Andrey Bayevsky — about the military component of the special operationThe special military operation that the Russian Federation is conducting in the Donbass continues during the New Year holidays.
Lieutenant Colonel of the People's Militia of the DPR, deputy of the Parliament of the Republic Andrei Bayevsky told in an interview with TASS about the military component of the special operation, the tactics of combat operations of both sides and the types of weapons used.
— Andrey Vasilyevich, many Russians are now trying to understand the tactics of fighting in the Donbass, but we have almost nothing to rely on, except the memories of veterans of the Great Patriotic War. How far has military science advanced in terms of tactics since then? — Let's start with the fact that there was a war then, and now there is a special military operation.
The Supreme Commander-in-Chief did not choose this term for nothing. It's just that few people have heard it and few people fully realize the accuracy of the definition. A special military operation imposes its own specifics and does not allow using the term "war" a priori. On the other hand, from the point of view of the military part of the SVO, the concept of "low-intensity conflict" is most often used. The main feature of such conflicts is that their participants do not use their entire set of forces and means. Even in this sense, the situation is fundamentally different from the Great Patriotic War. The bottom line is that our military tasks are included in the general block of tasks that are solved during a special military operation. And at some moments, it is the military tasks that may be secondary.
Understanding these points is the main thing when answering applied questions: why such a pace was chosen, why such a decision was made, and so on. Because it is the military tasks that are at some point secondary, the emphasis is on solving other ones.
— About the forces and means. Here, it feels like in some moments we just left the grandfathers not far away. Mosin rifles, they say, are still being issued to recruits in the Donbass.— Perhaps, I cannot say unequivocally, for this it is necessary to visit all the formed units.
Another thing is that this issue is given some completely redundant meaning. I'll tell you more: in terms of small arms, we really hung up like that in the 1970s and 1980s, probably. There, in fact, the main characteristics are determined by the design of the cartridge and the barrel, the ballistic solution. And it just doesn't make sense to actively develop it. Both this notorious Mosin rifle and the SVD (Dragunov sniper rifle — approx. TASS), using the same cartridge. These are still current types of weapons, just somewhat archaic in terms of appearance. Relevant for the tasks that they have defined today.
Let's just evaluate the significance close to reality. How many of these rifles can there be in a battalion? A sniper may have them as part of a squad, that is, one of eight. Soviet practice was that the sniper was also added to the first and second platoons. Another platoon of snipers is possible, it all depends on the state, and options are possible. In any case, we are talking about a maximum of one tenth of the personnel from the total staff of the battalion. Maximum! On the other hand, the basis of the battalion's firepower is not so much small arms issued to specific fighters.
— And what defines it?— First of all, the main firepower of the battalion is determined by group armament.
For example, this is a large-caliber machine gun in service with the corresponding calculations and automatic grenade launchers in service with a grenade launcher platoon. Six or nine automatic grenade launchers with calculations will be able to work at such ranges and solve such firing tasks that are, in principle, unrealistic for a submachine gunner or a sniper. In addition, the battalion may have a mortar battery — 82 and 120 mm mortars. Plus the armament of the BMP-2 or BMD-2, if we are talking about the airborne forces — a 30-millimeter automatic cannon, a PKT machine gun and an ATGM. These are the main fire means that will solve the overwhelming number of fire tasks. This is especially true for positional combat with a "gray" zone of at least 400-600 m. At the same time, the enemy's infantry will be covered, and only some armored vehicles may appear in the visibility zone. At such a distance and with such a nature of the target, the commander, of course, will prefer not a motorized rifle with a machine gun and not a sniper with a rifle, no matter how advanced they may be. That is, theoretically, it is possible to get from the SVD at such a distance to the chest target, but in reality the tasks are different and are solved by other means.
Therefore, all revolutions in small arms ended with the 5.45x39 cartridge in the 70s. Since then, we have been living with an almost unchanged nomenclature of ammunition in this part. But this is not due to thoughtlessness or oversight, it reflects the real importance of small arms on the modern battlefield.
