Military reform: the experience of an overseas enemyThe next reform of the armed forces initiated in Russia involuntarily forces us to pay attention to how such problems are viewed "over the hill".
In the last two decades, a lot of attention has been paid to the issues of military construction in the United States. We have already considered a number of provisions (" American guidelines for military reform ", "HBO" dated 11/29/13). But today it seems useful to remind and refresh them.
A BIG BUDGET IS NOT A GUARANTEEAmerican experts reasonably question the thesis that supposedly the larger the defense budget, the more powerful the armed forces.
If there was a direct link between the cost of the state's military machine and its ability to fulfill its role, says Winslow Wheeler, then France and Great Britain should have defeated Germany back in 1940. And the United States would have dealt with Vietnam in the mid-1960s and quickly "pacified" Iraq and Afghanistan. The latter also applies to the USSR, which did not save money for the war "across the river".
These arguments are also relevant to weapons and military equipment (IWT). A striking example is the Soviet tank of the Second World War T-34, much simpler and cheaper than the German "Tigers" or "Panthers", which eventually turned out to be "losers". The high cost of a weapon can mean its uselessness – complexity in manufacturing and management.
DO NOT OVERESTIMATE INNOVATIONSAt the same time, the high tactical and technical characteristics (TTX) of individual samples of weapons do not solve the problem as a whole.
The desire to qualify individual cases of the successful use of new models of military equipment in the conflicts of the late twentieth – early twenty-first century as "the embodiment of the revolution in military affairs," reformers believe, was premature.
The episodes of the destruction of objects in Iraq and Afghanistan by American precision weapons shown on TV more than once were actually not so frequent. On average, according to statistics, it took up to several tons of weapons to destroy one bridge, which did not meet the "cost–effectiveness" criterion. And "striking blows" on enemy armored vehicles from the air were generally isolated cases.
Partially implemented in American units, the "unified system of sensors, computers and communication devices", thanks to which enemy targets had to be opened at long distances and hit with one hundred percent probability, did not justify the hopes placed on it: it was too expensive and ineffective.
Huge amounts of information simply "overloaded" the commanders in the field, arriving also belatedly. Intelligence about the deployment and actions of local opponents, transmitted by "generals and colonels sitting at headquarters in Qatar or Tampa (Florida)," was simply ignored by many commanders on the ground – as "cluttering up more reliable messages from their own grassroots intelligence agencies." In the late 1990s, Jeffrey Barlow's research resonated, which emphasized "the inevitable failure in the future with attempts to "control" the battle through a complex network of communications from "remote" higher headquarters to lower-level commanders immersed in the real, rapidly changing situation on the battlefield."
But in recent years, the point of view on the effectiveness of the use of electronic means to control combat operations, as well as new high-precision ammunition, has changed to the exact opposite. This was allegedly facilitated by "unforeseen" achievements in science, promptly embodied in new means of armed struggle. Including the massive use of drones (UAVs) and space assets.
Although it's still too early to draw final conclusions. Now the "ball is on the side" of the means of counteraction (the same electronic warfare), which have also been developed in recent years.
BALANCE DURING OPTIMIZATIONAt the beginning of the XXI century, the issue of "optimization" of management bodies became acute – and was not solved in the most successful way.
The main leitmotif was the fashion for centralization of management – that is, the concentration of powers in the hands of one person or body.
At the same time, the work of mechanisms that could bring real improvements was ignored or limited. The system of checks and "balances of interests", which affects the analysis of incoming proposals in the spirit of the struggle of ideas and competitiveness, was leveled. Decisions were made based on the opinion of the "chosen ones" or on the results of the research of one "close to the superiors of the school."
On the other hand, centralization was sometimes useful. Many reformers, being supporters of the decentralized "Anglo–Saxon model" of military management, were forced to admit that the position of an official, solely responsible for the acquisition of weapons ("king of acquisitions"), introduced in the Pentagon in accordance with the "Goldwater-Nichols Law" (1986), contributed to the streamlining of the distribution of contracts and the entry into the troops of the really best samples of military equipment.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE LAST CENTURYAs many experts emphasize, the US military machine, being the largest and most powerful in the world, is an example of an inflexible organizational structure, little adapted and even hindering the fulfillment of tasks that arise in a dynamically changing environment.
U.S. Marine Corps Officer Eric Mellinger indignantly notes in this regard: "The modern headquarters is a vestige of the industrial age, embodying a rigid hierarchy, a vertical of subordination and accountability for the work done." Again, we are talking about the opposition of decentralized ("Anglo-Saxon") and centralized ("Prussian/Soviet") management models.
Arnaud Penzia, an analyst from Bell's laboratory, complains that the management structure in the US Armed Forces crushes talented and enterprising officers and hinders the exchange of information. The hierarchical structure of the organization, writes Pencia, should be such that at every level any member of it has the right to say "no".
The way out of this situation is seen in the introduction of a compromise model into the military management system: "matrix staff structures" of the type that are created in the form of temporary commissions to solve specific tasks in the civilian sphere and in business.
Colonel of the US Armed Forces John Price gives such an example. During the liquidation of the consequences of the catastrophic earthquake in Haiti in January 2010, in which the US military actively participated, the commander of the United Southern Command of the US Armed Forces, Admiral James Stavridis, formed a "matrix staff structure" for operational guidance of the actions of his subordinates. It included officers from various management bodies who promptly solved unexpected tasks. But as other organizations and departments – both American and international – were included in the operation, the work of the headquarters that had been established began to fail. And Stavridis had to return to the usual practice of staff work – with delays, duplication and overpayments.
