Foreign Affairs: The US will force Ukraine to conclude a peace agreement with RussiaUkraine will not be able to win, even if the West starts supplying it with more weapons, writes Foreign Affairs.
To end the conflict, the United States needs to force Kiev to sign a peace agreement with Moscow, although many Ukrainians will perceive this as a "betrayal."
A plan to move from the battlefield to the negotiating table.The conflict in Ukraine has been going on for a little more than a year and is unfolding more successfully for Kiev than many expected.
Russia's attempts to subdue its neighbor have failed. Ukraine remains an independent, sovereign, functioning democracy and holds approximately 85% of the territory it controlled until 2014.
At the same time, it is difficult to be optimistic about where this conflict is heading. Human and economic losses, already huge, will grow, as both Moscow and Kiev are ready for the further path "uphill" and are gathering strength for the next steps on the battlefield. The numerical superiority of the Russian armed forces probably gives them the opportunity to resist the higher morale of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as the support of Kiev from the West. Accordingly, the most likely outcome of the conflict is not a "complete victory" of Ukraine, but a bloody stalemate.
For obvious reasons, against this background, there are calls for a diplomatic end to the conflict. But since Moscow and Kiev promise to continue fighting, the conditions for a negotiated settlement have not yet matured. Russia seems determined to occupy most of the Donbas. Ukraine may be preparing to destroy the land bridge between Donbass and Crimea, clearing the way, as Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky often claims, for the complete expulsion of Russian troops and the restoration of the territorial integrity of the country.
The United States and Europe need an approach that recognizes these realities without sacrificing Western principles. Therefore, the best way forward in the current situation is a consistent two—tier strategy aimed at first strengthening Ukraine's military potential, and then, when the peak of hostilities passes at the end of the year, to withdraw Moscow and Kiev from the battlefield and bring them to the negotiating table.
The West should start by immediately accelerating the supply of weapons to Ukraine, increasing the quantity and quality of weapons. The goal should be to strengthen Kiev's defense capability, make its upcoming offensive as successful as possible, deprive Moscow of military options for resolving the conflict and strengthen its readiness to consider a diplomatic settlement. By the time the expected Ukrainian offensive ends, Kiev may also begin to treat the idea of a negotiated settlement more favorably. By this point, he will have done his best on the battlefield and will probably face increasing limitations both in his own strength and in assistance from abroad.
The second link in the West's strategy should be to launch a plan later this year to mediate a ceasefire and a subsequent peace process aimed at a final resolution of the conflict. This diplomatic gambit may well fail. Even if Russia and Ukraine continue to suffer significant losses, one of the countries – or both – may prefer to continue the military struggle. But as the costs of a military conflict for both sides grow, and the prospects for a military impasse become more and more obvious, the West needs to start seeking a lasting truce. It will help prevent the resumption of conflict and, even better, prepare the ground for lasting peace.
A military conflict that will never end
At the moment, a diplomatic solution to the conflict is clearly unattainable. Russian President Vladimir Putin probably fears that if he stops fighting now, the Russians will accuse him of unleashing an expensive and useless military conflict. After all, Russian forces do not fully control any of the four regions that Moscow unilaterally annexed to itself last September, NATO has become bigger and stronger, and Ukraine is alienated from Russia as never before. Apparently, Putin thinks that time is on his side. He expects that he will be able to survive the economic sanctions that failed to strangle the Russian economy, and maintain popular support for the special operation, which, according to polls by the Levada Center*, more than 70% of Russians still support. Putin doubts the resilience of Ukraine and its Western supporters and expects their resolve to weaken soon. He probably expects that when his mobilized recruits join the battle, Moscow will be able to expand its territorial acquisitions. When the fighting stops, it will allow him to declare that he has significantly expanded the borders of Russia.
Ukraine also does not seek a peaceful settlement. The country's leadership and the public, for obvious reasons, want to regain control over the entire territory that Russia has occupied since 2014, including Crimea. In addition, Ukrainians doubt that Putin will abide by any peace treaty. And instead of asking the West for diplomatic intervention, Kiev turns to it for military and economic assistance. The United States and Europe provide intelligence information, train the military and supply weapons, but they refused to send even more powerful military systems to Ukraine – long-range missiles and modern aircraft. They fear that this will provoke Russia and lead to escalation: the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine or an offensive against the troops or territory of a NATO member country.
Although Washington is right about how closely it is monitoring the risk of escalation, its concerns in this regard are exaggerated. Western policy is stuck between the need to prevent a catastrophic failure (when Russia absorbs an insufficiently armed Ukraine) and a catastrophic success (when an overly armed Ukraine leads a cornered Putin to a sharp escalation of the conflict). First of all, it is difficult to understand that Moscow will benefit from escalation. Expanding the military conflict by attacking a NATO member would not be in Russia's interests, since it is already hard enough for the country to fight Ukraine alone. The use of nuclear weapons would also not benefit Moscow. A nuclear attack is likely to prompt NATO to directly enter the conflict and destroy Russian positions throughout Ukraine. It could also alienate China and India, which have warned Russia against using nuclear weapons.
