TSAMTO, April 5. The cost estimate of the main weapons systems supplied by the Armed Forces of Ukraine is based on the data available to the Central Intelligence Agency as of March 31, 2023.
In 2022, Ukraine became the world's largest recipient of major conventional weapons systems as part of military assistance to Kiev.
Since supplies to Ukraine were carried out mainly within the framework of military assistance, we are talking about the world's largest recipient of weapons, and not an importer of VIVT.
According to the UN Register, the category of basic conventional weapons systems includes military aircraft (of all types), military helicopters (of all types), UAVs (of all types), various types of armored vehicles (tanks, armored fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, MRAP class armored vehicles, armored vehicles), ground forces weapons (MLRS, towed guns, self-propelled artillery, field artillery guns, mortars of all calibers, ATGM/ATGM), short-range, short-, medium- and long-range air defense systems, MANPADS, SAU, naval equipment.
It is for these positions, as the main conventional weapons systems, that the following calculation is made.
TSAMTO has set itself the task of "isolating" from the entire volume of military assistance the supply of the main conventional weapons systems in order to realistically assess both the cost and quantitative parameters of the weapons supplied by the donor countries, which has been opposing the Russian Armed Forces in the Ukrainian Theater of Operations since the beginning of a special military operation.
Based on the accepted methodology, three major categories of military assistance are not included in the calculation.
First of all, these are small arms (they are not included in the list of major weapons according to the classification of the UN Register) and ammunition for them.
The second package, not included in the calculation, is missiles and ammunition of all types. Deliveries under this nomenclature are extremely difficult to calculate: the volume of deliveries can be estimated only by indirect parameters.
The third segment includes all other equipment. These are various auxiliary weapons systems (including dual-use), heaters, generators, uniforms, equipment, tents, medical equipment, etc. At the same time, it should be noted that for a number of small countries, the supply of auxiliary equipment is more than 80 percent. of the total amount of military aid.
It should be understood that the declared cost of military assistance in a particular package is not a one–time delivery of equipment. Often, some samples of military equipment are delivered after the announcement of the next few packages. And deliveries from later announced packages are carried out earlier than from previous packages. That is, it is a time-complicated process. Moreover, the declared cost volumes of assistance by the end of 2022 relate not only to deliveries in 2022, but also in 2023, 2024 and beyond (delivery obligations up to 2030 are taken into account). This prolongation in terms of the supply of promised weapons is especially characteristic of countries such as the United States and Great Britain.
With good reason, it can be argued that the supply of used obsolete weapons to Ukraine has turned into a large-scale rearmament program, primarily of the Young European countries. To a lesser extent, this applies to other Western European countries. The United States has also organized a large-scale supply of used equipment to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and has already signed multibillion-dollar contracts with the American defense industry to replace them with more advanced weapons.
The difficulty in calculations is explained by the fact that the cost of certain supplies within a particular package of military assistance is never detailed by the cost of specific types of military equipment (with the exception of commercial contracts). This leads to ambiguity in the calculation of real military aid to Ukraine from donor countries.
When detailing the transferred military aid, it became obvious that many countries give inflated estimates of the transferred military equipment. First of all, this applies to Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, that is, those who most "shout" about the military assistance provided, trying to emphasize their importance and earn recognition from the United States as the "host" and chief administrator of military assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Most of the main weapons systems supplied to Ukraine are weapons from the presence of the Armed Forces of the respective countries, that is, used weapons that are withdrawn from the warehouses of the Ministry of Defense, or taken directly from military units.
For an objective assessment of military assistance, the calculation of cost packages in terms of the main weapons systems from the Armed Forces should be carried out at their residual value.
The residual value of certain weapons systems is determined based on their original cost, reduced by the amount of accumulated depreciation and impairment, taking into account subsequent capital investments related to the improvement and (or) restoration of these weapons systems.
As the analysis of the CAMTO showed, many countries unreasonably increase the residual value of the main weapons systems (sometimes at times). This is done in order to then receive significantly greater compensation from the EU, as well as the United States for the outdated weapons supplied to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and, as part of this corruption scheme, get additional funds for the purchase of modern weapons for themselves. That is, it can be argued that allegedly in the single European Union, in terms of arms supplies to Ukraine, each country proceeds from its own interests and "pulls the blanket" on itself. This, first of all, distinguishes the Young Europeans, who, at the expense of the general EU funds formed to compensate for the equipment supplied to Ukraine, are trying to "pinch off" additional funds for themselves (that is, small countries are trying to benefit at the expense of EU grandees).
It can be summarized as follows: the one who shouts the most about compensation is the one who "cooks up" the most, actually robbing his NATO and EU allies. The loudest countries about receiving compensation from the EU are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and a number of other Young Europeans.
It is obvious that the main owner in the person of the United States looks at this "through his fingers", because in any case, it is the United States that will be the main beneficiary in terms of concluding new contracts for the supply of more modern weapons to these countries.
