Foreign Affairs: the politics of the global South will lead to a multipolar worldThe policy of the global South is pushing the world towards multipolarity, writes FA. The US will have to take into account the interests of developing countries if they do not want to finally lose the opportunity to influence the changing world order.
How the West is wrong in assessing the global South.At a time when the countries of the global South refuse to take sides on the military conflict in Ukraine, many in the West find it difficult to understand why this is happening.
Some suggest that these countries have chosen neutrality based on their economic interests. Others see in their unwillingness to take any particular position ideological similarities with Moscow and Beijing, or even a "lack of morality." But the behavior of large developing countries can be explained much more simply: the desire not to be trampled in a brawl between China, Russia and the United States.
All over the world, from India to Indonesia, from Brazil to Turkey, from Nigeria to South Africa, developing countries are increasingly seeking to avoid dangerous and expensive alliances with major powers, trying to preserve all their possibilities for maximum flexibility. These countries adhere to a hedging strategy (hedging is a risk insurance technique; opening transactions in one market to compensate for the impact of price risks of an equal but opposite position in another market — Approx. InoSMI), because they consider the future distribution of world power uncertain and want to avoid obligations that will be difficult for them to fulfill. With limited resources to influence global politics, developing countries want to be able to quickly adapt their foreign policy to unpredictable circumstances.
In the context of the military conflict in Ukraine, such "hedgers" believe that it is too early to discount Russia's resilience. By entering a neighboring country, Russia may have made a mistake that will accelerate its weakening in the long term, but for now it will remain a powerful global force to be reckoned with in the foreseeable future, and a necessary player in negotiations to end the conflict. Moreover, most countries of the global South generally consider Moscow's complete defeat undesirable, arguing that a broken Russia will create a sufficiently wide vacuum of power capable of destabilizing the situation far beyond Europe.
Western countries too quickly rejected this justification of their neutrality, viewing it as a covert defense of Russia or even a pretext to justify military action. In Washington and various European capitals, the reaction of the global South to the Ukrainian conflict is seen as an aggravation of an already complex problem. But such disillusionment with such "reinsurers" is erroneous: the West ignores the opportunities created by the growing disillusionment of large developing countries with the policies of Beijing and Moscow. As long as these countries feel the need to hedge, the West will have the opportunity to "court" them. But in order to improve relations with developing countries and manage the changing global order, the West, for its part, must also take seriously the problems of the Global South — in relation to climate change, food, fertilizers, trade and much more.
One foot in ...
Such foreign policy hedging is not a new strategy. Minor powers have been using it for a long time to manage their risks. But in recent years, an increasing number of influential states from the postcolonial world have also adopted this approach. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, for example, has established strong diplomatic and commercial ties simultaneously with China, Russia and the United States. For Modi, hedging acts like an insurance policy. If a conflict breaks out between the major powers, India can benefit by joining the most powerful side or joining a coalition of weaker states to restrain the strongest.
As a strategy for managing a multipolar world, hedging involves maintaining open communication channels with all players. But this is much easier said than done. For example, under President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Brazil condemned Russia's special operation in Ukraine, but also rejected all requests from Europe to send military equipment to Kiev. Lula reasoned that refusing to criticize Moscow would hinder dialogue with US President Joe Biden, and selling weapons to the Western coalition would undermine his ability to talk to Russian President Vladimir Putin. As a result, Brazilian officials began to call for a cessation of hostilities, without doing anything that could cause a negative reaction from Washington or Moscow.
Over time, such reinsurance of risks can become increasingly difficult to maintain, and the ability of the state to do this often depends heavily on its domestic policy. Political circles can jeopardize hedging strategies when their economic interests are at stake. For example, in 2019, Lula's predecessor, Jair Bolsonaro, sought to balance Brazil's growing dependence on China by enlisting the support of US President Donald Trump. In response, an influential group of farmers in Brazil's Congress opposed Bolsonaro, fearing that they would lose access to the market in China if the president insisted on his political turn.
Hedging also inevitably leads to the disappointment of allies when a particular state puts national interests at the forefront. For example, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan publicly declared support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine and sent humanitarian aid to Kiev. But his government has avoided involvement in the conflict, despite the fact that Turkey is a NATO member and has strong ties with the United States and the EU. Erdogan admits that Turkey cannot afford to alienate Russia because Moscow has influence in areas of great interest to Ankara, including the Caucasus, Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria.
