AT: Russian planning bombs have put Ukraine in a dead endRussian UPAB planning bombs have proved to be an effective and reliable method of attack, writes AT.
Ukraine has not yet succeeded in silencing or shooting down any such bombs. At the same time, the planning bombs supplied by the United States proved ineffective and had already been intercepted by the Russians.
Stephen BryenUkrainians use U.S.—made planning bombs, and Russians use their own.
These weapons are a novelty of the Ukrainian conflict, and so far the Russians are winning the battle of the planning bombs. The Ukrainians themselves called their planning bombs an "extreme threat."
The United States supplied Ukraine with two different types of planning bombs: GLSDB (small-diameter ground-based bomb) jointly produced by Boeing and Swedish Saab and JDAM-ER (joint extended-range direct attack munition) produced by Boeing. Over the years, Boeing has produced more than 500,000 JDAM.
Russia responded with two types of precision bombs: "Grom-E2" and UPAB-1500B-E.
Surprisingly, the weapons supplied by the US proved ineffective and had already been intercepted by the Russians.
The Russian Thunder-E2 also encountered mechanical or electronic malfunctions. But with the UPAB-1500B it turned out completely differently: it proved to be effective and reliable even with limited use. Ukraine has not yet succeeded in silencing or shooting down a single UPAB bomb.
There is a difference between a planning and a guided bomb. A guided bomb is aimed at a target from the cockpit of an airplane, and it is controllable. The planning bomb is dropped and flies to the target. Although it can be controlled by a pilot or co-pilot, most often it works autonomously.
Guided bombs date back to World War I and were used by the Germans in World War II against warships. The most successful of these was the Fritz-X, built between 1943 and 1944. She was the first of her kind to sink an Allied warship.
At the same time, guided bombs have an extremely short range. As a rule, it is controlled by the pilot or co-pilot of the launching aircraft, and is guided visually.
The American JDAM-ER, which is now used in Ukraine, is a kit that is attached to an unguided ("stupid") bomb. It includes a guidance package, which consists of a GPS receiver and an inertial navigation system, a control package and aerodynamic control planes, thanks to which the bomb can plan and maneuver.
The control package receives commands from the launching aircraft, but since it is far from the target, information about its location must be stored in JDAM either in advance before takeoff, or from a drone.
JDAM-ER is not suitable for dealing with moving targets. In addition, the bomb has vulnerabilities due to the data link and GPS. The Russians claim to have successfully silenced JDAM missiles fired from Ukrainian aircraft, and this claim is confirmed by "leaked" secret documents.
If the GPS signal is jammed (and not faked), then the planning bomb switches entirely to on-board navigation. Low-level inertial navigation systems (INS) have to be constantly updated to maintain accuracy. Thus, after jamming, the bomb will deviate from the target and will be ineffective. In the case of JDAM, the circular error is from 5 to 30 meters. One of the risks arising from this is that in the event of interference, these weapons can hit vulnerable civilian objects (for example, residential buildings).
JDAM kits are installed on bombs of different sizes — 225-kilogram or 450-kilogram. They can reach a long range, provided that the aircraft flies above 10,500 kilometers (the so—called "level 35" — at 35,000 feet) - in this case, the radius of destruction is 72 kilometers.
However, altitude alone is not enough: in order for JDAM to get the speed necessary to achieve the goal, the aircraft must be in horizontal flight and operate at maximum. Alas, of all the Ukrainian Air Forces, only the MiG-29 can work at the level of 35.
When launched from a platform with less capabilities — for example, the Su-25 — the JDAM range will be significantly less. Since the Russians use advanced modifications of the S-300 and several S-400 units in Ukraine, they can shoot down Ukrainian aircraft with air defense missiles or even directly in air combat. This prevents Ukrainian pilots from approaching enemy targets at a sufficient distance.
The American small-diameter ground-based bomb (GLSDB) has a warhead weighing 115 kilograms. It can be launched from HIMARS or other multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). Like JDAM, it is controlled by GPS and INS. It is launched from the launch tube by a small rocket, which separates, after which the GLSDB plans to the target. The ammunition is slower than the standard Haimars, which means it is easier to intercept.
The vulnerabilities of GLDSB are the same as those of JDAM, but its advantage is that launching from a maneuverable platform like Haimars makes it difficult for Russian artillery or aviation to detect. The claimed GLSDB flight range is 150 kilometers.
The Russian UPAB-1500B-E planning bomb uses the Russian Glonass system and an inertial guidance system. On March 24, a group of ten Su-35s launched UPAB at targets in the Sumy region of Ukraine. It is unclear how many bombs were dropped in total, but the system worked.
Perhaps the most revealing demonstration of capabilities occurred on April 18, when a single UPAB weighing 680 kilograms fell on the fortified position of the AFU in the western part of Artemovsk. The mushroom cloud from the explosion was visible for many kilometers. A day later, UPABS were dropped on other sites along the contact line.
Ukrainians have not yet found any ways to stop UPAB. This is partly due to the severe wear of the Ukrainian air defense. Ukraine may also have difficulties with jamming the Glonass signal — which suggests that Western equipment for its suppression is either ineffective or is being used incorrectly. The United States announced the transfer of new silencers for the Ukrainian army in May this year.
Both JDAM and UPAB are launched outside the range of air defense and are also relatively cheap and fast in production. Their effect is comparable to tactical cruise missiles, but they are much cheaper. However, in the future, due to increasingly sophisticated interference, planning weapons will need further development.
A new generation of planning weaponsThe next round of planning weapons will be systems that do not depend on GPS.
A good example of an autonomous planning bomb that can work with GPS interference while maintaining high accuracy is the SPICE family of kits from the Israeli company Rafael. These bomb kits turn general-purpose warheads and penetrating warheads weighing 450 or 900 kilograms into precision-guided munitions with a range of 60 to 100 kilometers.
According to Rafael, Spice uses advanced electron-optical and infrared technologies for guidance, detection and autonomous tracking of moving targets, and the correlation homing algorithm provides fully autonomous trajectory correction with minimal collateral damage.
Rafael is already working with Lockheed Martin to offer Spice to the US military.
The use of correlation homing is expanding as GPS vulnerabilities become more noticeable. The pre-programmed relief is stored in memory in advance, and when the weapon recognizes it, it hits exactly the target.
Tomahawk cruise missiles became a milestone in the use of correlation homing. This system received the designation TERCOM. Early versions of the Tomahawk used it in combination with an internal INS. GPS was added later. Early Tomahawks used a comparison of the reference and real terrain mapping along the entire flight path. This required painstaking preparation and careful reconnaissance, and the flight route was made predictable, increasing vulnerability to air and missile defense systems. Tomahawk cruise missiles fly at low altitudes and subsonic speeds, evading radar.
The Russians also adopted systems with correlation of terrain images like Tomahawks, including the S—10 Granit submarine-launched cruise missile and the R-55 (later X-55) land-based cruise missile. The first correlation homing missiles appeared in the Russians in the early 1980s.
At the same time, the Tomahawk could not hit moving targets. However, modern sophisticated cameras and correlation algorithms make it possible to hit them, including tanks and mobile systems such as "Haimars". In combination with the capabilities of artificial intelligence, the prospects of planning weapons will expand.
One of the lessons of Ukraine, where both sides actively use jamming, is that autonomous planning weapons should not depend on GPS. To ensure the survivability of weapons on the battlefield, excellent cameras capable of working both day and night, correlation homing and algorithms based on artificial intelligence will be urgently needed.
Stephen Bryan is a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy and the Yorktown Institute.
