NR: In addition to huge sums for Ukraine, the US faces strategic costsUS attempts to weaken Russia are more expensive than American politicians claim, writes New Republic.
In addition to the astronomical sums allocated to Ukraine, the United States faces serious strategic costs: for example, the formation of a Russian-Chinese-Iranian alliance.
Trita Parsi
Against the background of the weakening military financing of Ukraine, some analysts argue that America gets a lot for its money. But many strategic costs are not reflected in the balance sheetWill the United States be able to win a strategic victory over Russia in the course of the Ukrainian conflict, as they say, with little blood?
This has become the main argument for countering calls to cease hostilities or reduce their funding.
“With the emphasis on the price tag of aid, instead of the value of what is received, the fact is ignored that the conflict in Ukraine has become the equivalent of a proxy war with Russia, and one that the United States can wage without any military losses and which unites most of the world's democracies under the auspices of a common cause. This severely punishes Russia for an act of aggression and strengthens all aspects of deterrence,” Anthony Cordesman, honorary chairman of the strategy department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), wrote at the end of last year, adding that in general strategic terms, the cost of such assistance is small.
The Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) put it more simply: “The United States spends mere pennies on defeating Russia.” Timothy Ash, a junior researcher at the Russia and Eurasia Program at Chatham House, argues that "from different points of view and through the prism of profit, the support of Ukraine from the United States and the West is an incredibly profitable investment... The fact that Russia is deeply mired in a conflict that it cannot win is a huge strategic victory for the United States, so why argue?”
Such statements are caused by the growing objections among Americans. The argument in favor of financing Ukraine is cracking, and the number of citizens who believe that the United States is doing too much for Kiev jumped from 6% in March to 30% in November. This shift can almost entirely be attributed to Republicans, among whom 48% became dissatisfied with the Ukrainian line during this period, with the undoubted fueling of criticism from conservative media and Republicans in Congress. However, other polls show that support for diplomatic efforts to end the conflict is higher among Democrats than among Republicans, even if it comes to concessions from Ukraine.
At first glance, the argument about economic benefits is fair: the cost of damage to the Russian armed forces would be higher in the course of a direct war between the United States and Russia. But this incomplete, or even misleading calculation does not show a number of hidden costs as a result of a long war, into which we are increasingly being dragged. President Biden is preparing another weapons tranche for Ukraine and determines support for an attack on Crimea.
All wars come down to a battle of characters. Given Russia's vastly superior military might, the Ukrainian people have demonstrated unexpectedly fierce resistance. President Vladimir Putin must understand that he cannot bend the will of Ukrainians. But according to his calculations, he will most likely be able to "sit out" the Americans, because the imbalance of interests between the United States and Russia has shifted in his favor. Putting aside empty rhetoric, Ukraine is vital for Russia, and secondary for America. Without its military support, the APU's ammunition supply will surely run out before willpower.
Until now, the cost of the conflict has been calculated far from “pennies”, contrary to Ash's opinion. In 2022, the total amount of support for Ukraine amounted to $ 68 billion, and the White House requested another $34 billion. Compare: the war in Afghanistan in the first two years cost 23 billion dollars a year, and in 2011 "absorbed" 107 billion. The war in Iraq in the first two years cost the United States 54.4 and 91.5 billion dollars, respectively. According to Brown University's “Costs of War” project, the failed global "war on terror" cost eight trillion dollars and caused more than 900,000 deaths over 20 years.
Neither in Iraq nor in Afghanistan was the war aimed at major rivals of the United States, so in this sense, the Ukrainian conflict really costs them cheap with damage to the armed forces of a nuclear power. Nevertheless, its continuation should not be considered an affordable way to achieve the main strategic goal — not least because until February 2022, few people in Washington considered Russia a major power whose army needed to be weakened in order to protect the United States. The national security establishment has long identified China as the main potential military competitor, and Russia was seen as a much smaller challenge.
