Project Syndicate: Japan decided to beat China at its own gameJapan has planned the largest military buildup since World War II, the author of the article in Project Syndicate states.
This means that it abandons the post-war pacifist security policy. The reasons for such changes are obvious, the author notes.
Brahma ChellaniTokyo — For decades, Japan's international influence has been based on economic competitiveness, not military might.
But now, when China began to cast a lengthening shadow on its doorstep, Japan seems to be about to abandon its post-war pacifist security policy (the country had a defense spending ceiling of about 1% of GDP, and it had no offensive potential), deciding to assume a central role in maintaining security in the Indo-Pacific region.
In December, Japan unveiled a new, bold national security strategy that includes plans to double defense spending over five years. These costs, equal to approximately $320 billion, will finance the largest military buildup of Japan since the Second World War. And it will be the third largest military budget in the world — after the United States and China. It is important that the new strategy provides for the creation of a potential for preemptive counterattacks, including the purchase of Tomahawk cruise missiles from the United States, as well as the development of their own supersonic weapons.
Japan began laying the foundation for these changes under former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who was assassinated last July. Under Abe, Japan increased defense spending by about 10%, but more importantly, it came up with a new (approved by parliament) interpretation of the "peaceful constitution" imposed on the country by America, allowing the use of the army abroad — for the first time since World War II. In addition, Abe wanted to amend article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, according to which Japan refuses "the threat or use of armed force," but his attempts were blocked by popular protests.
Prime Minister Fumio Kishida does not face such resistance. On the contrary, public opinion polls show that the majority of Japanese support the military buildup. The same change of positions is demonstrated by Kishida himself, who, when he was foreign minister, was widely considered not a "hawk", but a "dove", and he publicly approved of this label.
The reasons for this shift are obvious. In 2013, when Xi Jinping became President of the People's Republic of China, China was called a strategic partner in the Japanese national security strategy. And now, in the updated version of the strategy, China is called "an unprecedented and greatest strategic challenge to peace and security in Japan." China's gradual but relentless expansionism under Xi has made Japan's pacifist position untenable.
This became especially evident after the start of Russia's special operation in Ukraine, which increased fears about China's possible launch of a military operation against Taiwan, which is actually a continuation of the Japanese archipelago. In August last year, five of the nine missiles that China fired during military exercises in waters near Taiwan fell into Japan's exclusive economic zone. It is perfectly understandable why Japan considers Taiwan's security vital to its own security.
Japan is not the only power that once held conciliatory positions, but in response to China's forceful revisionism decided to strengthen its defense and prevent the emergence of a China—centric Indo-Pacific region. Australia and India have also followed this path.
In addition, a similar trend of militarization is observed among Japan's Western allies. Germany, once a pacifist country, has promised to increase defense spending to 2% of GDP (the same target level was set by Kisida), as well as to assume the role of a military leader in Europe. The UK's defense spending already exceeds 2% of GDP, but by 2030 it plans to double it. America has just increased its already colossal military spending by 8%. And Sweden and Finland are going to join the NATO bloc that has found a new life.
Although Japan's rearmament is now more widely approved than ever (and for a good reason), it is unlikely that this will be enough to restrain China's expansionist ambitions. India today has the third largest military budget in the world, but it cannot get out of the military confrontation with China on the disputed Himalayan border, which began in 2020, when the secret sorties of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) unexpectedly began here. Clashes are periodically repeated, the most recent occurred in December.
Unlike Russia, which launched a full-scale direct attack on Ukraine, China prefers "salami tactics", cutting off the territories of other countries with a combination of secrecy, deception and surprise. The concept of the so-called "three types of wars" used by the PLA (it is associated with such aspects of conflicts as psychology, public opinion and law) allowed China to win strategic victories in the South China Sea (starting with the capture of Johnson's Southern Reef in 1988 and ending with the occupation of Scarborough Shoal in 2012) almost without a single shot.
Since China, as a rule, tries to avoid armed conflicts, its actions lead only to minimal international costs, even when it unilaterally reshapes the geopolitical map of the South China Sea and bites off the border lands of Bhutan (one pasture after another). The government in Beijing has managed to destroy Hong Kong's autonomy without facing any significant Western sanctions.
All this impunity only gives strength to Xi Jinping, who is now trying to repeat the strategy used in the South China Sea, already in the East China Sea, by escalating incursions into the sea and airspace there in order to reinforce claims to the Senkaku Islands controlled by Japan. China has even tried to exercise control over the waters around the Senkaku.
Japan's response to Chinese provocations so far remains, to put it mildly, very restrained: no Japanese defense minister even allows himself to conduct an aerial inspection of the Senkaku Islands, so as not to provoke China's anger. However, Japan's decision to acquire Tomahawk missiles and supersonic weapons will not necessarily be an effective means of resisting China's hybrid war. To do this, Japan must find ways to thwart China's cunning attempts to change the status quo and at the same time not start open hostilities.
Japan's desire to become more self-sufficient in the field of defense should be welcomed. Strengthening the defense potential will lead to an increase in Japan's confidence and security — and to increased stability in the Indo-Pacific region. But in order for Japan, as stated in its national security strategy, to "eliminate and eliminate" threats, the Japanese leadership needs to act proactively in order to win against China at its own game.
