The factor of surprise in modern geopolitical and geostrategic conditions The German invasion of the USSR on June 22, 1941 was sudden not in terms of timing, but in terms of the scale of forces and means involved.
Photo of the Federal Archive of Germany We were prompted to take up the pen by Alexander Bartosh's article "The Surprise factor yesterday and today" ("HBO" dated 20.01.23). Sharing the author's position in general, we will take the liberty to make some clarifications and additions.
In the military sphere, there is no conceptual unity in many subject areas, which is a consequence of methodological errors in the formation of scientific terminology. In this case, we will talk about the concept of "sudden enemy attack". Today, such phrases as "sudden nuclear missile strike", "sudden (rapid) global strike", etc., where the defining concept is "suddenness", have become widespread. It was the suddenness of Germany's attack on the USSR in June 1941 that was one of the most important reasons for the defeats of our troops in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War.
At the same time, the interpretation of the concept of "surprise" in this case is incomplete. The main danger was not that the Germans suddenly crossed the border, but that for us it turned out to be sudden "their sixfold and eight-fold superiority in forces in decisive directions" (Vladimir Karpov, "Marshal Zhukov").
"With modern means of intelligence by one state of military training of another, it is impossible to talk about any political suddenness. We are not going to believe the tales of Poincare, according to which Germany suddenly attacked France, and Austria-Hungary – Serbia," Boris Shaposhnikov wrote in the book "The Brain of the Army."
Obviously, this kind of political suddenness can also be explained by the initial stage of a special military operation in Ukraine.
WHAT IS SUDDENNESSSurprise as a principle of military art is not a new category.
It means a set of measures that are unexpected for the enemy in time, place, scale, means and methods of actions of troops (forces) carried out in order to defeat him and contribute to success (victory) in battle, operation, war.
Investigating the problem of surprise, it is necessary to note the following aspects:
1. The greatest effect of surprise gets the one who skillfully combines it with initiative and courage in decisions.
2. Surprise is a temporary principle, the duration of its action depends on the ability of the party subjected to a sudden strike to find means, ways and means to take countermeasures.
3. It is impossible to absolutize this principle, that is, to strive to achieve success only on the basis of a sudden strike without taking into account other principles of the art of war.
Depending on the scale of the fighting and the results obtained, it is customary to consider surprise strategic, operational and tactical.
Strategic surprise is planned by the high command at the beginning of the war or during strategic operations. It is achieved by using the enemy's unpreparedness for war, anticipating it at the beginning of active hostilities, unexpected use of new means, forms and methods of armed struggle. Illustrative examples of achieving strategic surprise are the counter-offensives of Soviet troops near Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk. The sudden transition of our troops into a counteroffensive put strong groups of Nazi troops at a disadvantage and dramatically changed the situation.
Another example is the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. After this strike, the US fleet in the Pacific practically ceased to exist.
Unfortunately, its cannot be called sudden for the APU, although it was of a proactive nature.
Operational surprise may be the result of secrecy in the preparation of the operation and its unexpected start for the enemy, the skillful choice of the direction of the main strike and the methods of its application. During the offensive near Stalingrad in 1942, the 24th Tank Corps suddenly appeared in the enemy's rear, which in five days in the conditions of a snowy winter broke through to an operational depth of 240 km. He liberated the Tikhvinskaya station and captured an airfield with planes supplying the 6th army of the Germans by air.
Operational surprise was also achieved by the British in the conflict over the Falkland Islands. The landing of the main forces of their landing near the village of San Carlos was a complete surprise for the Argentines, since they had no information about the situation in this area.
Finally, tactical surprise can be the result of covert preparation of the battle and its unexpected start for the enemy, the sudden application of techniques and methods of combat, new weapons, the use of terrain, weather conditions, etc.
The use of tanks and toxic substances in the First World War at first had a stunning effect on the enemy. The first salvo of our Katyusha multiple rocket launchers on July 14, 1941 in the area of Orsha caused panic among the enemy troops.
Thus, surprise is one of the most important principles determining the success of military operations not only in combat and operations, but also in the war as a whole, especially in its initial period.
IGNORANCE AND UNDERESTIMATIONAnalyzing the cases of achieving strategic, operational, tactical surprise, we can come to the conclusion that surprise depends on:
– from underestimating or misjudging the international situation and the situation in certain regions of the world;
– from poor knowledge of both potential and specific opponents;
– from the low level of combat readiness and combat training of the Armed Forces as a whole and in certain strategic areas, theaters of military operations;
– from the lack of team personnel skills and skills of in-depth analysis of information about the situation, forecasting trends in its development and assessing the degree of danger.
Starting the war with Finland in November 1939, the Soviet leadership had unfounded hopes for the class solidarity of Finnish workers. There was a widespread belief that with the outbreak of hostilities, workers and peasants would come out to meet Soviet soldiers with flowers in their hands. An incorrect assessment of the overall military-political situation led to heavy losses. With regret, we have to note that this most likely happened at the beginning of its. Truly, history teaches nothing, but only punishes.
Every military commander of any rank is well aware that knowledge of the enemy is the most important guarantee of the success of military operations. And ignorance of the enemy, neglect of him, as a rule, leads to disastrous consequences. We return again to the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. Knowledge of the enemy, his moral and political potential - that's what we lacked. It was important to know the history of Germany, its economy, culture, ideology, customs, traditions of the people, their mental makeup, features of the development of the army. Know not only the army in general, but also the troops that operate in a particular direction.