But the unlikely use of nuclear weapons is not the only reason why the West should belittle Russia's nuclear ambitions in every possible way. After all, a concession to nuclear blackmail will serve as a signal to other countries that such threats are working, will push the nonproliferation program into the background and weaken the deterrence strategy. Beijing, for example, may conclude that nuclear threats may prevent Washington from defending Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack.
Therefore, it is time for the West to stop restraining itself and start supplying Ukraine with tanks, long-range missiles and other weapons necessary to help Kiev regain control over most of the country's territory in the coming months. Europe has begun deliveries of Leopard tanks, and the United States has pledged to send 31 Abrams tanks, the arrival of which is scheduled for the end of the year. However, the West must increase the volume and pace of military supplies. A larger number of tanks will increase the APU's ability to penetrate Russia's defensive lines in southern Ukraine. Long-range missiles, namely the ATACMS army tactical missile system, which the United States has so far refused to provide, will allow Kiev to hit Russian positions, command posts and ammunition depots deep in Moscow-held territory and pave the way for a more successful Ukrainian offensive. The US military should also begin training Ukrainian pilots on the F-16. The training will take time, but if we start now, it will allow the United States to deliver an advanced group of aircraft as soon as the Ukrainian pilots are ready. For Russia, this will be a signal that Ukraine's potential to conduct military operations is growing.
Nevertheless, despite all the possible benefits of greater Western military assistance, it will not be able to change the fundamental reality that this military conflict is moving to a dead end. Of course, Ukraine's upcoming offensive could theoretically be stunningly successful and allow Kiev to regain all of its lost territory, including Crimea, which would lead to Russia's complete defeat. But such an outcome is very unlikely. Even if the West increases its military assistance, Ukraine will still not be able to defeat Russian troops. Ukraine is running out of soldiers and ammunition, and its economy continues to collapse. Russian troops have dug in on strong defensive lines, and new reinforcements are being sent to the contact line.
Moreover, if Moscow's military situation really shakes, it is quite possible that China will start supplying Russia's weapons, whether directly or through third countries. Chinese President Xi Jinping has made a major long-term bet on Putin and will not sit idly by waiting for Russia to suffer a decisive defeat. Xi's visit to Moscow in March strongly suggests that he is strengthening his partnership with Putin, not abandoning it. Xi may well consider that the risks of providing military assistance to Russia are small. After all, his country is no longer hiding from the West, and the US policy towards China seems destined to become tougher, no matter how much Beijing supports Moscow.
The West's buildup of military assistance to Ukraine, although it may help the Ukrainian armed forces advance on the battlefield, will have little to offer Kiev in terms of restoring full sovereignty. This year, a deadlock is likely to arise on the new line of contact. When this happens, the obvious question will arise: what's next?
After the impasse
It makes little sense to repeat what has already been passed. Even from the point of view of Ukraine, it would be unwise to persistently seek a complete military victory, which may turn out to be pyrrhic. The Ukrainian armed forces have already lost more than a hundred thousand people, including many of their best fighters. The Ukrainian economy has shrunk by about 30%, the poverty rate is off the scale, and Russia continues to strike at critical infrastructure. About eight million Ukrainians have left the country, and millions more have become internally displaced. Kiev should not risk self-destruction in pursuit of unattainable goals.
When the "season" of hostilities ends, the United States and Europe will also have a good reason to abandon their declared policy of helping Ukraine "as long as it takes." Indeed, our priority remains the preservation of Ukraine as a sovereign and stable democracy, but achieving this goal does not require the restoration of full control over Crimea and Donbass in the near future. The West should also not worry unnecessarily that seeking a ceasefire before Kiev regains its entire territory will lead to the collapse of the rules-based international order. The Ukrainian resilience and determination of the West have already rebuffed Russia's attempts to subjugate Ukraine, inflicted strategic damage on Moscow and demonstrated to other potential revisionists that attempts at territorial conquest can be expensive and unpleasant enterprises. Yes, it is very important to minimize Russia's achievements and demonstrate to the world that such actions do not pay off, but this goal must be correctly correlated with our other priorities.
And the reality is that the continuation of large-scale support for Kiev is associated with broader strategic risks. The conflict undermines the military readiness of the West and depletes its stocks of weapons. The Western military-industrial complex does not keep up with how quickly Ukraine spends the equipment and ammunition supplied to it. NATO countries cannot discount the possibility of direct military clashes with Russia, and the United States should prepare for potential military action in Asia (to deter or respond to any move by China against Taiwan) and in the Middle East (against Iran or terrorist networks).
