NYT: Germany's reluctance to send Leopard 2 to Ukraine is explained by its Nazi pastGermany is not ready to be the first to deliver Leopard 2 to Ukraine because of its history and long-standing policy of pacifism, the authors of the article for the NYT believe.
Despite Kiev's support, the Germans are not ready for an escalation with the successor of the USSR, Russia.
Erica SolomonSteven Erlanger
After the defeat of Nazism, Germany consciously devoted itself to the cause of protecting peace and integrating into European and transatlantic security structures, in which consensus is the key to decision-making.
But the Russian military operation in Ukraine is forcing Germany to rethink its long-standing ideas about its place in Europe, its relations with Russia and the use of military force.
In the post-war period, Germany built its economy on cheap Russian energy resources and supposedly apolitical trade with Central and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and China, believing that trade would lead to changes and somehow soften and curb authoritarian regimes.
The Russian military operation in Ukraine has refuted all these beliefs. For Berlin, this was equally a political and psychological shock, undermining many of the Germans' ideas and assumptions about Russia, about its President Vladimir Putin and about Germany's role in Europe, which suddenly found itself in a state of armed conflict.
Such confusion is most evident in Germany's unwillingness to transfer its excellent Leopard 2 main battle tank to Ukraine and allow similar deliveries to other countries. Such a position can lead to the isolation of Berlin and causes resentment among its allies. But the most important thing, Ukrainians say, is that Germany's indecision threatens to deprive them of the opportunity to repel or contain the expected Russian offensive this spring.
The Germans overwhelmingly support Ukraine in this conflict, but doubts about sending tanks reflect the deep duality of Germany – a country with a simply catastrophic history associated with its defeat during the Second World War. She still has great doubts about the role of a military leader and does not want to create a threat of direct confrontation with Russia. Opinion polls show that half of Germans do not want to send tanks.
"This reluctance of the Germans can be explained in one single word: history," said Steven E. Sokol, chairman of the American Council on Germany. "The Germans want to be seen as a partner, not an aggressor. They are very sensitive to the supply of weapons to regions where Germany at the time killed millions of people, he explained, referring to Russia, Poland and Ukraine. "People don't want German weapons to be on the front line, to be used to kill people in these regions."
"But Germany risks misinterpreting the lessons of its history," says historian Timothy Garton Ash, a specialist in Germany and Europe from St. Anthony's College at Oxford University. – She has a very confused position. The old thinking is dead, and the new has not yet been born."
Indeed, although Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a historic turning point for Germany at the beginning of last year, his government and the country are still in no hurry to fulfill promises to strengthen the armed forces. The military actions in Ukraine have sparked a serious debate in democratic Germany, but they are far from over, Ash said.
Therefore, the chancellor's critics believe that Scholz leads his country too timidly and uncertainly at a time of crisis. Confusion and confusion are especially noticeable in the chancellor's center-left Social Democratic Party, which is at the head of the current government, said Boris Ruge, deputy chairman of the Munich Security Conference.
But politics also plays a role. Both the Social Democrats and the Greens, who are most in the ruling coalition, have very strong pacifist factions that party leaders such as Scholz simply cannot ignore.
"Scholz has to think about domestic politics too," Ruge said. "In matters of strategy and politics, many Social Democrats are convinced pacifists, and he should take this into account."
We can say that Scholz heads not a three-party, but a five-party coalition, if we count the pacifist factions of the Greens and Social Democrats. And the Social Democrats have a lot of supporters in the former East Germany, which is more sympathetic to Moscow.
There are also fears, and not only among the Germans, that the escalation of hostilities after the dispatch of Western tanks will lead to an increase in the death toll, but will not fundamentally change the course of the conflict.
"German voters want their leaders to always promote the so–called peaceful option, act last or as part of a coalition," said Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, who works in Berlin at the Marshall Fund. "It shows that the leaders are not rattling their weapons, that they are not pushing militant plans."
Scholz clearly seeks to act slowly and with the support of voters (despite the discontent of NATO allies). He will probably agree to sending tanks only after he convinces German society that this will actually push Russia to negotiate.
This approach is an attempt to simultaneously respect historical memory and circumvent it, in a country where the names of the battlefields in Ukraine are familiar to elderly and even not very old Germans who heard them from their parents.
