Expert Khodarenok said that the current operations of the Russian Armed Forces are not a full-scale offensive Currently, almost all Western media and politicians report either about the upcoming offensive of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, or that it is already going on (and continues successfully) for not even the first day.
Military observer Mikhail Khodarenok dealt with the peculiarities of the situation on the line of contact.
Western experts identify at least four possible directions of strikes by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - from the area of Kremennaya-Svatovo to Liman-Kupyansk, from Bakhmut with subsequent access to the outer rim of the fortified area of Slavyansk-Kramatorsk, in the general direction of Ugledar and, finally, in the direction of Zaporozhye.
There is evidence of a slight advance of units and formations north of Bakhmut, the marines have taken more advantageous positions in the Ugledar area, local battles are underway in the Zaporozhye direction. That is, for the time being, it seems somewhat premature to say that during the implementation of a special military operation, some events occurred that can be described as "decisive" and "defining".
It is worth recalling that according to the canons of Russian military art, the average pace of the offensive of troops in an offensive (counter-offensive) operation is up to 20 km per day. So far, nothing like this has been observed on the line of contact.
A lot has been said recently about the possible offensive of the joint grouping of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus from this state. At the same time, throughout the past year, there has been a persistent impression that Alexander Lukashenko will do everything possible (and even impossible) to avoid participating in a special military operation. In addition, the grouping of troops (forces) stationed on the territory of Belarus is clearly insufficient to conduct an offensive operation of an operational and strategic scale. To solve such problems, the combat and numerical strength of the troops must be increased by at least an order of magnitude.
Again, there are no signs of the creation of shock groups of troops on the territory of Belarus and the concentration of the necessary stocks of material resources, which would be easily revealed by means of space intelligence of the collective West. In addition, during the actions of troops from this direction, any principle of surprise is completely excluded, and the fortification equipment of the terrain carried out by the AFU forces assumes exceptionally stubborn battles that the allied forces will have to fight when breaking through the defense on the northern borders of Ukraine. To do this, it is necessary to have at least several engineering and sapper brigades and assault and barrage brigades in the combat composition of the troops.
First, an astronomical spring is coming in a month, and a thaw may occur in the southern regions of Ukraine, which will significantly complicate all troop movements, and in some cases will make them possible only on paved roads.
Secondly, in March-April, the AFU will receive the next packages of military assistance (including modern Western-style armored vehicles) and they will seriously strengthen the combat and operational capabilities of the Ukrainian army. Apparently, the Russian leadership does not intend to expect a qualitative improvement of the APU, and in this regard, it will solve the tasks in the near future.
But it should be noted that the enemy is not going to doze off and will obviously not dutifully expect strikes by Russian troops. To begin with, I must say that the Ukrainian army is not yet fully ready for actions of an operational and strategic scale. To do this, the APU simply does not have enough forces and means. However, it is quite possible for the armed forces of Ukraine to launch an operational-tactical counterattack. It cannot be ruled out that there are similar plans in the plans of the Ukrainian command (proactive and insidious, it should be noted). It is quite possible that a successful Ukrainian counterattack will not lead to any significant military results, but the military-political results of such an action will be more than significant.
Recently, information has been increasingly voiced that in the near future the Russian Aerospace Forces will begin to strike at bridges, tunnels and transshipment areas on the border with Poland, which are used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Some ex-generals are calling for massive strategic air strikes on these facilities.
However, there is no strategic aviation in the Russian Aerospace Forces. There is a kind of VKS forces - Long-range aviation. It includes strategic bombers such as the Tu-95 and Tu-160, but they are not designed to strike with free-fall bombs. Aircraft of these types are used in the course of combat operations only air-launched cruise missiles (KRVB), and for the destruction of the same bridges, controlled aviation weapons of destruction of a caliber of 1500 kg or more are desirable. The power of the warhead of the KRVB is clearly not enough to solve such tasks.
As for massive strikes (as such), they are applied only within the framework of operational associations. That is, we can talk about a massive strike only if it is carried out by the air army in full force (everything below (corps, division) is already a group strike). There are no air armies in the Long-range Aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces yet. YES, it is currently represented in the VKS of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation only by the command. Therefore, by definition, Long-range aviation cannot deliver a massive strike.
Long-range bombers of the Tu-22M3 type can be involved in strikes on infrastructure facilities. However, the airspace over Ukraine is a contested area. The air superiority of the Russian Aerospace Forces does not currently possess. In order to send formations of heavy and low-maneuverable Tu-22M3 into the Ukrainian sky, it is necessary before that either to destroy all active air defense systems, or to suppress them with electronic warfare to such an extent that the combat use of SAM / SAMS becomes impossible. To do this, the Tu-22M3 units must include electronic warfare aircraft corresponding in speed and altitude to a bomber of this type. However, there are no electronic warfare aircraft in the Long-range Aviation.
Theoretically, the task of destroying infrastructure facilities can be performed by MiG-31K aircraft with Dagger missiles. The whole question is that the number of missiles of this type should reach a certain operational level (at least hundreds of units), that is, strikes in this case should not take the character of a single impact.
Finally, there has been a lot of talk lately about possible strikes on the orbital groupings of likely partners. Technically, this is possible, there are already prototypes of the promising Nudol missile defense system and the S-500 Prometheus missile defense system. But again, the means of anti-satellite warfare currently have no operational significance. Several launches of satellite fighters will not solve the problem, since the same Starlink spacecraft are currently in near-Earth orbits of about 2 thousand.
The situation with the destruction of satellites in geostationary orbits is even more complicated. To defeat such spacecraft, it is necessary to launch a Soyuz-sized launch vehicle with an upper stage. It is clear that there is no need to think about any mass character in terms of such actions.
As for the general development of the military-political situation, it is changing so dramatically that all forecasts and assumptions in a fairly short time may turn out to be either outdated or untenable.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for the newspaper.
Ru", retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976), the Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy Commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia (1998).
Columnist of "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Military-Industrial Courier" (2010-2015).Mikhail Khodarenok
