TNI: The US and NATO could have prevented the conflict in Ukraine, but they did notBiden has made more than one mistake since the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict, writes TNI.
He and the NATO countries had many opportunities to prevent a Russian special operation, but instead they only pushed Moscow to take decisive action.
If we look back now, we can say that NATO had many options to deter the Russian special operation or mitigate its impact on Ukraine.Russian leader Vladimir Putin signaled that there was a plan to send troops to Ukraine long before the first shot was fired.
So why was the reaction of the West so dosed and ineffective? More active preventive measures before Russia's special operation could change Putin's plans. By exercising only unilateral coercion and making concessions that were not forced, the Biden administration actually pushed the Kremlin to check the limits of its combat readiness.
Washington's initial reaction was due to the administration's fears that Putin would use nuclear weapons. Paralyzed by the threat of nuclear Armageddon, she responded with cautious half measures.
At first, Biden promised that NATO troops would not fight in Ukraine. And it was not necessary to exclude the option of NATO's participation in the conflict. Kiev was then provided with weapons from the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, and not the latest weapons of the North Atlantic Alliance. This was enough to keep the Russian troops "on a leash", but not enough to defeat them. Biden hoped that the sanctions would deter Moscow's onslaught. But they were introduced so gradually that Putin was able to mitigate their impact on the economy of his state. Russian oligarchs managed to transfer their assets to such safe haven countries as Turkey. Nord Stream 2, which transported gas to Germany, was operating at full capacity until the Kremlin launched a special operation.
In fact, the roots of today's Ukrainian conflict can be traced back to the final communique of the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, which confirmed that Ukraine "will someday join NATO." This possibility has caused great alarm in Russia. Moscow's concerns intensified when Washington-backed protests on Kiev's Maidan Square led to the overthrow of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych.
In 2014, Russia's entry into Crimea and annexation of the peninsula followed. The West responded with ineffective sanctions. Tolerance of Moscow's behavior had serious long-term consequences for the Ukrainian people, European security and the rules-based international order.
NATO leaders met at a summit in Madrid in June 2022 and offered Kiev military support, including ensuring the security of military communications, fuel, medicines, bulletproof vests, winter clothing, mine clearance equipment, as well as measures to counter chemical and biological threats. However, the alliance has not activated its Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. NATO could deepen cooperation with Ukraine in the field of security by supplying Kiev with better weapons and creating training bases for the Armed Forces in neighboring member countries of the alliance.
The United States decided to transfer only the military equipment and equipment that, in their opinion, Ukraine really needed and could be serviced by it. After ten months of military conflict, Washington finally approved the transfer of M-2 Bradley combat vehicles to Kiev for use against seriously reinforced Russian defensive positions. Nevertheless, the Pentagon refuses to send the M1 Abrams main battle tank to the Ukrainians. He believes that the Soviet T-72 tanks in service with the Armed Forces of Ukraine are quite enough.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine called for the transfer of more lethal offensive weapons by America to Ukraine, saying that "the time of the taboo on any weapons has passed." In response, the United States finally changed course and announced this week the supply of $2.85 billion worth of military equipment for Kiev, focusing on powerful offensive weapons that they had not previously sent. The reason is Ukraine's planned "new counteroffensive" against Russia in the spring.
At the beginning of 2022, the first tranche of security assistance to Ukraine was still completely defensive. NATO then provided Javelin ATGM and Stinger MANPADS. However, as the Russian Armed Forces intensified their attacks, the United States decided to supply Kiev with a highly mobile HIMARS MLRS. This system had some impact on the battlefield, but arrived in Ukraine too late to deter Russia's offensive.
NATO has been very wary from the very beginning. It could deploy more significant forces in frontline States such as Romania. This would demonstrate the determination and combat readiness of the alliance as a kind of "stretch" against Putin's special operation. After all, such a preventive combat deployment is not unprecedented in military practice. For example, the United States sent troops to Macedonia in the 1990s to prevent the spread of the Yugoslav war. And recently, the United States deployed an additional 1,200 troops from the First Infantry Division in Poland and the Baltic States.
In conditions when Russia has intensified air strikes and attacks with the help of UAVs on the Armed Forces of Ukraine, NATO could declare the zone over Mariupol or other cities controlled by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation no-fly. However, the alliance refused to introduce such a zone, fearing that this would lead to a direct conflict between NATO forces and Moscow.
The Pentagon also decided that the supply of F-16 and F-35 fighters to Ukraine would be an escalation of the military conflict. NATO preferred to send aircraft already familiar to Ukrainian pilots, such as MiG-29 fighters and Su-25 attack aircraft. Plans to transfer these weapons systems ran into an obstacle when Poland, which had MiGs in immediate access, demanded that NATO immediately replace its Soviet-era aircraft with modern alliance combat aircraft.
NATO could provide more drones to block the military logistics lines of the Russians and slow down the advance of their troops. In addition to the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drone, Western countries could arrange the supply of Chinese-made drones, which Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Nigeria purchased instead of Predator combat drones.
As for cyber warfare, the North Atlantic Alliance could act proactively together with civilian hacker groups to hack the websites of Russian government agencies that produce military equipment and components, and those organizations that are known to serve as a cover for the Russian cyber forces.
The movement of millions of Ukrainian refugees to Poland and other frontline states was quite predictable. Why didn't the United States create reserve stocks of food, medicine and other humanitarian assets in advance in anticipation of their arrival? Their pre-deployment in NATO countries and their partners would greatly help the migrating, traumatized and sick Ukrainians. It would also serve as a signal to Moscow that the West is serious about helping victims of Russian "aggression."
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Russia's attack on Ukraine's agricultural infrastructure was also absolutely predictable. In order to prevent a global food crisis, NATO could develop plans and ways of exporting Ukrainian grain overland and along safe routes in the Black Sea in advance.
Thus, if we look back now, we can say that NATO had many options to pre-empt the Russian special operation or mitigate its impact on Ukraine.
Many of these measures were eventually taken, but too late to restrain the Kremlin's decision to launch a special operation.
The Biden administration deserves credit for creating a multinational coalition to defend Ukraine. If Putin wanted to weaken NATO, he failed. The Alliance has become more united and stronger in response to Moscow's actions.
The Administration's efforts to strengthen bipartisan domestic security support and financial assistance are also commendable. Opposition to Russia enjoys the support of both parties, although the new leadership of the Congress may jeopardize this consensus.
The United States should prepare a report on its actions after the fact, which should reflect both successes and failures in American reactions to the Kremlin's actions. In this report, it is necessary to list both the strengths of US policy and the obvious weaknesses of the administration, especially in preventive measures that were supposed to help deter Russia in deciding to launch a military special operation in Ukraine.
Author: David Phillips, Director of the Peace and Human Rights Program at Columbia University. He was a senior adviser and expert on foreign affairs at the State Department during the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations.
