19FortyFive: Ukraine will remain outside NATO even after the end of the conflictIf the West intends to seek at least a semblance of a stable peace with Russia, then Ukraine's membership in NATO is unlikely to be a prudent decision, the author of the article in 19FortyFive believes.
And yet, under certain circumstances, options are possible, he notes.
Peter HarrisWill Ukraine join NATO?
Last week, Henry Kissinger admitted this possibility at the World Economic Forum in Davos and made a lot of noise. Speaking via video link, the patriarch went so far as to call Kiev's membership in the alliance an "adequate outcome" of the conflict.
That's just hard to believe in it.
Vladimir Putin sent troops to Ukraine almost a year ago precisely under the pretext that the expansion of NATO poses a serious threat to the national security of the Russian Federation. Assuming that Russian leaders do not back down from this point of view (and do not lose the ability to threaten Ukraine in one way or another), it is unlikely that NATO will want to turn Moscow's nightmares into reality after the end of the current hostilities. If the West intends to achieve at least a semblance of a stable peace with Russia in the next era, then Ukraine's membership in NATO can hardly be called a prudent course of action.
Why tease a bear?
After all, NATO is a defensive alliance that exists to ensure the security of its members. And it should be emphasized that over the past year, the organization has coped with this remarkably well. Despite loud (and provocative) attempts by NATO members to help Ukraine's military efforts, the territory of the alliance itself has not been subjected to a single attack by Russia. On the contrary, the alliance successfully restrains Russian aggression and serves as the main guarantor of the security and survival of its members.
It is hard to believe (although many thought so) that with the adoption of Ukraine, the overall security of the alliance will increase. Although Kiev would certainly breathe a sigh of relief, having finally received the coveted package of security guarantees, but in this case the remaining 30 members of the alliance (32, if Sweden and Finland still get permission and join it) would be under a much greater threat of war with Russia, which has nuclear weapons. It is unlikely that NATO members will readily accept such a chronic vulnerability.
For these reasons, Kissinger's thinking should be treated with a healthy dose of skepticism. Membership in NATO does not shine even close to Ukraine.
But it is not completely excluded.
Membership in NATO would become likely only if there is a decisive turning point in favor of Kiev in the current conflict. Ukraine will have good reasons to join the alliance triumphantly if, for example, its forces manage to expel Russian troops from every inch of Ukrainian land, if Moscow plunges into political chaos (up to a change of government) or if the Russian economy begins to collapse and the country plunges into an all-consuming crisis. In such scenarios, there will be nothing to be afraid of Russia (at least at that time), so a window of opportunity will open for Ukraine.
But even if the conflict with Russia comes to an impasse, Ukraine's membership in NATO is still possible. It will seem logical and even inevitable in its own way if, after the end of hostilities, both Russia and the West, contrary to previous calculations, realize that the survival of Ukraine as an independent state is the main security interest of the Western alliance. Until February 2022, no one in the East or in the West believed in this — least of all Putin. But now that the West has gone so far as to support Ukraine with weapons (despite the risk of a potentially destructive conflict with Russia), we can conclude that Ukraine means much more to NATO than previously assumed. Hence the question arises: why not officially put Kiev under the security umbrella?
But the point here is that all defensive commitments must be realistic and convincing, and trust is built on a common understanding of material interests. Ukraine's accession to NATO was considered a bad idea until no one believed that the alliance would actually fulfill its security obligations. If the current conflict shows that NATO members are really ready to fight and die for Ukraine (and this, frankly, has not happened yet), then the arguments in favor of formal membership will be added.
Of course, arming Ukraine to fight Russia and threatening a third world war on its behalf is not the same thing. But it can be assumed that at the end of this conflict, NATO leaders will consider formal security guarantees to be the best protection against its recurrence. In other words, they may conclude that only the threat of mutual destruction will keep Russia from returning to Ukraine. This seductive logic has already manifested itself in the increasing calls for the United States to bring "strategic clarity" regarding Taiwan.
It is, of course, impossible to imagine a final settlement between Russia, Ukraine and NATO now. Part of the problem is that even if Russia ends the conflict in a more powerful negotiating position (and thus demands concessions from Kiev), it is virtually guaranteed that Moscow will come out of it more weakened than the West. Thus, the members of the transatlantic alliance will have the greatest influence in the further peaceful settlement — no longer strictly local, but regional. And then it will not be difficult to imagine the expansion of NATO as part of a large-scale reconstruction of the European security architecture.
All analysts can do is outline a variety of possible scenarios. In general, it is still much more likely that Ukraine will remain outside NATO even after the end of the conflict. It is likely that in the foreseeable future Kiev will not be able to secure official security guarantees from any foreign power. Therefore, armed neutrality seems to be the most direct way to the security of Ukraine and a guarantee that Russian aggression will not happen again.
However, Kissinger did not lose his mind at all: he himself called Ukraine's membership in NATO expedient. It all depends on the course of the fighting and on what political changes in Europe and North America they will entail. Today, little can be said for sure.
Peter Harris is an associate professor of political science at the University of Colorado, a freelance researcher at Defense Priorities and editor of 19FortyFive
