On February 21, 2023, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, in a Message to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, made a statement on the suspension by the Russian Federation of the Treaty on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (DSNV). On the evening of February 21, an explanatory statement was issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in connection with the suspension by the Russian Federation of the Treaty on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (STCW).
(c) The Press Service of the President of RussiaIn a statement, the Russian Foreign Ministry said:
In the statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry published on February 8, 2023 on the situation around the DSNV, as well as in the relevant comments of the Ministry's leadership, a detailed assessment was given of the disappointing state of affairs with the implementation of the Treaty, which developed as a result of the destructive actions of the United States in the context of this agreement, as well as in general because of their line on the comprehensive weakening of the security of the Russian Federation and the political and economic "strangulation" of our country.In the development of the previously outlined approaches, we note the following negative factors that cut through the fault of the United States the full functioning of the DSNV.
The extreme degree of Washington's hostility, the confrontation it is forcing, and the openly taken course of malicious escalation of the conflict in and around Ukraine have created a fundamentally different security situation for us.
At the same time, we remind you once again that the preamble of the Treaty, which is an integral part of it, postulates the commitment of the parties to the principle of indivisible security and building relations based on mutual trust and cooperation. However, today the United States openly seeks to inflict a "strategic defeat" on Russia, and the tensions spurred by Washington go far beyond the Ukrainian crisis - the United States and the West led by them are trying to harm our country at any level, in any sphere and in any region of the world.
There is every reason to state that the US policy is aimed at undermining Russia's national security, which directly contradicts the fundamental principles and understandings enshrined in the preamble of the Treaty, on which the Treaty is based and without which it would not have been concluded. In fact, we are talking about a radical change in circumstances compared to those that existed at the time of the conclusion of the DSNV.
In such an environment, it is no longer possible to conduct business with the United States and, in general, with the West as usual - both in principle and in relation to the field of arms control, which is inseparable from geopolitical and military-strategic realities.
Moreover, serious changes in the security landscape are also related to the fact that the consolidation of Western countries on anti-Russian grounds increasingly affects aspects of their nuclear policy. In particular, NATO members, who have been practicing so-called "joint nuclear missions" for decades and have openly declared the North Atlantic Bloc a "nuclear alliance" for some time now, are increasing the emphasis on nuclear weapons in NATO-wide conceptual installations, declare their focus on further strengthening and increasing the combat readiness of the capabilities "assigned" to NATO in this area. There are calls to expand the nuclear infrastructure of the bloc and move it to the east. The focus of these efforts against our country is not hidden.
In this context, the factor of the combined nuclear arsenal of the three NATO nuclear powers, namely the United States, Great Britain and France, which can be turned against Russia, is of particular importance in the current conditions. In this sense, it is very symbolic that all the countries of the North Atlantic bloc, including Great Britain and France, have clearly demonstrated their involvement in the problems of the Strategic Partnership by issuing a joint statement in which they completely block the approaches of the United States. This political act confirms the validity of the Russian position on the need to perceive the nuclear capabilities of the three Western nuclear states together and take this factor into account in the process of limiting and reducing nuclear weapons, as well as when considering the future fate of the Strategic Nuclear Forces.
For many years, Washington has ignored the relationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons, which is also fixed in the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty. The statement on missile defense made by Russia in the context of signing and ratifying the Treaty clearly refers to the fundamental importance of this relationship. Our document unambiguously emphasizes that the Strategic Missile Defense System can operate and be viable only in the absence of a qualitative and quantitative build-up of US missile defense systems. Nevertheless, Washington defiantly continues to take actions going in the diametrically opposite direction. Against the background of the general aggravation of the military-strategic situation, this factor is gaining increased importance.
The most important thing for assessing the situation with the implementation of the Strategic Arms Agreement is the fact that Washington has long and significantly violated the central provisions of the Strategic Arms Agreement on quantitative restrictions on the relevant weapons of the parties. This is due to the illegitimate unilateral exclusion from the credit under the Treaty of more than 100 units of American Strategic Offensive arms, which were renamed in Washington so that they no longer fall under the contractual definitions, or declared converted, without giving the Russian side the opportunity to reliably verify that the results of such conversion comply with the requirements of the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty, i.e. to comply with the procedure directly provided for by the Treaty. This clear and direct violation has been repeatedly pointed out.
In addition, the well-known US attempts to "probe" the security of a number of Russian START facilities declared under the Treaty have become blatantly provocative and extremely risky. The armed attacks on them, undertaken by the puppet regime in Kiev, were carried out with the explicit military-technical and information-intelligence assistance of Washington.