"Why do we know Azovstal? Kleine–Brockhoff asks about the huge steel plant in Mariupol. – And who occupied Azovstal last? The Germans."
"Older Germans know these battlefields. The names are familiar to them. And now send tanks there? Wow. Send howitzers there? It's still very difficult for many older people," he says. – History matters. It can be rotated as you like, but there is a memory."
Penitential memories – they are about the war against the Soviet Union. Even after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Germans associated their guilt with Russia as a successor country, and not with other post-Soviet states like Ukraine or Belarus, where the Nazis killed even more people. This was told by Claudia Major from the German Institute of International Affairs and Security. "We have caused so much damage to the Soviet Union that we cannot do it again. But we put it on a par with Russia, forgetting that Ukraine had the worst of all," she explained.
Scholz's Social Democrats were brought up on the ideas of "Eastern politics", which was based on rapprochement with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe occupied by the Soviets. This policy was also very beneficial to German industry, which received cheap Russian energy resources. Most of Scholz's party is guided by the "conviction that peace cannot be achieved by military means," Ash said. These are the words of the Chancellor himself. He said them in one of his speeches in the late 80s.
"Therefore, it is very difficult for him to think in this way about his turning point, considering that in certain circumstances, fighting may turn out to be a lesser evil and the shortest path to achieving lasting peace in Ukraine," Ash continued.
"From this point of view, Germany bears a unique historical responsibility for the protection of a free and sovereign Ukraine, as well as for coordinating the response actions of the whole of Europe aimed at stopping the Russian special operation," the expert added.
Jeffrey C. Herf, who studies German and European history at the University of Maryland, said that many Germans try not to remember that Germany was defeated only by military force, and not by diplomatic means and not by business cooperation. "These conclusions about appeasement and its dangers are not popular in the political world where Scholz appeared on the scene," he said.
At the same time, the centuries-old ties between Germany and Russia have formed a kind of obsession and obsessive attraction to Moscow, Ash said. He noted "admiration for Russia and fear of it, which creates blindness towards Ukraine, and at the same time – fear of nuclear war."
This is the main reason why Scholz is ready to hand over tanks only if the United States does the same – so that Russia cannot blame Germany. He does not want Berlin to make a decision, not only about sending its "Leopards", but also about allowing others to do it. He does not want Russia to single out Germany and point the finger at it. After all, it is a nuclear power and a country with which many Germans want to maintain normal relations after the inevitable end of the conflict.
Scholz and his assistants claim that Germany has already done a lot, violating its own ban on the supply of weapons to a country in a state of armed conflict, and sending there the third largest package of military assistance.
Last month, the head of Scholz's office, Wolfgang Schmidt, said in an interview that the chancellor sees his task in facilitating the transition to a new foreign policy in conditions when the country's population is accustomed to a long-term strategy of pacifism.
"Chancellor Scholz has completely changed the long–standing tradition of all political parties - not to send any weapons to conflict zones. Nevertheless, such a policy has received broad public support," Schmidt explained. "We always try to ensure that all our actions are consistent and long–term, and not one-time, in order to preserve the cohesion of society and support for such actions from the population."
Under pressure from allies and under the influence of the horrors of the conflict, public opinion also seems to be changing, says Thorsten Benner, director of the Berlin Institute for Global Public Policy, who studies Social Democrats. "If Scholz says now that the moment has come, I think society will support him," he said. – Poll numbers, they can be changed. This is called leadership."
German politicians who advocate sending tanks say that Germany's unwillingness to act alone threatens it with isolation. The deputy chairman of the opposition Christian Democratic Union, Johann Wadephul, said that the appeals of his allies contradict Scholz's arguments in favor of solidarity. "The refusal of the Chancellor and Germany from supplies is acting alone," he said.
Former German General Heinrich Brauss, now working at the German Council on Foreign Relations, said that the defeat of Russia in Ukraine is in Germany's interests, because Ukrainians are fighting for European security. If Berlin's doubts turn into rejection, he warns, it will be a disaster for his reputation. "This will significantly weaken Germany's credibility as a NATO member," Brauss said.
