Friction, wear and lubrication in the global hybrid war"The United States has unleashed a total hybrid war against Russia, which is fraught with a real danger of a direct military clash between two nuclear powers," the Russian Foreign Ministry said on February 8, 2023.
This requires drawing the attention of politicians, diplomats and the military to the phenomenon of hybrid warfare.
A special military operation (SVO) in Ukraine can be considered as a kind of transitional stage from the military (built on a combination of non-force and force operations) to classical military operations. Before that, Washington managed to implement a full range of GW tools in Ukraine: informational and psychological impact, color revolution, proxy war.
Taking into account the experience of ITS own, it is advisable to study the influence of some factors that determine the course, and often the outcome of military conflicts. These are factors that have received the names of "friction", "wear" and "lubrication" of war in military theory ("Friction" and "wear" of hybrid war". "Military Thought", No. 1, 2018).
The phenomenon of "friction" allows us to explain why a lot of things go wrong during the war, as expected, and to make the necessary adjustments to the strategy. Forecasting the "wear and tear of war" allows you to update strategic planning documents in a timely manner, plan the supply of weapons and military equipment, and the rotation of personnel. "Lubrication" reduces the negative impact of friction and wear on the course of military operations.
FRICTION IN HYBRID WARFAREKarl Clausewitz emphasized that "friction is the only concept that, in general, distinguishes a real war from a paper war."
In other words, in a war there can be a huge distance from what is conceived to what is being realized. The correctness of this idea has been confirmed in all military conflicts, including its planned as Russia's response to the US proxy war in Ukraine ("The US is chaoticizing Greater Eurasia ", "HBO" from 02.02.23).
The factors of friction and wear are not fully taken into account today when planning military operations. Hence the surprises when operations begin to develop clearly not according to the plan of military planners. I will refer to Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Andrei Kokoshin: "The phenomenon of the concept of friction of war, introduced by Clausewitz, is of great importance for understanding war as a sphere of the uncertain and unreliable… At the same time, the concept of "friction" of war in the post-war decades practically disappeared from domestic military scientific works." We add that in the pre-war years, the friction factor of the war was taken into account in the documents of the General Staff of the Red Army under the heading "secret".
Features of the World Hybrid War (MGW) as a conflict designed for many years, in which diverse forces and means are involved, friction turns into a source of significant disturbances in the course of hostilities, giving them the character of an unmanageable and even unmanageable process.
For traditional warfare, Clausewitz identifies seven sources of general friction: danger; physical tension; uncertainty and unreliability of information on the basis of which decisions are made; random events that cannot be predicted; physical and political limitations in the use of force; unpredictability due to interaction with the enemy; gaps between the causes and consequences of war. The list of friction sources for MGV looks wider.
NEW SOURCES OF FRICTIONThe following features contribute to the emergence of new or increased danger of former sources of friction in a proxy war.
Firstly, the decisive role of friction is determined by the very essence of proxy war. This is a military conflict between two States that are trying to achieve their goals through military actions on the territory and using the resources of a third country, under the guise of resolving an internal conflict in this third country. Most often, this is a civil war, which was provoked by the state – the customer of the proxy war and the manipulator of the proxy agent's actions. The presence of three or more proxy war actors increases the likelihood of unplanned situations and thickens the "fog of war", which serves as a source of friction.
Secondly, a variety of hybrid threats, the duration of the proxy war and its calculation for the exhaustion and collapse of the victim state play a role in the occurrence of accidents as catalysts of friction and wear. The client of the proxy war uses the strategy of starvation, which gives the conflict a permanent destructive character. The consequences of accidents range from tactical to strategic and require the use of methods of scientific foresight. "It is difficult to deal with the unexpected," Machiavelli wrote, "with everything foreseen in advance, it is easy."
Taking into account the nonlinear nature of the GW, as a result of friction, tactical-level phenomena receive the power of a strategic catalyst capable of influencing the course of the entire military campaign. Cascade amplification mechanisms assert themselves with particular force in MGV. Small events trigger unexpected and unpredictable processes that cannot be evaluated within the framework of any theory. In a proxy war, the catalysts can be diplomatic demarches, economic sanctions, the supply of new weapons systems, man-made man-made disasters, terrorist attacks on communications, attempts on leaders, etc. The totality of sources of friction is usually greater than their simple sum, since some types of friction interact with others, which increases the destructive result.
Thirdly, the "uncertainty and unreliability of information" mentioned by Clausewitz. It should be recognized that during the preparation of its governing bodies were not fully provided with reliable information about the degree of readiness of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for resistance. This became a serious source of friction, almost immediately "something went wrong".
Important sources of friction at the initial stage of its were unjustified hopes for the advantage of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation as the management of military operations and for overwhelming military-technical superiority. The ability of the proxy war customer to quickly consolidate the efforts of about 50 states for political, financial, military and military-technical assistance to Ukraine was also not taken into account.
Fourth, let us pay attention to Clausewitz's thesis about the gap between cause and effect, which leads to the violation or disruption of military plans.
The concept of social determinism asserts that the main sources of wars are contradictions of public order: economic, political, moral, religious-confessional, interethnic, etc. Motivations associated with nationalism and ethnic identification were used during the ideological impact on the population of fascist Germany.
Similar technologies were used by the United States and the Kiev rulers in the Civil War in Ukraine to incite nationalist, Russophobic, anti-Russian sentiments. The economic and military-political motivations of the United States and NATO as customers of the proxy war are undeniable.
An important reason for its response to Kiev's actions was Russia's desire to prevent the genocide of the Russian-speaking population of Donbass, to achieve the neutral status of Ukraine, to prevent its entry into NATO. The proxy war unleashed by the United States, the transformation of the territory of Ukraine into a springboard for military aggression by the United States and NATO against Russia is also the reason for the actions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to curb the aggressor.
