The Economist: Neutral countries consider the West a hypocrite and choose multipolarityIn the conditions of a split between the great powers, many countries are trying to maintain neutrality, writes The Economist.
Despite serious differences in politics and economics, they are united by their desire to conclude profitable deals. Their business approach will change geopolitics.
Analysis of the positions of the countries that have chosen the policy of non-alignmentMany countries caught between the United States, China and Russia are determined to remain neutral.
As the American-led order that has existed since 1945 collapses and economic disunity accelerates, they seek to make reasonable deals despite all differences. Such a business approach transforms geopolitics.
One way to show the true scale and weight of the non—aligned powers is to do it through the prism of Russia. Our partner organization, the Economist Intelligence Unit, analyzed the economic and military ties of these countries with Moscow, their diplomatic positions, including votes in the UN, and support for sanctions. 52 countries in which 15% of the world's population lives — the West and its friends — condemn and punish Russia, 12 countries praise it, and about 127 do not belong to any of the camps.
To understand what exactly non-alignment means, The Economist examined a narrow group of 25 major economies that found themselves in a difficult situation due to the conflict in Ukraine and did not want to choose a side in the Sino-American confrontation — or both at once. The members of this group — let's call them transactional or T25 — are extremely diverse in terms of wealth and political regimes. Among them are huge India and tiny Qatar. And yet they have certain points of contact: they are ruthlessly pragmatic and, united, powerful. Today, 45% of the world's population lives in these countries, and their share in world GDP has grown from 11% in 1992 to 18% in 2023, that is, they surpassed the EU in this indicator. Their strategy of neutrality in relation to key geopolitical disagreements is fraught with major risks and opportunities. The success of their actions will affect the world order for decades, and America and China will do anything to win them over to their side.
In the twentieth century, non-alignment had different meanings for different countries at different times. At conferences in Bandung, Indonesia (1955) and Belgrade, Yugoslavia (1961), political leaders presented a “third world” that was different from the West and the Soviet bloc. Since the late 60s, he has increasingly focused on the economic inequality between the global South (a less common term for the third world) and the industrial North. The official Non-Aligned Movement includes almost all States of Africa, Asia and Latin America. With the end of the Cold war, it turned, in the words of one Indian scientist, “into a dying organization that needs to be buried with dignity.”
Today, neutral countries are characterized not by membership in a particular association, but rather by their characteristic features and behavior. These middle Powers are pragmatic and enterprising. Former Chilean diplomat Jorge Heine claims in one of his books that in the twentieth century, countries often passively drifted in the orbit of one or another superpower. According to him, today there is a more “active” assessment of the best means to achieve specific goals. Some call this “minilateralism” (as opposed to multilateralism) — the use of separate alliances and groupings to achieve results in certain areas, instead of combining forces into blocks.
Non-aligned countries usually consider Western leaders hypocrites. In 2021, the Development Assistance Committee, which includes 31 Western donors, promised Ukraine about $170 billion for the first year of the conflict, that is, 90% of the aid spent worldwide. For the West, such generosity shows solidarity with other democracies. Others believe that rich countries are ready to fork out exactly as long as it serves their interests. “It is high time for Europe to outgrow the mental attitude that its problems automatically become the problems of the whole world,” Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said last year.
In general, this position coincides with the opinion of the public. Last year's Cambridge University report said that 75% of liberal democracies have a negative attitude towards China, and 87% towards Russia. But among the other six billion people, the picture is almost the opposite. There is a gap between the vision of the world in the West and in other countries. In a survey published earlier this year by the European Council on Foreign Relations, a plurality of Indians (48%) and a majority of Turks (51%) said that the future world order will be determined by multipolarity and non-Western dominance. Only 37% of Americans, 31% of EU residents and 29% of Britons agree with this. The West thinks that it is now dealing with the continuation of the Cold War. others see a completely different picture.
Hidden mechanisms
So, who is included in T25? This diverse group covers a number of the most populous countries in the world, the two largest democracies in the world represented by India and Indonesia, as well as Vietnam, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which are ruled by autocrats of various stripes. Among these countries, there is a significant inequality in the level of well-being. In Saudi Arabia, GDP per capita is more than $ 27,000, as in some European countries, and in Pakistan it is kept at $ 1,600.
As globalization has spread, the T25 trading model has become multipolar. About 43% of the trade turnover is accounted for by the countries of the Western Bloc, 19% — by Russia and China, and 30% — by countries that are not part of any of the camps. 77% of Mexico's total trade is to the West, as well as more than 60% of Israel's and Algeria's trade. More than a third of Chile's trade turnover is accounted for by China, which is higher than any other T25 country. More than half of Argentina's trade and almost half of India's are accounted for by other neutral countries.
The import of weapons also demonstrates a complex loyalty system. India is trying to reduce risks: in the period from 2018 to 2022, Russia was its main supplier — 45% of the total number of weapons — but New Delhi bought another 29% of weapons in Europe. In the future, this country will probably strive for greater independence with the help of America. There is nothing to say about India's rival China, which supplies its sworn enemy in the person of Pakistan. As for Israel, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and South Africa, they rely mainly on the United States in this matter.