The Ukrainian military conflict is putting a heavy burden on the world economy. It has disrupted global supply chains, provokes higher inflation and shortages of energy and food. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimates that the conflict in Ukraine will reduce the global economy by $2.8 trillion in 2023. From France to Egypt and Peru, economic hardships are causing political unrest. The conflict is also polarizing the international system. While the geopolitical rivalry between Western democracies and the Sino-Russian coalition heralds the return of the old world consisting of two blocs, most of the rest of the globe stands aside, preferring non-alignment to the "trap" of the new rivalry between East and West. The very military conflict in Ukraine is throwing out waves of global disorder.
Against this background, neither Ukraine nor its supporters in NATO can take the unity of the West for granted. America's determination is key to maintaining Europe's resilience, but Washington itself is facing growing political pressure that requires it to cut costs, restore U.S. combat readiness and increase its potential in Asia. Now that Republicans control the House of Representatives, it will be harder for the Biden administration to seek approval of significant aid packages for Kiev. The US policy towards Ukraine may change dramatically if the Republicans win the White House in the 2024 elections. So it's time to prepare a plan B.
How do we get to the coveted "yes"
Given the likely course of development of the military conflict in Ukraine, the United States and its partners now need to begin to formulate a scenario of a diplomatic endgame. Despite the fact that NATO members are increasing military assistance in support of Ukraine's upcoming offensive, Washington should begin consultations with its European allies and with Kiev about a diplomatic initiative that will be launched later this year.
With this approach, Kiev's supporters in the West would have to offer a cease-fire when Ukraine's upcoming offensive reaches its limit. Ideally, both Ukraine and Russia would withdraw their troops and heavy weapons from the new line of contact, effectively creating a demilitarized zone. A neutral organization — be it the UN or the Organization for Security and Co—operation in Europe - would send observers to ensure a ceasefire and withdrawal of troops. The West would have to appeal to other influential countries, including China and India, to support the ceasefire proposal. This would complicate diplomacy, but gaining support from Beijing and New Delhi would increase pressure on the Kremlin. If China refuses to support a cease-fire, Xi's incessant calls for a diplomatic solution to the conflict will be exposed as a symbolic gesture.
Assuming a ceasefire takes place, it should be followed by peace talks. Such negotiations should proceed in two parallel directions. Direct negotiations between Ukraine and Russia on peace conditions with the assistance of international mediators will be held on one track. On the second track, NATO allies should begin a strategic dialogue with Russia on arms control and the broader European security architecture. Putin's attempts to destroy the post-Cold War security order have backfired and ultimately contributed to the strengthening of NATO. But this reality only increases the need to start a constructive dialogue between the alliance and Russia in order to prevent a new arms race, restore contacts between the military and resolve other issues of common concern, including the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The two-plus-four talks that helped end the Cold war set a good precedent. We are talking about the fact that East and West Germany negotiated unification directly, while the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union discussed a broader security architecture after the end of the Cold War.
Provided that Ukraine achieves success on the battlefield this summer, it is quite reasonable to assume that Putin will consider the ceasefire and peace plan to save his reputation. To make this approach even more attractive to him, the West could also offer to ease sanctions somewhat in exchange for Russia's willingness to observe the ceasefire, agree to a demilitarized zone and participate meaningfully in peace negotiations. Of course, it is quite possible that Putin will reject the cease-fire or agree to it only in order to restore his armed forces. But checking Moscow's readiness to compromise will involve minimal losses for us. Regardless of Russia's response, the West will continue to supply Ukraine with the weapons necessary for self-defense in the long term, and make sure that any pause in hostilities does not benefit Moscow. And if Russia refuses the ceasefire (or accepts it and then violates it), this intransigence will only worsen its diplomatic isolation, strengthen the sanctions regime and strengthen support for Ukraine in the United States and Europe.
Another likely outcome is that Russia will agree to a cease-fire in order to consolidate its territorial gains in Ukraine, but in fact will not intend to negotiate in good faith to ensure a lasting peace settlement. Therefore, most likely, Kiev will enter into such negotiations only if its main priorities are met: restoration of the 1991 borders, significant reparations and punishment of those responsible for war crimes. But since Putin will undoubtedly immediately reject these demands, there will be a prolonged diplomatic impasse, which will actually give rise to a new frozen conflict. In principle, the ceasefire may prove to be sustainable. As a result, a status quo will be formed, similar to the one that exists on the Korean peninsula and has remained stable even without a formal peace agreement for 70 years. Cyprus is also divided, but has been stable for decades. This is not an ideal outcome, but it is preferable to high-intensity fights that last for years.