The escalation of hostilities in Ukraine will result from the supply of heavy armored vehicles, long-range missiles and modern combat aircraft to Kiev by the United States and NATO. The logical consequence of the planned deliveries was the statement of the Russian leaders about the use of "the most serious weapons" as a counteraction measure.
The principle of anticipating enemy actions requires strengthening the reconnaissance of routes for the transfer of new batches of weapons to Ukraine, the use of special operations forces, the suppression of air defense systems and the subsequent use of missiles, strategic and assault aircraft to disrupt the transfer.
At a certain stage of escalation, airfields, ports and land communications of NATO countries used as transshipment points may become objects of the use of the "most serious" weapons. The time will come to reconsider (again according to Clausewitz) the "physical and political restrictions on the use of force", which can act as powerful sources of friction in their own, leading to its prolongation and unnecessary sacrifices.
A serious source of friction is the actions of the "fifth column" and agents of influence in Russia, which must be suppressed by organizational measures and counterintelligence operations.
WEAR AND TEAR IN HYBRID WARFAREThe "wear and tear" of war is the depreciation of the resources available to the subjects of the civil War due to the loss of their (resources) quality.
For GW as a multidimensional and long-term conflict, the wear factor is important. Three groups of war wear should be distinguished.
Physical wear and tear is the deterioration of the state of manpower resources, weapons and military equipment, technologies, the capabilities of industry and agriculture to meet the needs of the country.
Moral wear and tear – loss of quality of resources due to the duration of GW and insufficient rates of renewal and replenishment. Combatants and civilians in the combat zone, as well as strategies, concepts, and ideological attitudes of war subjects are subject to moral deterioration.
Economic depreciation is the loss of resource efficiency under the influence of economic factors, depreciation of tangible assets (primarily industrial, transport, social infrastructure facilities) up to the loss of their properties.
An analogue of the "wear and tear of war" in foreign sources is the concept of war wear, describing the state of the elements of war that, as a result of a prolonged conflict, are close to exhaustion, "dejected by war or completely exhausted."
The triad "friction-lubrication-wear" has a decisive influence on the implementation of the strategy of war, contributes to a significant, often unpredictable transformation of the elements of any war. In GW, due to its multidimensionality, duration, uncertainty and a wide range of participants, the impact of wear is very significant. Under the influence of wear and tear, resources gradually "melt", which eventually requires a way out of the war and consolidating the results achieved.
Wear is a constant phenomenon. By implementing a strategy of war, it is possible to slow down the process of depreciation of resources of all kinds, but it cannot be completely prevented. There are three wear periods.
The first period is characteristic of the initial work on the temporal and spatial coordination of all elements of the GW provided for by its strategy. This is a period of mutual development and establishment of interaction between the political, economic, information and military-power components of both sides.
The second period expresses the normal interaction between the elements of the GW, which, when coordinated, ensure the achievement of the goals and objectives of the offensive or defensive strategy.
In the third period, the wear of the resources of the GW reaches the limit values. Decisions are required on a further strategy aimed at exiting the war and consolidating the results achieved or at attracting additional resources to continue the war.
LUBRICATION IN HYBRID WARFAREThere are peculiar lubricants that allow you to reduce friction and wear in any military vehicle, including MGV.
The presence of strategic nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence forces, a flexible adaptive offensive or defense strategy, a country's worthy place in the group of technologically advanced states, combat experience, good training of the armed Forces, the availability of a mobilization reserve, stocks of weapons and ammunition, strict discipline, a well-thought-out information strategy, continuous intelligence, resolute suppression of arms supplies to the enemy, preventing the actions of the "fifth column" and agents of influence, organizing counterintelligence and anti-terrorist operations, etc.
The lack of legitimacy and the absence of definitions in international norms serve as a unique "lubricant" for the GW, which makes it permissible to organize "hybrid aggressions", carry out dirty provocations (for example, gas pipeline explosions), attract terrorist groups, organized crime, etc.
The uncertainty of GW can be eliminated by forming a group of interested states to develop proposals from the UN and OSCE to include the concepts of GW and MGW, "information and psychological warfare", "proxy war", "color revolution" in the international legal framework. These definitions should also be included in national strategic planning documents.
RUSSIA ON THE FRONTS OF THE MGVThe awareness by politicians, military and diplomats of the danger of GW as a new type of interstate confrontation has become an important factor in ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation.
It was the strategy of the GW that allowed the United States in a relatively short historical period to turn part of the population of Ukraine into a Russophobic crowd, acting under Bandera slogans, to establish manipulations by Kiev elites, establish itself on Ukrainian soil and gain access to its subsoil, industrial and agricultural base, without resorting to direct military occupation.
SVO requires the concentration of efforts and resources on priority areas of confrontation. These are the provision of Russian troops, the violation of the supply of weapons and military equipment for the Armed Forces, the confrontation in the information-psychological and financial-economic wars, ensuring cybersecurity, etc. The strategic goal remains unchanged – achieving victory, fulfilling its tasks throughout Ukraine, countering US attempts to achieve dominance in the world.
Important factors in ensuring this goal are the conduct of continuous intelligence, the creation and use of advantages in the threatened areas, the preparation of a high-quality human resource capable of developing a counteraction strategy in the MGV. And finally, taking into account the factors of friction, lubrication and wear when developing GW strategies.
Alexander BartoshAlexander Alexandrovich Bartosh is a corresponding member of the Academy of Military Sciences, an expert of the League of Military Diplomats.