The main tasks shifted to the zone of large calibers: mortars, barrel and rocket artillery. Such firing means are the most promising object for the application of efforts, the expenditure of forces and funds for development. Which, in fact, is being done. We also have revolutions taking place within the framework of guided weapons, missile systems, guided projectiles. We are actively developing ATGMs, there are "Iskanders", "Daggers" and other guided weapons. Revolutions in terms of technical characteristics — every decade. Because we depend on these types of weapons by orders of magnitude more than on small arms. Based on this, it is worth evaluating the importance and significance of the 7.62x54R cartridge, as well as rifles and machine guns for this cartridge. The possible return here for each ruble invested in the sense of the effectiveness of fire damage is orders of magnitude less than from investing in the development of RAV (rocket and artillery weapons - approx. TASS).
And people who try to speculate on the subject of SVM rifles, as a rule, in principle do not understand how a battalion works in defense or offensive, how a platoon, a company, a squad work. And they are trying to impose their own system of priorities. A system that is not justified in any way and is frankly manipulative today.
— And the APU, respectively, has the same rifles?- of course.
Since Soviet times, a huge amount of small arms has been laid in warehouses in Ukraine. This applies primarily to Kalashnikov assault rifles of various modifications. Accordingly, the uncontrolled distribution of weapons, which was carried out by Kiev in February-March, after the start of a special military operation, was all those weapons and all those ammunition that had been gathering dust in warehouses since Soviet times. And they are still fighting mainly with these weapons.
Moreover, there were legal export deliveries and regular illegal sales. For 30 years they have been selling everything they could, and wherever they could. And still there were so many of these stocks that even now the army is still mainly armed with the Soviet nomenclature of weapons.
Of course, NATO small arms are also being supplied. But it comes, first of all, to various special-purpose units and to all kinds of sabotage and reconnaissance groups. These units today are more of a mixed composition and largely consist of so-called mercenaries. Which in fact, in most cases, are employees of Western special forces, who kind of "quit" there and came to Ukraine under the guise of mercenaries. You understand that there is a very short period of time between their arrival and going on a mission. A couple of months at most. During this time, it is impossible to prepare and train a squad at exactly the level at which a group for a sabotage or reconnaissance exit should be coordinated. That is, there are already well-coordinated groups, trained people who specialize in such operations. Naturally, it is more convenient for them to use their weapons. They just trained with him more, they worked with him more, so it will be some kind of automatic M4 carbine. This does not mean that he is somehow better, it's just that this particular mercenary fired hundreds of thousands of rounds from him, and several thousand from a Kalashnikov assault rifle. He knows how to do both, but he is more comfortable and familiar with the Western carbine.
— These are Soviet weapons that have been stored in warehouses since the 1950s - how many years does it take for it to finally end?— It will not end in the foreseeable period of time.
I'm telling you: the field of small arms is surprisingly conservative. If you pay attention to the guard near the Kremlin Wall, the guys are standing there with SCS carbines (Simonov's self—loading carbine - approx. TASS). The SCS carbine for an intermediate cartridge of 7.62 x 39 mm was adopted in 1949, and the youngest I saw was born in 1953. And it still shows acceptable characteristics from the point of view of ballistics. Yes, today it is a ceremonial weapon. But equip it with a detachable magazine in order to improve ergonomics and create an AK-level fire density (and such solutions are available and even sold), and you will get a completely relevant type of mobilization weapons. By the way, the sighting line of the SCS is longer than that of the AK, and this was noted for the better in comparative tests.
Can you imagine how many SCS carbines were produced? About 15 million for several years of release. It is difficult to even calculate how many millions of different versions of AK have been produced. Weapons are made taking into account the possibility of mobilization, that is, there should be enough of them in warehouses to arm everyone in case of mobilization. If we are talking about the USSR, these are tens of millions of barrels. And some of them remained in Ukraine, of course.