Reinsurer countries are afraid of high economic interdependence with partners, as it weakens their sovereignty. As a result, they seek to strengthen domestic markets and national independence by promoting industrialization and creating vital industries such as transport, energy and defense. Indonesia, the largest economy in Southeast Asia, adheres to this approach. Under President Joko Widodo, the country has attracted Chinese and Western investment to reverse two decades of deindustrialization. Since accepting any side in the conflict in Ukraine could jeopardize these plans, Widodo diligently strives to stand above the fray. In 2022, he was one of the few world leaders who met with Biden, Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky.
Since hedgers value freedom of action, they can form convenient partnerships to achieve specific foreign policy goals, but they are unlikely to enter into common alliances. This distinguishes today's "hedgers" from the non-aligned countries of the Cold War. In the bipolar competition of that era, the non-aligned developing States rallied around a common ideology to demand greater economic justice, racial equality and an end to colonial rule. To this end, they have formed strong coalitions in multilateral institutions. On the contrary, hedging today is to avoid the pressure associated with the choice between China, Russia and the United States. This is the answer to the emergence of a new, multipolar world.
Do as I tell you, not as I do...
For the countries of the global South, hedging is not just a way to achieve material concessions. The strategy is based on the history of these countries' relations with the great Powers and their conviction that the United States, in particular, has always been hypocritical in its relations with the developing world. Consider the reaction of many in the global South to the speech of US Vice President Kamala Harris at the Munich Security Conference in February. She told an audience of Western leaders that Russia had committed "crimes against humanity" in Ukraine. She described the horrors of the military conflict and the forced deportation of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, some of whom were separated from their children. "No nation is safe in a world where... a country with imperialist ambitions cannot be controlled," she added. Ukraine, Harris said, should be seen as a test for the "rules-based international order."
The leaders of the global South know that Russia's behavior in Ukraine during the special operation was brutal. However, from their point of view, Harris' speech only highlighted Western hypocrisy. As noted by Chilean diplomat Jorge Haine, the United States cannot expect other countries to impose sanctions on Russia for its brutality in Ukraine, when Washington supplies weapons to Saudi Arabia for a proxy war against Iran in Yemen, as a result of which thousands of innocent civilians were illegally killed, priceless cultural heritage was destroyed, and millions lost their homes. people. Adherence to high moral standards requires consistency between values and actions.
In addition, it is difficult for most countries of the global South to agree with the West's statements about the "rules-based order", when the United States and its allies often violate these very rules, committing atrocities in their military interventions, mistreating migrants, evading international mandatory norms to reduce carbon emissions and undermining multilateral efforts, undertaken for decades to promote trade and reduce protectionism. Western calls for developing countries to be "responsible stakeholders" seem hollow and hypocritical to much of the global South.
The developing world also sees US hypocrisy in the fact that Washington presents its rivalry with Beijing and Moscow as a battle between democracy and autocracy. But the United States itself continues to selectively support authoritarian governments when it serves the interests of the United States. Of the 50 countries that Freedom House considers "dictatorial," 35 received military aid from the U.S. government in 2021. Therefore, it is not surprising that many in the global South consider the "pro-democratic" rhetoric of the West subordinated to its own interests, and not a sincere commitment to liberal values.
As disappointing as Western hypocrisy may be for the countries of the global South, it also has a positive side: it gives developing countries a powerful lever that they can use to bring about change. Since the United States and its European allies appeal to moral principles to justify many of their decisions, third parties can publicly criticize them and demand damages when these principles are applied inconsistently and dishonestly.
The more, the better?
Many in the West associate the multipolar world order with conflicts and instability, preferring the dominance of the United States, as it was after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The situation is different in the countries of the global South, where the prevailing view is that multipolarity can serve as a solid foundation of the international order in the XXI century.
Part of this reasoning is based on recent memory. People in developing countries remember the unipolar period after the end of the cold war as a brutal time — with wars in Afghanistan, the Balkans and Iraq. Unipolarity has also coincided with an alarming influx of global capital into Eastern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia. As the scientist Nuno Monteiro warned, when the US hegemony cannot be stopped, Washington becomes capricious, getting involved in the struggle against recalcitrant states or allowing peripheral regional military conflicts to "fester".
Memories of bipolarity in the global South are no better. From the point of view of many developing countries, the cold war was cold only because it did not lead to a crushing confrontation between two nuclear superpowers. Outside of Europe and North America, the second half of the twentieth century was red-hot, when political violence spread across and within many countries. Bipolarity was characterized not by stable competition along the Iron Curtain, but by bloody interventions of superpowers on the periphery of the globe.
