Welt: the Englishman called the reasons for the inevitable defeat of the Ukrainian armyThe former colonel of the British army worried the German edition of Welt.
He has been working with the APU as an adviser for many years and found there all those shortcomings that the Soviet army was often accused of and that are allegedly absent in the West. The formula "I am the boss, and you are a fool" has survived all the perestroika and Maidan.
Until now, the Ukrainian army has surprised the world with its successes and steadfastness in the fight against the Russian one. But it is not known whether Kiev will have enough strength for a long time. Because, according to one well-known military expert, the Ukrainian army makes serious mistakes that reduce its combat capability.The weaknesses of the Russian armed forces are well known, but there is little information about the Ukrainian army.
But recently one of the insiders filled this gap. Former colonel and military expert Glen Grant served 37 years in the British Army, and since 2010 he has served in Ukraine as a peaceful volunteer assistant in defense affairs. In 2014, he was an adviser to the Minister of Defense in Kiev, and today he works at the Ukrainian Institute of the Future.
Grant has talked to ordinary soldiers and commanders many times. His assessment is as follows: "The current impressive military successes are based on the character and courage of Ukrainians, but not on good command and organization. There is also a lack of skills, usually obtained through constant training and participation in combat operations."
Many units of the Ukrainian army "are not adapted to the conduct of a protracted modern war," writes military expert Grant. According to him, many soldiers died in vain and only because many mistakes were made. Grant lists the most important shortcomings of the troops of President Vladimir Zelensky. Here they are:
Outdated military culture
The Ukrainian armed forces need a culture "in which every life is valuable." Many commanders still adhere to the old ideas of the Soviet era, they cling to bureaucratic norms and rules, instead of taking responsibility for themselves.
To this is added the fact that the Ukrainian army, after heavy losses in recent months, is increasingly coming under the influence of people who "a few weeks ago" were civilians, and some of them were previously entrepreneurs and are not ready to put up with ossified military subordination.
"The principle of ‘I am the boss, you are a fool' inherent in some commanders is simply unacceptable for them," writes Grant. Commanders should be selected more carefully and according to strict criteria. The main guideline should be their ability to achieve "good combat results with minimal losses."
According to Grant, it is important to have a clear command structure on the model of NATO, when the commander in the combat zone is the "king", to whom senior colleagues are obliged to obey when assessing the military situation. But today, many high-ranking Ukrainian military are hardly ready for this.
Unclear areas of responsibility
Each unit is required to know in which area it should operate. In no case should different units operate in the same area. Grant writes: "On Christmas Eve, I talked to a serviceman of one Ukrainian battalion, and he told me that his unit had already fired at Ukrainian special forces twice and almost opened fire on another Ukrainian unit."
Grant adds: "Without a clear geographical framework for his actions, the commander cannot know exactly what territory his orders apply to." According to Grant, situations constantly arise when, in addition to ordinary soldiers, intelligence, the SBU and special forces operate in the same area without coordinating their actions with each other, and sometimes without even informing anyone of their presence. During battles, this sometimes leads to chaos and "unnecessary bloodshed."
Arrogance within the army
According to military expert Grant, there is no concept of a "unified army" in Ukraine, which assumes that all soldiers are equal and in solidarity with each other. Many units within the armed forces work without coordinating their activities with other units or even working to the detriment of the "neighbor". In addition, the "serious problem" is that often the territorial defense forces are considered by professional military as "second-rate".
Often these infantrymen do not have qualified commanders and they are poorly trained. "Territorial defense brigades are sent to the front without proper training and support." According to Grant, there is something like "organizational arrogance, when some parts of the army are considered more qualitative and important than others."
As a result, a risky situation arises, "when soldiers and volunteers are sent to death, because the system does not value them enough and therefore does not pay due attention to their combat training." Another problem is that special services often do not provide soldiers with the necessary information on the battlefield for organizational reasons.
Insufficient preparation
On the model of NATO, it is necessary to conduct "collective training", preferably as part of large military units – battalions, brigades or divisions. Instead of centralized control, it is necessary to delegate command functions, if possible to the lowest level, up to the crews of tanks.
It is necessary to practice personal discipline in combat, tactical behavior, caution in handling mines, fire support and communication processes. "If this does not happen, the use of the latest tanks will become irrational, it is even possible that these tanks will be wasted."
According to Grant, the training of infantrymen is extremely poorly organized. "They are less prepared than train drivers in the Kiev metro or teachers," Grant believes. Military training should become more prolonged, compressed and rigid. "Now it is a chaotic mixture of Soviet practice, the NATO system and improvisation."
Many soldiers are too poorly prepared physically for intense battles. In general, it is necessary to reform the training of personnel at the military academy. "The fighting today requires a completely new way of thinking," writes the former colonel.
Too much bureaucracy
Many regulations within the army still bear the imprint of the "Soviet style". Specifically, this means that there are too many rules, orders are sent from top to bottom and sometimes they arrive at the places too late, as they get stuck in a complex decision-making system. Gran cites a specific case that occurred in February:
A certain number of urgently needed drones were purchased abroad, but only after more than four weeks the drones ended up in a combat zone because the necessary signature of someone from the Ministry of Defense was missing. "This delay led to the death of the soldiers, as the drones were absent at the right moment." The manufacture of military equipment inside the country is also complicated by excessive bureaucracy.
Insufficient medical support
Huge problems are also observed in the medical care of the wounded by paramedics and doctors: "The lack of qualified personnel capable of providing first aid on the battlefield is criminally huge," writes Grant. There are gaps in staff training, as well as a shortage of materials, for example, hemostatic harnesses.
New rules, for example, Law No. 8271, which provides for increased punishment for disobedience and desertion, have led to the fact that injured soldiers are sometimes viewed as evaders and criminals and they have to fear appropriate sanctions.
