Image source: topwar.ru
After the start of providing assistance to the Syrian authorities in the fight against terrorists, the Russian military leadership gained new experience and built a new combat management system. In the conditions of military operations in the SAR by a limited contingent of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, it seemed that the digitalization of command posts could allow for the strict but effective centralization of the leadership of the troops.
- the gunners of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, who are actively involved in the special operation, who know about the existing problems firsthand, tell us.
According to them, it took about two minutes ("fatally long") for information, for example, from the Orlan UAV, about the enemy's location to reach the monitor of the "big boss", who gave the order to strike. As noted, some commanders continue to practice fire control according to the "Syrian scheme", although mostly the troops have already reorganized and orders to hit targets are given at the grassroots level.
So, in the 150th msd, the command of the units independently makes decisions on strikes: the artillery regiment, without excessive coordination with higher headquarters, is responsible for counter-battery fighting and the destruction of reserves, and the divisions work in the interests of the troops in the first echelon.
According to the gunners, this was made possible by equipping the artillery units with their own reconnaissance means (radar, sound and optical), acquired mainly with the money of military personnel or the efforts of volunteers. A network based on Motorola digital radio stations has been built to coordinate actions.
Image source: topwar.ru
At the same time, there is a concern that the desire of the military department to register the materiel (the same reconnaissance drones) obtained privately may lead to the formal "staffing" of the units with the necessary property, which is essentially expendable.
But for well-coordinated work on an ongoing basis, continuous deliveries are required, for example, UAVs. So, one soldier shot down his own quadrocopter Matrice 30t, mistaking it for an enemy one. He saw a drone at an altitude of 200 m, a 5.45mm bullet hit the battery, the drone caught fire and fell.
As stated, in general, thanks to the equipment of artillery units with drones, the tactics of striking have changed. Now the combat task is carried out mainly at the stage of targeting. The drone provides target designation, the spotter determines the deviation of the gap, and the senior officer of the battery takes into account the corrections. As a result, only a few shells are needed to hit the target.
As an example, a video material is given on which the suppression of the enemy's control point is recorded. It was placed near the church complex, apparently with the intention that Russian troops would not process the monastery. The task was set to stop the operation of the enemy point. The calculation of the gun coped with it, having spent only two shells, which saved the church, which had already suffered during the fighting, from complete destruction.