Against this background, we consider it the height of cynicism to demand that the United States immediately provide them with access to these and other strategic objects of Russia, hiding behind the provisions of the DSNV on inspection activities. This causes particular bewilderment in conditions when the anti-Russian restrictions imposed by Washington previously violated the operability of the procedures provided for in the Treaty related to verification activities. As a result, the ability of the Russian side to conduct control measures on the territory of the United States without hindrance and on a completely equal basis was undermined, which created obvious unilateral advantages for the American side.
These assessments were repeatedly brought to the American side and were invariably accompanied by a call for Washington to take measures to rectify the situation, taking into account the concerns expressed by Russia. However, instead, Washington continued to purposefully carry out malicious steps to undermine Russia's security. The stakes in the total hybrid war unleashed against our country by the Americans are rising.
According to the totality of the above circumstances, the Russian side was forced to come to the conclusion that the United States had committed a significant violation of the Treaty, that is, such a violation that is of fundamental importance for the implementation of the object and objectives of the Treaty.
In this regard, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, announced on February 21 this year in a Message to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation that our country had suspended the operation of the DSNV.
At the same time, in order to maintain a sufficient degree of predictability and stability in the nuclear missile sphere, Russia intends to adhere to a responsible approach and will continue to strictly observe the quantitative restrictions on START provided for by it within the life cycle of the Treaty. In addition, the Russian side will continue to participate in the exchange with the American side of notifications of ICBM and SLBM launches on the basis of the relevant agreement between the USSR and the USA in 1988.
The decision to suspend the operation of the DSNV may be reversible. To do this, Washington must show political will, make good-faith efforts for the general de-escalation and creation of conditions for the resumption of the full-scale functioning of the Treaty and, accordingly, comprehensively ensure its viability. We call on the American side to do just that. Until then, any of our steps towards Washington in the context of the DSNV are absolutely excluded.
We also call on the United States to refrain from steps that could prevent the resumption of the operation of the DSNV in case the necessary conditions mature for this. We are convinced that the potential of the Treaty in terms of its contribution to strengthening international security and strategic stability is far from being exhausted. Nevertheless, he will be able to fully reveal himself only if the opportunities for symmetrical, equal and thorough implementation of the DSN by both sides are restored.
We mean to carefully monitor the further actions of the United States and its allies, both in the field of strategic offensive arms and in general on the track of international security and strategic stability, as well as analyze them for damage to Russian interests and the need for us to take additional countermeasures.
bmpd comment. Thus, judging by the statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the suspension announced by the Russian side of the operation of the DSN is actually reduced only to the termination (actually non-renewal) of inspections on the ground, as well as to the termination of the exchange of information within the framework of the DSN.
At the same time, the Russian side declares that it will continue to strictly observe the quantitative restrictions on START provided for by it within the life cycle of the Treaty, and will also continue to participate in the exchange with the American side of notifications on ICBM and SLBM launches on the basis of the relevant agreement between the USSR and the USA in 1988. The Russian side also calls on the United States to do the same - that is, first of all, to preserve the ceilings of strategic weapons.
It should be noted that the Russian side now already has the number of strategic carriers much lower than the levels fixed in the DSNV (about 550 versus 700) and, even if it desires, it is physically unlikely to be able to exceed the carrier ceilings in the next few years. In terms of strategic nuclear warheads, the situation is nominally better for the Russian side, but the technical capabilities of increasing warheads on carriers for the Russian Federation are also limited. In reality, taking into account the need to write off old types of ICBMs, the Russian side could begin a significant increase in the number of warheads only with the deployment of new heavy Sarmat ICBMs, however, their development program has turned into a long-term project and it is unknown when the Sarmat ICBMs will be deployed, especially in significant quantities.
In contrast, the United States has the ability to rapidly increase the number of warheads on "unloaded" carriers. primarily on the Trident II SLBM. In addition, the United States is at the beginning of a cycle of modernization of strategic weapons (B-21 bomber, GBSD ICBM, new SSBMS), and the start of mass production of these samples will also create prerequisites for their possible significant numerical increase, and in much larger quantities than any possible Russian measures.
In light of this, it can be stated that the suspension of the STCW announced by the Russian side is more of a political demonstrative gesture and is accompanied by Russian active signals of readiness to comply with the limits of the STCW. In the next few years, this "suspension" in this way is unlikely to seriously affect the balances of the strategic nuclear forces of the parties - unless, of course, the United States goes for an unlikely tough response with an increase in the number of previously "unloaded" warheads. The suspension of the Strategic Nuclear Forces does not in any way "untie the hands" of Moscow and does not in any way reduce the already de facto certain strategic nuclear superiority of the United States. Planning beyond 2025-2026 (the formal validity period of the DSNV) is now impossible for Russia anyway.