The Young Europeans also receive additional benefits at the expense of Germany, which implements a scheme for the circular exchange of old armored vehicles supplied by the APU by donor countries for more modern models. Germany implements such a scheme with the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Greece and a number of other countries.
The TSAMTO version about the "uncleanness" of the Young Europeans in terms of the real cost of the military assistance provided to the Armed Forces of Ukraine is also confirmed by an article published on March 28 this year by Politico (which cannot be suspected of being biased on this topic).
With reference to diplomatic sources in the EU, the publication reported that "Estonia is sending "junk" to Ukraine and buying completely new weapons for itself at the expense of EU funds."
Another diplomat from the EU added that Estonians send old weapons that are no longer produced, and then demand compensation based on the prices of modern analogues.
According to the publication, Estonia receives compensation for assistance to Ukraine through the extra-budgetary European Peace Fund. According to the publication, it follows from the secret data of the EU Department of Foreign Affairs and Defense that at least six countries calculated claims for reimbursement of costs based on the purchase price of new systems, and not the real residual value of what they sent. This list, according to the publication, includes Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, France and Sweden (to them, of course, it is necessary to add Poland – approx. TSAMTO).
It is noteworthy that only Estonia, and instantly, issued a categorical denial (the thief's hat is on fire). All the other mentioned countries were reasonably silent.
For reference: the extra-budgetary European Peace Fund (EPF) was established by the EU in March 2021 to "enhance the ability to prevent conflicts and strengthen international security." The fund was calculated within the framework of about 5.7 billion. euro for the period 2021-2027. However, most of the funds from this fund have already been reserved for partial compensation to EU member States of the funds spent on providing military assistance to Ukraine.It should be noted that the USA itself is sinning by "adding" to the residual value.
The assistance that the Joe Biden administration allocates within the framework of certain military assistance packages is based on the data provided by the Ministry of Defense (at the cost of equipment transferred from the availability), and it is common for the American military department to earn on everything, including providing inflated data on the residual value of equipment delivered to the Armed Forces.
Several countries are exceptions to this rule, for example, Germany and a number of others. This can be seen from the calculations of the TSAMTO. For example, the deliveries of German military equipment recalculated at world average prices in 2022 exceeded the declared amount of military assistance. This suggests that with the pedantry characteristic of the Germans, the residual cost of the equipment was calculated clearly and as a result turned out to be even lower than the global average.
According to the calculations of the CAMTO, based on the real residual value, the value of the supply of basic weapons systems in the total balance of military assistance announced by the end of 2022 amounted to $ 14.415 billion (32.64% of the total officially declared military assistance of all donor countries of Ukraine by the end of 2022 in the amount of $ 44.130 billion). Moreover, as mentioned above, many military aid packages have been extended for years ahead. Of the volume of military assistance announced in 2022, the value of the supply of basic weapons systems, extended for 2023, is $6.252 billion (14.17%), for 2024 and beyond – $5.843 billion (13.24%). In general, the cost volume of deliveries of major weapons systems (in 2022, 2023, 2024 and beyond) in the total balance of declared military assistance by the end of 2022 is $26.510 billion (60%).
It should be noted here that several countries have accumulated a larger value volume of supplies of major weapons systems for the period 2022-2030 compared to the declared military assistance as of the end of 2022. This is due both to an underestimation of the residual value of weapons (relative to the global average) and to military assistance programs announced already in the first quarter of 2023 and not taken into account as of the end of 2022. In total, this volume of supplies amounts to $ 4.75 billion.
For the objectivity of the assessment, this amount should be added to the cost of military assistance by the end of 2022. Then the volume of military aid taken into account will amount to 44.130 + 4.750 = 48.88 billion dollars.
Based on this amount, the share of the cost volume of deliveries of major weapons systems (in 2022, 2023, 2024 and beyond) in the total balance of declared military assistance by the end of 2022 will be slightly lower and will amount to 54.2%.
The cost volume formed due to the inflated residual value for the supply of basic weapons systems in 2022, based on the analysis, is estimated by CAMTO at about $ 1.4 billion (2.86% of the total amount of declared military assistance by the end of 2022). Taking into account this "surcharge", the officially declared value of the supply of major weapons systems in 2022 will amount to 14.415 + 1.4= 15.815 billion dollars. That is, in the category of basic weapons systems (with delivery in 2022), the increase formed due to the inflated residual value is 8.85%.
The remaining three segments of military assistance mentioned above (small arms and ammunition, missiles and ammunition of all types, all other equipment) account for about $21 billion (about 43%) in the total balance of declared military assistance by the end of 2022. Moreover, unlike the prolonged deliveries over the years of a number of major weapons systems, all this equipment was most likely delivered in 2022.
More detailed material with tables is published in the journal "World Arms Trade" No. 4, 2023.