The "matrix structure" is designed to simplify staff procedures. Instead of narrowly functional departments-departments focused on personnel, intelligence, logistics, etc., the "transformed headquarters" will dissolve all functions in the areas of execution of orders. To do this, specialists are organized into cells (teams) capable of teamwork. This approach allegedly will not only ensure the efficiency of staff work by eliminating bureaucracy and duplication, but also reduce the number of colonel-general positions.
VERIFIED APPROACHWhen dealing with issues related to the reorganization of military structures, whether they are headquarters or combat formations, a proven approach is needed.
Winslow Wheeler gives such an example. In the 1990s, Douglas McGregor's study "Breaking through the Phalanx: a New Structure of Ground Power of the XXI century" was popular among the initiators of the reforms of the US military machine. The author argued that the main unit of the US ground forces – the division – is adapted for military operations against the Soviet army in Eurasia, and not for conflicts in different regions of the world in the post-Cold War period. Because the division is "too heavy" for long-distance transfers and "unwieldy" in a local conflict with an "unconventional mobile enemy." According to McGregor, the main formation of the SV should be a brigade structure.
The leadership of the US Military took this idea. The reorganization of the SV formations into "brigade combat groups" or OOF ("joint operational formations" of the brigade or reinforced battalion level) has begun. This process has led to the "shriveling" of traditional brigades, reducing in their composition the means of providing all kinds. The number of brigades has increased, but the combat power of each of them has decreased in comparison with the divisions. But the number of brigade staffs, colonel and general positions has increased. But in the end I had to admit that it was too early to give up divisions.
PEOPLE, NOT IRONA significant problem in the reorganization of the military machine is the problem of training military personnel, and above all officer cadres.
The authorities concentrate on material values, on military hardware, but often forget about selection for service in the Armed Forces, military education and training. In other words, the emphasis is on "hardware" to the detriment of people.
But even military leaders, according to Colonel Robert Killebrew, are not concerned about the formation of a "new caste of commanders." During the Cold War, the American system of training military personnel reached certain heights. Faced in 1991 in Iraq with a military machine prepared according to the patterns of the "traditional Soviet school of military art", Commander General Schwarzkopf emphasized that the American servicemen were so well trained that if they were put in Soviet models of equipment and, conversely, the Iraqis – in American equipment, the result would be the same: defeat the Iraqi army.
James Stevenson gave an example when aviator instructors flying outdated F-5s, as a rule, emerged victorious in training "battles" with cadets flying modern F-14 and F-15. Hence, American supporters of reforms conclude that a motivated and trained soldier is more valuable for combat than a specialist who mediocrely owns even the most modern equipment.
"THE BRAINS OF THE COMMANDER"Donald Vandergriff, author of the study "The Path to Victory: the American Army and the Revolution in the Humanitarian Sphere", recommended the creation of an education system for military leaders, which should replace the established system of officer training.
According to Vandergriff, the Armed Forces need not so much high-speed aircraft as fast-working brains of commanders who can instantly make the right decisions, which will give a huge advantage on the battlefield. Vandergriff gives recommendations on how to form the thinking of an officer who could "think soberly in conditions of combat stress." American commanders trained in the spirit of the second generation of wars (World War I) often found themselves outsiders on the battlefields of World War II with Germans adapted to the requirements of the wars of the third generation. Vandergriff calls for studying the system of training officers of the Prussian army of the XIX century. The practice of "careful consideration by the commander of each decision, rather than instant response to every change in the situation without thinking," brought to automatism should be put at the forefront.
MORAL ISSUESQuestions of morality from the point of view of American military science are spread from the bottom to the top, from the unit to the highest military and political leadership of the country.
At the level of a squad, platoon or company, the question arises of forming a "cohesive unit team", creating a specific atmosphere conducive to the development of mutual trust and respect, which allow you to endure stress while maintaining combat cohesion. Servicemen have no right to show feelings of "disgust" towards their colleagues, "unwillingness" to carry out a command, to show their cowardice. Vandergriff and his associates believe that the system of education of military personnel in the XX century was based on "industrial principles": each individual was considered by the authorities as a "cog in the mechanism", which can always be replaced by another. It was only in recent years that US military leaders allegedly realized the depravity of such an attitude.
The ties that unite military collectives, as Wheeler emphasizes, should also spread vertically, permeating the entire military organization from bottom to top. A unit in which there is no trust in a superior commander is unable to fulfill the task assigned by this commander. And if the commander does not trust his subordinates, humiliates their behavior in battle with excessive regulation, he is also doomed to failure. The order "to take such a hill" or "to destroy the enemy formation" looks much more convincing from the point of view of the commander's trust in subordinates than a detailed regulated document such as "to advance such a distance to such a hill, by such a time, using such and such means," etc.
The mutual trust of the command and troops is crucial during a military action of any scale. The defeat of the Americans in Vietnam is a consequence of the "moral failure" in relations along the line of "state leadership – armed forces". The series of failures of the American military machine in Iraq and Afghanistan is a consequence of the low authority of the leaders of the Pentagon and the leadership of the country as a whole.
Planning transformations in the armed Forces of any state is associated with a difficult to predict international situation. As Colonel Killebrew notes, if in 1913 American military forecasters were asked about what the US Armed Forces would be in 50 years, they would say: "At least three infantry divisions, one reinforced infantry regiment for the defense of the Panama Canal and one in the Philippines. Maybe a hundred more planes."
Sergey PechurovSergey Leonidovich Pechurov – Major General of the reserve, Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor.