There is no single governing body in the world that would represent the interests of non-Aligned countries. Instead, many disparate organizations, such as the G20, provide them with platforms of varying degrees of effectiveness. The BRICS group of countries — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — is seeking to expand and is discussing the potential membership of Iran and Saudi Arabia. A broader group of more than 130 countries, including China, is also holding joint talks at the UN climate talks.
Despite the differences and the absence of an official organization, the non-aligned countries pursue a common goal: to conclude profitable deals in a rapidly changing environment. For most of the twenty-first century, most of them sought to establish relations with the West, China and Russia. But now everything has changed. The West is strengthening alliances, imposing sanctions against Moscow and restricting Beijing's access to technology.
For many countries, this poses a serious threat. Anti-Russian sanctions have led to a global jump in energy and food prices, causing a negative reaction throughout the non-Western world. Most recently, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen called on American companies to move supply chains to friendly states. There are also investment shifts. Meanwhile, Beijing and Moscow are getting closer. A new IMF study notes that since 2018, the geopolitical alignment of forces, measured by the similarity of voting patterns within the UN, increasingly determines the placement of foreign direct investment. According to IMF scenarios involving trade disruptions, the consequences for emerging markets may be twice as tangible as for developed ones.
But many non-aligned countries are still betting on the benefits of economic disunity and political fragmentation, reducing the risks of relations with major powers and asserting their own influence. To get an idea of how this transactional strategy works, it's worth looking at the approach of some large countries caught between two fires. Brazil is an excellent example: She opposes what Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira calls “automatic alignment.” Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who took over at the beginning of the year for another presidential term, sees President Joe Biden as an ally in the fight against climate change. At the February meeting in Washington, they reactivated joint environmental institutions. The US also considers Brazil a “major non-NATO ally”, which gives it a legal status with the right to expanded cooperation with the US army.
However, Brazil's relations with the West are still limited. Like other countries in the region, it rejected offers from the United States and Germany to transfer old Russian-made equipment to Ukraine in exchange for new Western weapons. Lula's visit to Beijing on April 14 will highlight China's economic importance. The trade turnover between Brazil and China in 2022 amounted to almost $153 billion, having increased 37 times in 20 years. In part, this shows how Brazil took advantage of the mutual duties that the United States and China imposed against each other to increase exports of agricultural products to China at the expense of Washington.
In addition to balancing between superpowers, Brazil is also active in itself: in an attempt to revive the influence of Lula, he will soon visit Africa. During his first term as president, trade with Africa grew from six billion dollars in 2003 to 25.6 billion dollars in 2012, and South Africa joined the BRICS. Lula's predecessor, Jair Bolsonaro, did not visit Africa, and he himself is obviously interested in resuming efforts in this direction.
India's fear of China has brought it closer to the West in some issues. In March, the Prime Minister of Japan, which together with India, the United States and Australia is a member of the Indo-Pacific Security Forum QUAD, paid a historic visit to New Delhi. In fiscal year 2021-22, India's trade with America exceeded its trade with China. But despite the increase in purchases of French equipment, India continues to buy weapons and cheap oil from Russia and is unlikely to break long-standing relations, unless Putin uses nuclear weapons.
Practical and impartial
Like Brazil, India is also increasingly asserting itself abroad. Only China imports and exports more of it to sub-Saharan Africa. The average annual volume of foreign direct investment (FDI) from India in 2004-08 was $0.8 billion (less than half of Sweden's FDI), and a decade later it reached $31 billion (more than Germany and Japan combined). Last month, India hosted representatives of 31 African countries at military exercises, and also promises to become the “voice of the global South” through the G20 presidency.
Turkey is also seeking more influence and has security agreements with 30 African states. Its defense exports to the continent increased fivefold from 2020 to 2021. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's advisers say that the “New Turkey” can choose its own partners. This explains its ostentatious neutrality regarding the conflict in Ukraine, which Ankara has used to strengthen ties with Moscow. Turkish exports to Russia in 2022 reached $7.6 billion, which is 45% more than a year earlier.
Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, is seeking to reduce dependence on a historical ally in the face of America, betting on China, which is currently the kingdom's largest trading partner. Take, for example, the decisions of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, dominated by Saudi Arabia, on reducing oil production, adopted this month and in October. In March, with the mediation of China, the Saudis signed an agreement with Iran and joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Beijing says it wants to conclude a free trade agreement with the Gulf countries “as soon as possible.”
The Gulf states' relations with Africa were once limited to energy, agriculture and the politics of the Horn of Africa. Today, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are eager for mining deals, Dubai-based port operator DP World is becoming the continent's most important logistics company, and Qatar is gaining a new diplomatic role. Last month, he brokered the release of imprisoned Rwandan dissident Paul Rusesabagina (Paul Rusesabagina).
