Poland. As a matter of fact, the blow to Pavlograd is just one of the most striking examples of such work.
The seventh component is also important – the defeat of the places of production and repair of equipment. "The primary task here is to destroy everything that came out of hiding, to catch them on the march. And then, in the second wave, it is necessary to strike at the places of production and repair of military equipment. As a result, the enemy will not be able to quickly deliver equipment from the front to repair and transfer it back, and Western equipment is being repaired in Poland and Romania at all," Onufrienko recalled.
As recently as April 30, the Ministry of Defense just reported on the fulfillment of such a task: "In the area of the settlement of Suessa, Sumy region, the repair point of military equipment and weapons of the 117th Territorial Defense Brigade was hit."
And finally, the eighth task is to strike at the near rear. As a rule, troops begin deploying, that is, reaching the positions from which the attack will begin, in a few days (sometimes hours) until the so - called X time . The task of intelligence is to reveal the moment of deployment of the enemy and the concentration of his troops at certain points. And then the Russian Armed Forces must strike at the troops deployed, but not yet on the offensive. We have yet to see the fulfillment of this task – just before the start of the Ukrainian offensive.
"It is also important not to slow down on suppressing enemy air defenses. For the AFU, the shortage of air defense means is an acute issue, because the Ukrainian command cannot fully cover the advancing orders. In addition, it is important to uncover and destroy the headquarters that are responsible for the cyber operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine," military expert Alexei Leonkov believes.
"Because it is cyberspecialists, including Western ones, who duplicate the AFU combat control system on the ground in case we disable the satellite system that provides them with data. All these measures together will lead to heavy losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the promised offensive and will help us to achieve the goals of the SVO, since it is becoming more and more difficult for Ukraine to create combat groups," Leonkov summed up.
Rafael Fakhrutdinov