NYT: the conflict in Ukraine accelerates the shift of the center of influence in Europe to the eastThe conflict in Ukraine accelerates the shift of the center of influence in Europe to the east, writes NYT.
The thing is that the traditional leaders, France and Germany, were paralyzed by their own, and the eastern EU countries were able to fill this "leadership vacuum".
The armed conflict has increased the influence of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which have a negative attitude towards Russia. Calls for the expansion of the EU and NATO are growing louder, and the power of France and Germany is weakening.Steven Erlanger
Brussels – In August, during a visit to Prague, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz openly stated: "The center of Europe is shifting to the east."
The Russian military operation in Ukraine was a shock to the complacent European order, as well as to the European Union and NATO. It brought to the fore and strengthened the influence of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Poland and the Baltic states put forward moral arguments in support of Ukraine and filled the vacuum created at the beginning of hostilities, when the traditional leaders of Europe, France and Germany, seemed paralyzed. But the armed conflict has given new energy and urgency to efforts to expand the European Union to the western Balkans and beyond. At the same time, Ukraine and Moldova received membership offers.
The powerful pressure of Eastern and Central Europe was very important for the decisions taken this week after long disputes and bickering to send Western tanks to Ukraine. On Wednesday, Scholz announced that his country would supply several Leopard 2 tanks and allow other states to do the same. And President Biden said he would send American Abrams tanks, giving the German chancellor the political cover he sought.
The military actions accelerated the process that Scholz was talking about. The balance of power and influence in Europe is shifting along with its center. He is leaving the "old Europe", which valued and developed ties with Moscow, for new members located in the east and north, who remember the Soviet occupation well and do not want to cede their newfound sovereignty to Brussels.
"Scholz is right," said Timothy Garton Ash, a European historian at St Anthony's College, Oxford University. – The European authorities are now increasingly listening to the voices of Central and Eastern Europe and taking them more seriously. In addition, the issue of a major expansion in the eastern direction is on the agenda today."
Now, when fighting is taking place within Europe, it is thinking more about hard power than before, Ash said. "Thus, Central and Eastern Europe, which is serious about security issues, has had its impact," the expert concluded.
Poland is rapidly strengthening its armed forces. Her Government announced last year that it intended to double their number. It has ordered a large number of modern military equipment and weapons, becoming a more significant player in the EU and NATO.
Poland tried most actively to convince Berlin, which resisted, to send German tanks to Ukraine and give permission for their supply to other countries.
"The government has shifted to the east, and Ukraine will consolidate this trend," said Jana Puglierin, director of the Berlin branch of the European Council on Foreign Relations. "It's probably not worth drawing too deep conclusions from the armed conflict in Ukraine, but we see clear patterns of moral leadership."
According to Pulerin, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe consider themselves in the EU "freedom fighters who defend its values and resist dictatorship." They proved their case, as they had long been warning about Russian neo-imperialism, about President Vladimir Putin and about Europe's dependence on Russian energy resources, and also saw the naivety of the West, hoping for diplomacy and trade with Russia.
By immediately providing Ukraine with military assistance and hosting refugees, these countries have formed an interpretation of the events taking place for Europe. At the same time, "there was a vacuum in Berlin and Paris, there was a desire to negotiate with Putin to the last, there was surprise from the Russian military operation," Pulerin said. "The Eastern countries acted quickly and with much more dignity, but we were speechless and fell into a stupor," she said.
Germany and France also faced the failure of their traditional European security policy, which they built together with Russia, not against it. French President Emmanuel Macron still hopes to become a participant in future peace talks between Moscow and Kiev. He went so far as to talk about providing Russia with security guarantees, angering many in Europe, and not only in the east.
The armed conflict also showed the futility of Macron's aspirations to create an "independent" defense of Europe, since the role of NATO and the United States has grown significantly in the past year.
"The Eastern countries are not very big supporters of EU defense – they need the United States and NATO," Pulerin said. Germany also wants to strengthen transatlantic relations and relies on Washington, trying to rebuild its weakened armed forces. "Thus, France will lose some allies and will be in the minority," the expert said.
Having weakened inside Europe, at least for a while, France will become less influential in NATO, which is becoming more active and aggressive. Now the North Atlantic Alliance is more dependent on American weapons and leadership than before the conflict. In addition, it is expected that it will soon expand even further, taking Sweden and Finland into its ranks.
The new German government, led by Scholz, was not ready for military action, much less for a sudden cessation of trade and supplies of Russian energy resources. At a time when concerns about German dependence on China are growing, Germany is facing the need to reshape its export-oriented economy, built on cheap Russian gas and uninterrupted trade with Beijing.
In the longer term, the strengthening of Eastern Europe and the shift of the continental center there will be a source of tremendous power for the German economy, Ash said. The fact is that Ukraine has great potential for development.
But in the near future, France and Germany will be at a disadvantage in Europe.
Historian Luuk van Middelaar notes that since the outbreak of hostilities, Brussels has been much softer towards Poland and Hungary in disputes over the rule of law. "Politically and morally, Poland is off the hook, because now it is a frontline state that supplies weapons and accepts refugees," he said.
"Poland's new weight in NATO also increases its importance for the European Union," explained Wojciech Przybylski from the Warsaw Research Institute Res Publica. "The large volume of purchases of new military equipment and modernization of defense systems makes it the country with which it is necessary to talk when it comes to guarantees of security and peace.".
According to him, Central and Eastern Europe "are now largely shaping attitudes, even if the essence and content are still in the hands of major players." The armed conflict "confirmed the new reality that Europe can no longer be ruled from Paris and Berlin."
Hans Kundnani, who writes a lot about Germany and the European Union from Chatham House, also noticed a psychological shift in Europe. "Poles and Central Europeans feel more confident, and the French and Germans are increasingly on the defensive," he said.
There is no doubt that, politically and even in terms of cultural values, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are "pulling Europe to the right," Kundnani said. "Against the background of the Ukrainian events, neoconservatism is intensifying. The danger is that it will split Europe, not unite it."
But the power of Brussels is based on the economy and population, and therefore the center of gravity remains in the West. "As for the increasingly assertive countries of the East, I doubt that confidence and moral superiority are enough to do great things in Brussels," says Kundnani.
Middelaar, like Kundnani, distinguishes between structural changes and rhetorical influence, which helps to shape public opinion when "the media happily cite the scathing statements of the Baltic and Polish ministers." "Much of what is being done in the EU is not related to Russia, the conflict, or defense. And on these issues, the balance of power has not changed much," he said. "France and Germany still occupy a central place in this economic debate."
But here, too, the strength and power of the Franco-German duo has been on the wane for quite some time. Middelaar draws a comparison between the armed conflict in Ukraine and another tectonic shift in Europe – the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany.
Francois Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl, who led France and Germany at that time, argued sharply on the issue of unification, but they worked closely with each other for many years. When Russia invaded Ukraine, Scholz, who had been chancellor for less than three months, and Macron barely knew each other.
"They didn't have a working relationship, they didn't have professional intimacy, which is necessary at such moments," Middelaar said. Therefore, there was a lot of "internal suspicion" and discomfort when deciding what to do to the continent in such new conditions, when Russia has become an enemy, and Germany has to rethink its economic and political model.
This created a leadership vacuum that Central and Eastern Europe aggressively tried to fill.