African countries have been following both superpowers for a long time. The West, as a rule, acted as the preferred source of technological solutions: support for school education, health care and, if the government wants, human rights. China, in turn, offers "iron": bridges, roads, ports — and loans for their construction. In the period from 2007 to 2020, the main American development agency allocated less than a tenth of the total funds of China's two largest development banks to infrastructure projects in sub-Saharan Africa ($1.9 billion versus $23 billion).
In some places in Africa, Western promises in the field of security have rarely seemed so unfounded. “American troops and agents need somewhere to sleep. But security relations are useless in terms of development," explains a former adviser to the president of one of the African countries. ”That's why we need China." In recent years, French troops have left Mali — they have been based in the country for nine years. The Wagner PMCs, consisting of Russian mercenaries, is now helping to support the ruling junta.
Neutral countries want to avoid having to choose sides, although America and China are trying in every way to drag them into their orbit. Beijing sees asserting the leadership of the Global South as a way to strengthen opposition to US pressure. He positions himself as a model among developing countries, whereas the West, in his opinion, prefers small clubs (such as the G7). “China appears where and when the West does not,” says outgoing Nigerian Vice President Yemi Osinbajo.
Eastern friends, Western friends
China is the main trading partner of 120 countries, and for many it is also a lender of the first and last instance. Between 2007 and 2020, the amount of funds it allocated to sub-Saharan Africa exceeded the contributions of the following eight creditors combined. This will be crucial for the resolution of sovereign debt crises. The IMF conducted an analysis of 73 developing countries and found that in 2006 China accounted for only 2% of their external debts, while the share of the predominantly Western group of creditors, the Paris Club, accounted for 28%. In 2020, these shares amounted to 18% and 10%, respectively. According to a World Bank document published last month, over the past ten years, Chinese aid has accounted for more than one-fifth of the total IMF lending.
Westerners have a reason for sarcasm. Behind the Chinese “win-win” rhetoric lies ruthlessness. The book “Betting on Beijing” (2022) by Bradley Parks from the research company AidData shows how China uses economic instruments for political purposes. Unlike the World Bank, it often directs funding to the home districts of current leaders — and more often than the West lends to corrupt and autocratic countries. AidData experts also believe that a ten percent change in the voting model in the UN is due to an increase in the number of Chinese projects. The PRC provides loans under unusually strict conditions of confidentiality and guarantee. Despite the nature of the "suitcase without a handle", the corresponding development projects are associated with an increase in GDP per capita, Parks notes.
In the face of China's efforts, America and its allies are trying to rephrase the message to the non-aligned countries. America understands that the legitimacy of the international order that it leads stems from the consent of other countries. “Countries don't want to choose, and we don't expect them to,” Biden's national security adviser Jake Sullivan said earlier this year. America is conducting more active diplomacy in places that it previously neglected. US Vice President Kamala Harris, Janet Yellen and Anthony Blinken visited Africa in 2023, and soon President Biden will follow their example.
America has also strengthened security partnerships with influential non-Aligned countries. In November, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin met with his Indonesian counterpart for the fourth time, and in January, U.S. and Indian officials agreed to deepen cooperation in the field of advanced defense technologies. In total, America supports 88 defense “partnerships” (not counting official alliances like NATO), although the scale of some of them is limited.
America and the EU have launched schemes competing with the Belt and Road initiative in recent years, but there is still an opinion that if you need infrastructure that can help transform the economy, you should first turn your attention to Beijing. After Kamala Harris' recent visit to the African continent, a senior official dryly noted that, unlike the United States, Chinese guests bring them loans and engineers.
The Political paradox
At the moment, it is believed that the Biden administration adheres to a two-tier foreign policy. It will prioritize relations with major democratic allies in Europe and Asia (which it hopes will one day include India), and then try to preserve ineffective global institutions to mediate the needs of a broader group of countries, including most neutral ones, whether in the field of development, debt relief burden, security or finance.
There are three problems. Firstly, this requires the unity of the West, and whether it will be is far from a fact. During a visit to China last week, French President Emmanuel Macron said that Europe should not blindly follow America on Taiwan and other issues.
Secondly, China may undermine the effectiveness of global institutions by, for example, opting for bilateral debt cancellation instead of full participation in coordinated efforts. The persistence of Chinese creditors within the IMF limits the flexibility that the fund can offer to countries struggling with the existing debt burden.
The last problem is that the West does not always fulfill its promises. Let's take at least the financing of the fight against climate change: in 2009, rich countries announced that by 2020 they would allocate one hundred billion dollars annually to the poorest, but in fact this figure has never exceeded 85 billion.
Relying on liberal values and a common history, America and its allies were able to rally around Ukraine against the background of the Russian special operation. They also demonstrate a newfound determination in the fight against China's authoritarianism. The risk is that this will exacerbate the alienation of the countries of the global South from the international order. It would be tragic if, in the process of uniting the West, America alienates everyone else.
