The markets of the Middle East and North Africa are becoming increasingly important for both exporters and importersAccording to the latest report by SIPRI (an independent international institute engaged in research on conflicts, armaments, arms control and disarmament), in 2019, for the first time in history, a conglomerate of the arms industry from an Arab state (EDGE from the United Arab Emirates) entered the list of the 25 largest companies producing weapons and military equipment (IWT).
This is just one illustration of the growing role that some States of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) play in the global arms trade – not only as importers of weapons of mass destruction, but also increasingly as manufacturers and exporters.
These events are taking place in a region characterized by growing tensions and active armed conflicts in Libya, Syria and Yemen. Based on previous SIPRI studies, this thematic paper provides an overview of the state of control over the supply of conventional weapons, as well as small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the Middle East and North Africa.
ARMS LEAKAGE TO MENA COUNTRIESThe diversion of weapons means the appropriation or redirection of conventional military materials contrary to national or international law, including to illegal markets, which leads to a potential change of ownership or control.
This can happen at any stage of the supply chain, including after the materials have come into the possession of an authorized end user.
The Middle East and North Africa face several different types of leakage, described below.
1. Illegal arms shipments that violate the embargo.
States and non-State actors have been involved in illegal arms shipments, including to recipients subject to the UN Security Council arms embargo.
The UN embargo on Yemen prohibits supplies to non-State armed groups, but since 2015 there have been reports of persistent violations by both States and non-State actors. At the same time, the report of the UN Group of Experts for 2022 notes that some types of weapons have technical characteristics similar to weapons produced in Iran.
Numerous violations of the UN embargo against Libya have also been documented, including by Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The report of the Group of Experts for 2022 notes that, although the number of violations decreased, the embargo remained "completely ineffective." As a result, a significant number of weapons end up in the hands of non-State actors in Libya.
2. Illegal arms shipments that violate end-user guarantees.
In other cases of deliveries to armed groups and parties to the conflict, States ignored the end-user guarantees they provided when initially acquiring weapons. The UAE, for example, re-exported self-loading rifles, which they purchased from Bulgaria, to the Libyan and Yemeni armed forces from 2011 to 2016. According to other reports, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have also re-exported American-made armored vehicles to non-state armed groups operating in Yemen.
3. The collapse of the state and the seizure of the battlefield.
The collapse of the State and the seizure of the battlefield are a significant and potentially the largest source of illegal weapons in the MENA countries. The collapse of the Libyan State in 2011 and parts of the Iraqi State in 2003 led to large-scale looting of national stocks of weapons and ammunition.
A study conducted by Conflict Armament Research also showed that at least 12% of the weapons seized from the Islamic State group (IS, banned in Russia) originate from Iraqi national stocks and were probably captured during the fighting.
4. Deficiencies in physical security and inventory management.
Deficiencies in physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) procedures also played a role in the diversion of weapons from national stockpiles in Libya and Iraq – and at least some of these deficiencies persist today. Moreover, there are potential gaps in PSSM procedures – although not at a comparable level – even in States with more established control systems, such as Israel, where weapons stolen from the military were detected in 70% of shootings in 2021.
MILITARY BUILDUPThe States of the Middle East and North Africa are still heavily dependent on imports for their military acquisitions and build-up.
According to the SIPRI database on the supply of military hardware, the supply of major conventional weapons to the States of the Middle East has increased significantly over the past 15 years. Seven of the 25 largest arms importing states in 2017-2021 (Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE) were located in the Middle East.
In North Africa, Algeria and Morocco are the main importers. And in 2017-2021, they were, respectively, the 11th and 25th largest recipients of major conventional weapons at the global level.
NATIONAL ARMS INDUSTRYAt the same time, many MENA States have developed (or are striving to develop) their own weapons industry.
This has led to the fact that some of them have established limited licensed production of basic conventional weapons and SALW; for example, armored vehicles in Algeria and Egypt and anti-tank missiles in Jordan.
Jordan has also become an exporter of major weapons. According to SIPRI, in 2017-2021 it was the 25th largest supplier, although this was mainly due to the export of used equipment (for example, combat helicopters and armored personnel carriers).
The MENA States have also been able to create a significant domestic potential for the production of weapons. Israel is the most successful and long-standing example, it has the most self-sufficient and technologically advanced weapons industry in the region. Israel remains the main arms exporter to the MENA and has been among the world's top 10 suppliers of major conventional weapons since the 2000s.
Turkey has also made significant progress in developing its own weapons industry and is able to partially or fully produce a wide range of weapons systems (for example, armored vehicles, ships, artillery, missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles). Turkey was the 12th largest supplier of major weapons in 2017-2021.
Iran has developed the potential to produce various categories of both basic weapons and SALW, including tactical and combat drones. Iranian UAVs have recently been in the spotlight after reports of their use by Russia in Ukraine. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have used netting agreements to promote the development of domestic production capacity. Both states are currently capable of producing a wide range of military equipment domestically, although the UAE has achieved greater success both as a new arms manufacturer and as an arms exporter.
TRANSFER OF WEAPONS AND CONTROL OF SALWGiven the tensions, the build-up of military power and the problems in controlling the proliferation of weapons in MENA, there is a clear need for effective control systems for the transfer of weapons and SALW.
States and international organizations have developed a number of standards and guidelines on what such systems should include in order to regulate the supply of weapons and prevent leakage.
The United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (UNPOA) contains provisions that cover all aspects of the life cycle of small arms or light weapons, from their production and storage to their sale, transfer and disposal. The ATT (International Arms Trade Treaty) establishes norms and standards for effective control over the supply of conventional weapons. Both documents require States to report on measures taken at the national level to implement these standards.
At the regional level, in 2002, the League of Arab States (LAS) adopted the Arab Model Law on weapons, ammunition, explosives and hazardous materials. However, there are no reporting requirements in this document. Public information about the content of the State system of control over the supply of weapons and SALW is important for assessing its strengths and weaknesses and is a key component of an effective system.
As for the UN Action Program, less than half of the MENA States submitted reports in both 2020 and 2022, and the States that submit reports often contain a minimum of details.
Very little information was provided from MENA States in Exchange for UN national legislation on the transfer of weapons, military equipment, dual-use goods and technologies and technologies. Since the establishment of this mechanism in 2002 and until 2016, when it ceased to exist, only five out of 20 States in the Middle East and North Africa shared information about national legislation. Judging by the information that is available in the reports for the UNPOA submitted by the States of the Middle East and North Africa, as well as information on legislation that is available on the Internet, some systems of control over the supply of weapons in the region seem more mature than others. Most MENA States have adopted provisions concerning international arms transfers, as well as stockpile management, marking and record keeping.
The available information indicates that there are gaps and shortcomings in the national systems of control over the supply of weapons and SALW in all States of the Middle East and North Africa. Arms and SALW control systems cannot solve all the problems identified in this thematic handbook, such as leakage after the collapse of the State and illegal arms shipments in violation of the arms embargo. However, they can help to close some of the gaps that allow weapons to enter illegal markets.
Vasily IvanovVasily Ivanovich Ivanov is a journalist.
