The number and geography of military districts are changingThe speech of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu on December 21, 2022 at the board of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, apparently, can be considered the beginning of the next – it's hard to say which one in a row – military reform in the country.
At the same time, in any state in general, and in Russia in particular, it is not words that matter, but deeds. Therefore, at the moment, what the minister said is nothing more than a declaration of intent. Accordingly, all comments about his speech are purely speculative so far.
FROM DIVISIONS TO DIVISIONSIn fact, it is proposed to quantitatively restore the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation almost to the size of the Armed Forces of the USSR in this territory – but, of course, on new organizational and technical bases.
In fact, the reform of Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, focused on waging local wars against a much weaker enemy (this is how Western armies have been fighting for 30 years, this is how we ourselves fought in Georgia and Syria), is "turning back."
Divisions that were previously folded into brigades are being re-deployed into divisions. Moreover, new divisions are being formed from scratch, and in significant numbers. Thus, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are reoriented again to waging a "big" classic war with an equal opponent.
Seven motorized rifle brigades and, most interestingly, five Marine brigades will be deployed (or restored) to divisions. Moreover, this process will affect all military districts. This point is most interesting in relation to the Marine Corps. The amphibious capabilities of the Russian Navy are extremely insignificant, they are several times less than those of the US Navy ("Amphibious problem of the Russian Navy", "HVO", 03/22/19). At the same time, the US Navy has only four Marine divisions, one of which is considered a reserve. Thus, the Russian marine Corps may be larger than the American in terms of personnel – with a very small number of amphibious ships, besides scattered across five separate sea and ocean theaters of military operations and having a fairly low amphibious capacity.
However, the American Marine Corps has long been almost completely detached from the Navy. It has not conducted any amphibious landings since the Korean War and, in fact, has turned into a "second ground force", having a smaller number, but a higher level of combat training than the actual ground forces.
In this regard, the Russian marine corps, obviously, will completely copy the American one, also becoming the "second ground forces", smaller in size, but better prepared than the "first". The difference from the American version will probably consist in the fact that the Russian Marines will also be assigned the tasks of coastal defense. Which is simply irrelevant for the United States for geopolitical reasons.
SHOCK-FIRE BIASIn addition to the deployment of existing brigades in the division, it is planned to form an army corps (in Karelia), three motorized rifle, two amphibious assault and five artillery divisions, eight bomber and one fighter aviation regiment, six army aviation brigades.
It is unclear what the composition of the army corps in Karelia will be. But regardless of this, the task of forming such a significant number of new parts and compounds seems extremely ambitious.
It is interesting to note that the formation of new compounds has a clear and distinct "shock-firing" bias. Only three motorized rifle (i.e. infantry) divisions are formed, and none tank divisions. Instead, five artillery divisions, eight bomber aviation regiments, six army aviation brigades, and an unknown number of high-capacity artillery brigades will be formed. It follows from this that in future wars, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation should "crush" the enemy with artillery and aviation.
An additional role should be played by the landing force: already the world's largest Russian Airborne troops will receive two more divisions ("When the Supreme Reserve comes into play", "HVO", 09/21/18).
It is quite logical that they will not be airborne, but amphibious assault. Two already existing airborne divisions are quite enough for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, moreover, it is not very clear where they can land by parachute - in the deep rear of which enemy.
But the role of amphibious assault formations landing in the near rear of any enemy from helicopters on their own feet is more than clear: they should strengthen the defeat and disorganization of the enemy after the impact of artillery and aviation on him.
As for the linear units of the ground forces (tank and motorized rifle), then, obviously, they will be assigned mainly an auxiliary role: finishing off the enemy, occupying and controlling the territory (of the three new motorized rifle divisions, two are just designed to control new territories – the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions). In fact, this is the implementation of the American concept of "contactless war" in some hypothetical Russian version.
CONSCRIPTS, CONTRACTORS, OFFICERSNew formations will need to be manned and equipped with equipment.
A significant increase in the production of equipment will require huge financial costs. But, obviously, this is no longer considered a problem, since the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation, in fact, is switching to a wartime regime. Additional enlisted personnel will be recruited either by increasing the service life to one and a half or two years, or by expanding the draft contingent (now the draft is actually selective), or by synthesizing these two options.