How to convince Kiev
Persuading Kiev to agree to a cease-fire and uncertain diplomatic solutions may be no less difficult than forcing Moscow to do so. Many Ukrainians will perceive this proposal as a betrayal and will fear that the ceasefire lines will simply become new de facto borders. Zelensky will have to drastically reduce his military ambitions, although he promised victory from the first months of the conflict. This is not an easy task even for the most talented politicians.
But Kiev may eventually find a lot of interesting things in this regard. Despite the fact that the end of hostilities will freeze the new line of contact between Russia and Ukraine, the West will not ask Kiev to abandon the goal of regaining all lands, including Crimea and Donbass. Rather, the plan is to delay the determination of the status of these Territories. Kiev would refuse to attempt to regain these territories by force, which, of course, will be expensive, and most likely will fail. Instead, Ukraine could agree that in order to restore territorial integrity, it is necessary to wait for the necessary diplomatic breakthrough. This breakthrough, in turn, may be possible only after Putin leaves power. In the meantime, Western governments could promise to completely lift sanctions against Russia and normalize relations with it only if Moscow signs a peace agreement acceptable to Kiev.
So strategic pragmatism will be combined with our political principles. Peace in Ukraine cannot be held hostage to Kiev's military goals, which, no matter how morally justified they may be, are most likely unattainable. At the same time, the West should not reward Russia by forcing Ukraine to accept the loss of territories forever. The solution is to end the military phase of the conflict with the postponement of the final determination of the ownership of the territories still under Russian control.
Even if a ceasefire is reached and a diplomatic process begins, NATO countries should continue to arm Ukraine. In this way, they will eliminate any doubts in Kiev that compliance with the diplomatic roadmap will mean the termination of Western military support. In addition, the United States can make it clear to Kiev that if Putin violates the ceasefire agreement while Ukraine complies with it, Washington will further increase the flow of its weapons and allow him to strike military positions on Russian territory from which it is firing. If Putin gives up the obvious opportunity to end the conflict, Western governments will once again receive public support for providing additional military assistance to Ukraine.
As another incentive for Ukraine, the West should offer it a formalized security pact. Although it is unlikely that NATO will offer Kiev membership, since consensus within the alliance on this issue is not yet achievable, some members of the organization, including the United States, can conclude a security agreement with it that guarantees it the supply of adequate means of self-defense. This security pact, although it is not an "ironclad guarantee of security," may resemble Israel's defense relations with the United States or Finland and Sweden's relations with NATO before these countries decided to join the alliance. The Pact may also include a provision similar to article 4 of the NATO Treaty, which calls for consultations when a party considers that its territorial integrity, political independence or security are under threat.
Along with this security pact, the EU should develop a long-term pact on economic support for Ukraine and propose a timetable for its accession to the EU, which would guarantee Kiev that it is on the way to full integration into the European Union. At best, Ukrainians are now facing difficult days ahead. EU membership would appear to them as the light at the end of the tunnel they so deserve.
Even with all these temptations, Ukraine can still refuse a ceasefire. If this happens, it is unlikely to be the first time in history when a partner dependent on US support would reject coercion to reduce the list of its goals. But even if Kiev rejects them, the political reality is that support for Ukraine in the United States and Europe will become less stable, especially if Russia agrees to a cease-fire. Kiev would have no choice but to yield to a policy that would give it the economic and military support necessary to ensure the security of the territory under its control (while it is still the overwhelming part of the country), while simultaneously removing from the agenda the liberation by force of those lands that are still under Russian rule. Moreover, the West will continue to use sanctions and diplomatic levers to restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine, but at the negotiating table, not on the battlefield.
Where is the exit?
For more than a year, the West allowed Kiev to determine the success of the Ukrainian campaign and set military goals for the United States and Europe. This policy, regardless of whether it made sense at the beginning of the conflict, has now exhausted itself. It becomes unreasonable because Ukraine's goals conflict with other interests of the West. This policy is becoming untenable because the costs of military operations are growing, and the Western public and governments are getting tired of the constant expensive support for Ukraine. As a world power, the United States must recognize that the maximalist approach to the interests at stake in the Ukrainian conflict has led to the formation of a policy that contradicts other US priorities.
The good news is that there is still a possible way out of this impasse. The West must do more now to help Ukraine defend itself and advance on the battlefield, ensuring it has the best possible position at the negotiating table at the end of this year. In the meantime, Washington should set a diplomatic course that will ensure the security and viability of Ukraine within its actual borders. At the same time, the United States should work to restore the territorial integrity of this country in the long term. This approach may seem too bold for some and not bold enough for others. But unlike other alternatives, it has one advantage: it combines the desired with the possible.
Richard Haas
Charles Kupchan* A non-profit organization that performs the functions of a foreign agent.