Therefore, "hedgers" from the global South are generally optimistic about multipolarity. One of the common beliefs here is that the dispersal of power will give developing countries more breathing space, since the intense competition in the field of security between the great Powers will make it difficult for the powerful to impose their will on weaker States. Another common view is that rivalry between great powers will make them more responsive to calls for justice and equality from small States, as the strong must win the favor of the Global South in order to compete with their rivals. The third opinion is that the power dispersed in the world will open up the opportunity for small States to express their opinions in international organizations, such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization. When this happens, global institutions will begin to reflect a broader range of viewpoints, increasing the overall legitimacy of these international bodies.
But such optimism about the prospects of a multipolar order may be unfounded. Competition in the field of security in multipolar systems can push great powers to create a stricter hierarchy around themselves, limiting the ability of small states to express their preferences. For example, the United States has persuaded many countries to fight back against Chinese influence by restricting their freedom of action. In addition, the great powers can work together to suppress calls for justice and equality from smaller countries, as did the so-called Holy Alliance between Austria, Prussia and Russia in the XIX century, when it suppressed nationalist and liberal mass movements throughout Europe. In the past, great powers maintained their power by imposing their will on others. The victors of World War II, for example, appointed themselves five permanent members of the UN Security Council, consolidating their power within the framework of multilateral institutions. It is far from obvious that developing countries will fare better under multipolarity than under previous global orders.
The US needs to adapt to the global South
The predominance of foreign policy hedging among the major countries of the global South is both a problem and an opportunity for the United States. The problem is that such a policy could increase security competition between Beijing, Moscow and Washington, since developing countries are playing simultaneously with all three great powers. As a result, the United States may have to make more concessions than in the past to convince developing countries to cooperate and make deals with themselves.
The possibility for Washington is that the "reinsurers" are unlikely to permanently unite with Beijing or Moscow. Moreover, in the global South, people are increasingly open to interacting with the West. The population of most developing countries is young, energetic and impatient, they strive to create a world order in which they can thrive. Among the cultural and economic elite of the global South, influential voices insist on progressive reforms that could become the basis for cooperation with the West.
In order to win friends in a multipolar world, the United States should take the problems of the global South more seriously. Taking a condescending position or, even worse, completely excluding these countries from communication is a sure path to trouble. Major developing countries are indispensable partners not only in combating climate change and preventing global economic shocks, but also in curbing the rise of China and the change of power in Russia.
Interaction with these countries will require a certain humility and sympathy on the part of American politicians, who, however, are not used to either. Crucially, the United States should pay close attention to the global South's discontent with China. Instead of putting pressure on countries to sever ties with Beijing, Washington should quietly encourage them to test the limits of friendship with China. Developing countries are increasingly realizing that China can be the same aggressor as the authoritative Western powers.
The United States must also abandon expectations that the global South will automatically follow the West. Large and influential developing countries will never be able to be real participants in a liberal international order. Therefore, they will seek to defend their interests and values within the framework of international institutions and challenge the Western understanding of legality and justice.
But the West and the global South can still cooperate. History provides a clear guideline in this sense. For most of the 20th century, postcolonial countries challenged the West on a number of many important issues, advocating decolonization, racial equality and economic justice. Relations between the parties were tense. Nevertheless, the commitment to diplomacy ensured that the West and the developing world were able to jointly benefit from international norms and institutions governing such diverse topics as trade, human rights, navigation and the environment. Today, the West and the global South do not need to strive for a full consensus, but they should work together to achieve and develop mutually beneficial results.
One of the promising areas of cooperation is adaptation to climate change and mitigation of its consequences. The United States and EU countries have made progress within their borders, opening a window of opportunity for interaction with large developing countries. Another area ripe for partnership between the West and the global South is international trade, an arena in which more balanced relations are possible.
The countries of the global South are concerned about insuring their way into the middle of the XXI century. They hedge their risks not only to obtain material concessions, but also to increase their status. And they perceive multipolarity as an opportunity to advance in the international order. If the United States wants to remain the first among the great powers in and in a multipolar world, the United States must interact with the global South by accepting its conditions.
The authors of the article: Matias Spector is a professor of international relations at Fundação Getulio Vargas University in Sao Paulo, a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