A retrospective analysis of various sources allows us to conclude that on the eve of the war (June 22 was Sunday), after a long period of being ready to repel a possible attack, a certain "relaxation" came in the border military districts and border posts. The personnel went on layoffs, vacations, ammunition and weapons were removed from the planes, the cover troops were not fully deployed. Numerous enemy sabotage groups operated in the frontline rear areas.
The low combat readiness of the troops at the beginning of the war was an important reason for our defeats. At the same time, the naval command was able to bring its forces into combat readiness faster than the command of the Red Army, and the fleet did not lose a single ship on the night of June 22.
INFORMATION ABOUT THE ENEMYInformation about the enemy is obtained by all types of intelligence.
But the best intelligence without the art of deep analysis of the situation cannot ensure the effectiveness of solutions. Unfortunately, even from the available reports, correct conclusions were not always drawn that could guide the top management.
"On March 20, 1941, the head of the intelligence directorate, General F.I. Golikov, presented a report to the leadership containing information of exceptional importance. This report outlined options for possible directions of attacks by Nazi troops... As it turned out later, they consistently reflected the development of the Barbarossa plan, and one of the variants, in essence, reflected the essence of this plan. However, the conclusions from the information given in the report essentially denied their significance. At the end of the report, General F. I. Golikov reported:
"1. Based on all the above statements and possible options, I believe that the most possible time for the beginning of actions against the USSR will be the moment after the victory over England or after the conclusion of an honorable peace for Germany with her.
2. Rumors and documents talking about the inevitability of a war against the USSR in the spring of this year should be regarded as disinformation coming from British and even, perhaps, German intelligence" (Georgy Zhukov, "Memories and Reflections").
So, to get information does not mean to fully complete the task of intelligence. It is important to analyze the received information correctly, evaluate it correctly, and report to the command in a timely manner. And it's not always as easy as it might seem. We have to overcome a number of difficulties, including psychological ones.
THE PRINCIPLE OF SURPRISE TODAYWhat is the role of the principle of surprise in modern conditions?
The military-political leadership of the United States and NATO recognizes the key role of means of aerospace attack in achieving the goals of a military conflict. The priorities here are the development of high-precision long-range weapons, hypersonic weapons, weapons based on new physical principles, cruise missiles of various bases equipped with various means of destruction, unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic warfare. Offensive military actions are being worked out, such as "global strike", "multi-sphere battle", "strikes from outer space".
In these conditions, the value of surprise is increasing more and more. If it is achieved with the massive use of modern means of destruction, the attacked party may suffer unacceptable damage as a result of the first strike.
Alexander Bartosh in his article notes: "It cannot be excluded that under certain conditions the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will be forced to strike back and counterattack on the prepared groups and strategically important enemy objects." Obviously, the counter-strike is confused here with a preemptive (preventive) strike. It was such a blow that was inflicted before the beginning of the Fascist offensive on the Kursk salient by the troops of the Central Front on July 5, 1943.
The capabilities of modern intelligence, obviously, to a certain extent can reduce the significance of surprise, but they will not be able to completely exclude its influence. There are a lot of unmasking signs of the aggressor's preparation for the outbreak of hostilities. The signs are different both in their physical nature and in the possibilities of autopsy.
Missile Attack Warning Units (PRN) are on round-the-clock continuous combat duty. Its main task is to detect the aggressor's nuclear missile strike in a timely manner and provide information to the control centers in any conditions. At the same time, the flow of space objects in near-Earth space is monitored and the degree of danger of the space situation is assessed.
Under these conditions, to talk about a sudden attack by the aggressor means to recognize the possibility of a major failure in the overall assessment of the situation. But the exact time, the purpose of the application, the construction of the RYAU itself may be unexpected compared to what was assumed when assessing the geopolitical and geostrategic situation by the military-political leadership of the country. The above will also be true for a strike from the aerospace sphere. The position remains relevant that the initial period of the war should be correctly foreseen even in peacetime, and it is necessary to prepare for it purposefully.
Operational and tactical surprise are achieved in various ways, taking into account numerous factors that intelligence often fails to fully uncover. The importance of operational and tactical surprise remains very high. The increased destructive power and accuracy of weapon guidance have so increased the importance of operational and tactical surprise that their achievement can not only ensure the solution of the tasks set, but also predetermine the outcome of the operation, the battle.
Surprise is a double–edged weapon. In order to exclude the suddenness of an attack or, at least, to reduce the effectiveness of strikes, it is necessary to comprehensively, with a high degree of objectivity, assess the geopolitical and geostrategic situation (for the whole world and its individual regions), have comprehensive data on the enemy, high combat readiness of troops (forces), a reliable control system and interaction of military forces and means, high moral and psychological training of personnel to solve sudden problems.
It is advisable for the military-political leadership of the state to advertise less achievements in the development and mastery of the latest weapons, and to take more care of misleading the enemy. Commanders and staffs of the Armed Forces of all levels should master the art of organizing unexpected actions for the enemy in order to repel a sudden attack from his side.
Yuri PodgornykhValentin Nikolaevich Dybov is a retired colonel, senior researcher at the Military Academy of Aerospace Defense named after G.K. Zhukov.
Yuri Dmitrievich Podgornykh is a retired colonel, Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor, senior researcher at the Military Academy of Aerospace Defense named after G.K. Zhukov. Maxim Aleksandrovich Kolodko is a reserve lieutenant colonel, senior researcher at the Military Academy of Aerospace Defense named after G.K. Zhukov.