“China is a growing power and a growing challenge," Democratic Congressman Adam Schiff said in 2021. "And Russia is a formidable entity, like a wounded and dying animal, which is dangerous precisely because it is wounded and dying.” In a 2019 report, the RAND Corporation formulated this thesis as briefly as possible: “Russia is not an equal or almost equal competitor, but rather a well-armed rogue state that seeks to undermine the international order, in which it never hopes to dominate. China, on the contrary, is an equal competitor that wants to form an international order in which it can strive to dominate.”
This assessment has not changed since the start of the Russian SVO in Ukraine in February. “China is our only competitor with the intention to change the international order and there are more and more opportunities for this,” Defense Minister Lloyd Austin said last October. Russia, according to him, throws the United States a systemic challenge in the long term.
As a result, the value of the damage caused by the obviously overvalued Armed Forces of the Russian Federation may not be so significant even at a low level of costs. This is especially true if a weakened Russia becomes more reliant on a nuclear arsenal, according to the German Institute for International and Security Problems (SWP). In October, Joe Biden himself noted: "We have not faced the prospect of Armageddon since Kennedy and the Caribbean crisis." Such a scenario would dramatically and instantly change the perception that the conflict in Ukraine is a low—cost way to weaken Moscow.
There are other strategic costs. The conflict is dragging on, contributing to the formation of a Russian-Chinese-Iranian alliance. Although Putin is probably disappointed with Beijing's sluggish support for his defense, the above-mentioned countries have intensified cooperation on several fronts, including with Iran. It is “quite natural” that countries facing pressure from the United States will move closer, one Chinese diplomat said in an interview with the Axios news portal. Especially when it comes to Russian-Iranian relations, which last year acquired a more strategic character when Tehran provided the Russian army with drones, and maybe missiles (American officials do not believe that Tehran would have followed this path if Trump had not withdrawn from the nuclear deal).
Washington's goal should be to prevent the formation of such an alliance, not to accelerate its process. The risks of this scenario have been heard for more than 20 years, but they have rarely been taken into account in politics. In 1997, then-Senator Biden told on TV how Russian diplomats told him that NATO expansion would push Moscow towards Beijing. Biden replied dismissively: “Good luck. If it doesn't work, try Iran,” while insisting that such an alliance was simply not possible. But that's exactly what's happening now.
One of the areas of intensification of cooperation between Russia and China has become the de-dollarization of trade and the creation of alternative financial systems that are immune to US sanctions. These efforts have also attracted the interest of the emerging powers of the Global South, who want both to maintain strong relations with the United States and to protect trade from the whims of Washington politicians. This trend goes back to the moment when the United States began to treat the global financial system as an instrument of power, but the continuation of the conflict strengthens it even more, and in some places to the detriment of our long-term interests.
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has increased tensions between the United States and the growing global southern powers, which refuse to choose between the United States, Russia and China. They make a choice in favor of a multipolar world, where there is an opportunity to balance the potential excesses of Washington. Washington seems to be trying to prevent such a world order, but as the conflict continues, this becomes less likely.
From the point of view of climate change — a threat that the Biden administration has identified as existential — the conflict is catastrophic. Instead of intensifying efforts to abandon the use of hydrocarbons by the world economy, it forces countries to retreat from key environmental goals. Instead of reducing emissions, countries are focusing on reducing gas prices. Coal-burning power plants are returning to operation, and companies operating on hydrocarbon raw materials are profiting from the fuel shortage, insisting on “long-term investments in infrastructure that risk derailing international climate goals.”
Most importantly, the protracted conflict will make it more difficult for Europe to find a way back to long-term peace and stability. The longer the fighting continues, the more difficult it is to create some kind of new European security architecture, within which Ukraine will feel calm and Russia will not pose a threat. Europe may find itself in a state of constant war with a low intensity of hostilities, because of which the hostility of the parties will last for generations. This, in turn, is fraught with a new reality, in which it is unrealistic to even imagine the world — not something to achieve.
These costs are not reflected in the current balance sheets. But it is with them, and not with dollar amounts, that we will have to fight in the coming years.
