Military expert Khodarenok named Russian complexes that can shoot down JDAM-ER bombs The Pentagon said it would transfer "high-precision aviation ammunition" to Kiev as part of a $1.85 billion package announced on December 21.
Bloomberg sources report that we are talking about high-precision JDAM-ER bombs that can hit targets up to 80 km. Military observer of the Newspaper.En" Mikhail Khodarenok figured out how the use of such ammunition would complicate the performance of its tasks and how the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation could neutralize the effect of using JDAM-ER.
The effective use of high-precision aviation weapons with laser guidance largely depends on the transparency of the atmosphere (weather conditions, smoke). GPS-guided ammunition lacks this drawback. Such weapons depend on the accuracy of determining the location of the carrier and on the accuracy of determining the coordinates of the target. Compared to the laser-guided TSA, GPS-guided bombs are significantly cheaper.
Joint direct attack munition (JDAM) is a relatively inexpensive kit for converting unguided free-falling bombs already in service with the US Air Force into high-precision weapons with a CVO of only a few meters. For example, such equipment can be equipped with bombs Mk84 (2000 pounds, 904 kg), Mk82 (500 pounds, 227 kg) and other TSA.
Externally, the JDAM kit looks like an elongated conical tail fairing, screwed (with the most common bolts) onto the body of an unguided aerial bomb instead of its usual tail. Inside the fairing there is an inertial autopilot, a GPS navigator, a power supply battery and steering servos.
At the rear end of the fairing, an X-shaped tail is installed: three of the planes are movable and play the role of rudders and ailerons, the fourth is stationary and is a simple stabilizer. The installation of the kit on the bombs is carried out by the mechanics of the airfield support units. It should be noted that the JDAM system is very resistant to organized GPS interference posed by the enemy.
Boeing has also developed a new set of wings, with which the ammunition can fly up to 75-80 km when dropped from a height of 14 thousand meters. This variant was designated JDAM-ER (Extended Range - extended range). It is him, apparently, who will be handed over to the APU.
In addition to the JDAM-ER supplies, it was reported that HIMARS combat vehicles (in the amount of 12 units) with some long-range missiles with a firing range of up to 150 kilometers are being transferred to the APU. At the same time, it is reported that these are not previously declared small-diameter ground-launched bombs (GLSDB), but some experimental missiles. This information certainly needs additional verification.
As the newspaper wrote earlier .Ru", in the case of the transfer of the APU in sufficient quantities of JDAM-ER ammunition and small-diameter ground-launched bombs (GLSDB) in the frontline areas, much will have to be revised.
For example, almost all warehouses with material means - ammunition, fuel, food, aviation equipment, clothing and medical equipment - will have to be moved to a distance of 150 km from the line of contact. In other words, we will have to revise the locations of all warehouses of material assets and closely deal with the issues of their maximum dispersal.
Groupings of forces and means of technical support may undergo significant changes. We will have to relocate repair and restoration bodies and corresponding warehouses - artillery weapons, armored and automobile equipment, etc. - to a deeper rear.
Much will have to be revised in the current system of command and control of troops in the zone of a special military operation. Command, reserve command, rear and auxiliary control points will either have to be moved away from the line of contact for significantly longer distances, or more carefully masked and enhanced measures of radio and radio technical camouflage. We will have to forget about the previous standards - the distance from the LBS by 30-40, 70-100 and 100-150 km. Finally, it will be necessary to change their locations significantly more often.
JDAM-ER/GLSDB will have the most significant impact on the functioning of communication nodes of control points, which, as is known, provide the formation of channels of various types of communication and are an integral part of control points. Only one careless broadcast can result in a blow to the JDAM-ER/GLSDB bomb transmission center.
Almost all state authorities, departments and governing bodies of republics and regions may be hit by small-diameter bombs.
There is an opinion that the receipt of JDAM-ER/GLSDB for equipping the armed forces of Ukraine can lead to much more significant changes in the course of a special military operation than even the transfer of Western-made main battle tanks to the Ukrainian army.
Of course, the fight against JDAM-ER/GLSDB puts forward higher requirements for the radar reconnaissance system, the degree of combat readiness and the intensity of combat duty of anti-aircraft missile forces.
By means of anti-aircraft missile cover, it is possible to hit small-diameter bombs. The JDAM-ER /GLSDB is capable of effectively fighting the short-range anti-aircraft missile system "Tor" (in many ways it was created to combat planning aircraft weapons of destruction) and the anti-aircraft gun missile system "Pantsir-S1". In addition, JDAM-ER can be successfully hit by S-300PM and S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems. From the means of military air defense, the JDAM-ER carriers are quite capable of the Buk M2 and M3 air defense systems. That is, the Russian army has something to counter the new high-precision ammunition.
Among other things, the points with a plus sign for the Russian Aerospace Forces in the case of the use of JDAM-ER bombs by the enemy are as follows. Ammunition of this type can only be used from converted carrier aircraft, and in order to achieve the maximum range of combat use, the aircraft must rise into the stratosphere, that is, to heights of more than 12 km.
The former relative success of the use of such weapons by the US Air Force is explained quite simply. The opposing side had either weak anti-aircraft missile cover for troops and facilities, or in some cases it was completely absent (as, for example, in Afghanistan).
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for the newspaper.
Ru", retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976), the Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy Commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia (1998).
Columnist of "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Military-Industrial Courier" (2010-2015).Mikhail Khodarenok