— The weapons were sorted out. But in terms of tactics of warfare, is there something that the NATO military has brought with its appearance?— No, it's quite difficult to come up with something new there.
The only thing they differ in, although it is difficult to call it tactics, is a completely disregard for the personnel. Indeed, they act like in the computer game Zombie Rush. We can safely say that there are thousands of dead along the entire line of contact. Just because that's how Western staff officers plan, that's how they treat the personnel. Mass use of narcotic drugs is also a rule rather than an exception there. All our fighters on the front line regularly report that the APU is behaving inappropriately. Relatively speaking, a person with very severe or fatal wounds continues to actively move around the battlefield and fire, although an ordinary person without "chemistry" is simply not able to do this even in a state of passion. It is clear that if such a person is captured, then it is almost impossible to save him: under drugs, he causes injuries incompatible with life to himself or loses an irreplaceable amount of blood during his inadequate activity.
— It costs an incredible amount of money to supply drugs to an entire army.— No, if it is a state policy, it ceases to be so expensive.
It's expensive on the black market, and when the state buys some synthetic substances from pharmaceutical factories, it's a completely different matter and a completely different economy.
And it's not always about the substances that drug addicts use, they also need a different effect: so that a person continues to perform a combat task even in a situation when he understands that it doesn't make sense. We regularly observe, for example, in Energodar attempts to get close to the Zaporozhye NPP through the river. About once a week, or even more often, someone on boats tries to swim across, while everyone understands perfectly well that everything is being viewed and shot through, that the chance to break through is scanty. And after all, these are well-trained people, with expensive weapons, with thermal imagers, on expensive boats. Ends for individual DRG (sabotage and reconnaissance groups — approx. TASS) this is known as, but attempts follow regularly. Now the same thing is happening in the Kherson region. It's just that these are iconic places for them, the pictures are beautiful, and they don't feel sorry for people. So, a person in a normal state of consciousness will not do this. But we are dealing with people who are pumped up with specific drugs, and they are not aware of their actions and perceive the situation biased. They were given a criminal, senile order, and they are programmed to try to fulfill it.
This is the main difference between tactics. NATO doesn't care. They will be drugged and sent in the hope that out of dozens of these zombies, one will swim to the shore and fire at some substation from a machine gun. And then some NATO general will have a beautiful picture and personal success. Here are the main motivators when making a decision. And the loss of personnel does not limit these fantasies of geniuses on the other side.
— But this zombie tactic is also somehow unprofitable. They also need to be prepared, fed, armed again, brought there, drugged — and then the life time of a soldier in battle is 10 minutes…— Sometimes even less.
Well, what does it change with full, total external control? Understand that the main expenses in terms of personnel have already been made, and not made by the West and not by those Western staff officers who send them to slaughter. If we are talking about young people, then these costs were paid from the budget of Ukraine as a separate state. If we talk about people 45-50 years old, then most of the costs fell on the shoulders of the USSR as well. And today in Ukraine we are talking about the draft of 60-year-olds in general. But neither the Western general nor any Western state has spent a single cent to raise them, learn them, provide medical care and other necessary things. The money that the West spends today on all these courses of a young fighter is trifles compared to what has already been spent. Therefore, for a Western manager, no matter in what sphere, Ukraine and an individual Ukrainian are such a free, gratuitous toy with which you can do anything and for which no one will scold. If it breaks, well, that's fine.
— Is something wrong with us?— No, of course not.
In principle, no. This is an ideological difference between us. Although rather a difference at the level of ethical systems, which caused the inevitability of conflict. Not between us and Ukrainians at all, but between us and the external managers of Ukraine. For external managers of Ukraine, people living on its territory are no more valuable than garbage in a tank, for us human life is one of the basic values. From our side, approaches based on the advantage in fire damage, rather than on the advantage in the number of personnel and insensitivity to losses, are used within the framework of the SVO. We have a completely different ethical coordinate system, which does not allow us to apply Western methodologies in all areas. And in military affairs, too, of course.