At the same time, an increase in the draft age from 18 to 21 years has been announced, which can be estimated in two ways. Of course, at 21, a person is in all respects much more mature than at 18, so he is better suited for army service. But, on the other hand, at the age of 21, he is obviously more integrated into society than at the age of 18, so taking him off to serve in the army will cause much more damage to both the person himself and the country's economy than conscription of an 18-year-old.
Obviously, the recruitment of contract personnel will be increased (this was stated directly in Shoigu's speech: contract personnel should be almost 700 thousand out of the total number of 1.5 million military personnel). Which, obviously, will require an increase in monetary allowances and social benefits for this category of military personnel.
The most difficult thing will be to recruit the necessary number of officers for new formations. The failures of the Russian Armed Forces during the fighting in Ukraine were partly the result of a shortage of forces. Another reason for them (especially at the beginning of the campaign) was, apparently, the wrong political attitude. However, there were clearly serious errors of a military nature proper, which cannot be explained by any external reasons.
A significant improvement in the quality of officers is becoming perhaps the most important task for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. However, its solution will be extremely difficult to combine with the simultaneous increase in the number of officers: to a certain extent, these tasks are mutually exclusive. Obviously, a very significant increase in monetary allowances and expansion of social benefits are also needed here. In addition, it is necessary to dramatically improve the quality of higher military education, as well as to develop and begin to steadily introduce a new code of officer honor into the troops.
PLUS AVIATIONThe proposal to introduce a mixed air division and an army aviation brigade into each combined arms or tank army makes an extremely strong impression.
It should be noted that so far there is only one tank army in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation – the 1st TA as part of the Western Military District (ZVO). Which proved itself in Ukraine very, to put it mildly, not brilliantly (which, apparently, was not due to the lack of its own aviation).
Not a single new tank division is supposed to be formed not only from scratch, but at least deployed from a tank brigade. How tank armies can be formed without tank divisions and even brigades is not entirely clear.
At the moment, the Russian ground forces have only two tank divisions and two tank brigades, and one division and a brigade are already part of the 1st Tank Army. From this it follows that this army will remain the only one of its kind and the main type of armies will remain combined arms.
The introduction of army aviation brigades into the armies seems to be a very rational step. As you know, in the US Armed Forces, each division has an army aviation brigade in its composition.
The inclusion of a mixed aviation division in the composition of the land forces association (obviously, we are talking about front-line aviation) currently has no analogues in the world. At the moment, it is completely unclear how this step will be implemented in practice.
"KARELIA WILL DREAM FOR A LONG TIME..."It is unclear whether the restored Moscow and Leningrad military districts (MVO and LVO) will replace the current military district or will become part of it.
It is also unclear whether this step is a "punishment" of the Western Military District for not quite successful actions in Ukraine (in comparison with the troops of other districts) or it means further strengthening of Russia's western borders. However, one does not completely exclude the other.
At the same time, it is quite obvious that the re-establishment of the LVO and the formation of an army corps in Karelia is a reaction to the potential accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO. The armed forces of these two countries are noticeably stronger than the vast majority of the armies of European countries that are members of NATO. Moreover, the Finnish army has always focused not on anti-partisan actions ("the fight against terrorism"), but on a classic war against a strong enemy, that is, against Russia.
Accordingly, even regardless of whether Finland is a member of NATO, the contingent of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the north-west of the country is completely insufficient to confront this country ("On guard of the Northern Capital", "HVO", 26.10.18). This is especially true for Karelia, which accounts for more than a thousand kilometers of the border with Finland. But at the same time, the only military unit in the Republic of Karelia is now the 159th Fighter Aviation Regiment at the Besovets airfield near Petrozavodsk. Moreover, this regiment is not covered by anything either from the ground or from the air.
Accordingly, the deployment of the army corps in Karelia is an issue that has long been "overripe". Again, regardless of whether Finland and Sweden are members of the North Atlantic Alliance.
However, as mentioned above, the creation of new formations and an increase in the potential of existing ones has been announced for all current military districts. That is, obviously, not only the ZVO or its "heirs" in the person of the MVO and LVO will be strengthened.
It is impossible to say anything more precise about this yet. And in general, time will tell what and how these decisions are implemented in practice and to what extent the declaration of intent will come to life.
Alexander KhramchikhinAlexander Anatolyevich Khramchikhin is an independent military expert.
