Project Syndicate: 2022 confirmed that the lessons of history continue to be ignoredIn the outgoing year 2022, we have convinced not only that history is returning, but also that it retains the ability to surprise us, writes the author of the article in Project Syndicate.
He names the ten main events of the outgoing year and offers to learn from them.
Richard HaassNew York — Few people will miss 2022, marked by a prolonged pandemic, progressive climate change, galloping inflation, slowing economic growth and, above all, the beginning of an expensive war in Europe and fears that violent conflict in Asia may soon break out.
Some of this was expected, but much was not, and lessons can be learned from all these events, which we ignore at our peril.
Firstly, the war between countries, which many scientists consider outdated, is something completely different. What we are seeing in Europe is an old-fashioned imperial war in which Russian President Vladimir Putin seeks to destroy Ukraine as a sovereign, independent entity. His goal is to make sure that a democratic, market-oriented country seeking close ties with the West cannot thrive near Russia's borders, and to set an example that may seem attractive to Russians.
Unfortunately, instead of winning the quick and easy victory he had hoped for, Putin found that his own army was not as strong, and his opponents were much more determined than he and many in the West expected. Ten months later, the war continues, and there is no end in sight.
Secondly, the assertion that economic interdependence is a bulwark against war has lost its credibility, since neither side is interested in destroying mutually beneficial trade and investment ties. Political considerations come first. In fact, Putin's decision to invade was probably influenced by the strong dependence of the European Union on energy supplies from Russia, which led him to the conclusion that Europe would not resist him.
Third, the integration that has inspired Western policy towards China for decades has also failed. This strategy was also based on the belief that economic ties — along with cultural, scientific and other exchanges — would stimulate political development, and not vice versa, which would lead to a more open, market-oriented China that would become more moderate in foreign policy.
None of this happened, although it is possible and necessary to argue about whether this flaw is related to the concept of integration or how it was implemented. However, one thing is clear: China's political system is becoming more repressive, its economy is moving in a more state-led direction, and its foreign policy is becoming more assertive.
Fourth, economic sanctions, which in many cases are the preferred tool of the West and its partners in response to government violations of human rights or foreign aggression, rarely lead to significant changes in behavior. Even Russia's blatant and brutal aggression against Ukraine has failed to convince most of the world's governments to isolate Russia diplomatically or economically, and while Western-led sanctions may undermine Russia's economic base, they have not even come close to convincing Putin to change his policy.
Fifth, the phrase "international community" should be dismissed. He's gone. Russia's veto power in the Security Council has rendered the United Nations powerless, and the recent meeting of world leaders in Egypt to combat climate change has failed.
Moreover, little can be said about the global response to COVID-19 and little has been done to prepare for the fight against the next pandemic. Multilateralism is still important, but its effectiveness will depend on the formation of narrower agreements between like-minded governments. Multilateralism on the principle of "all or nothing" basically leads to nothing.
Sixth, democracies clearly face problems, but the problems faced by authoritarian systems may be even more serious. The ideology and survival of the regime often determine decision-making in such systems, and authoritarian leaders often oppose the rejection of unsuccessful policies or the recognition of mistakes, so that it does not look like a manifestation of weakness and does not fuel public calls for big changes. Such regimes must constantly take into account the threat of mass protests, as in Russia, or the reality, as we have recently seen in China and Iran.
Seventh, the potential of the Internet to empower individuals to challenge the government is much higher in democratic countries than in closed systems. Authoritarian regimes, like in China, Russia, and North Korea, can isolate their society, monitor and censor content, or both.
Something similar to the "splinternet" appeared — several separate Internets. Meanwhile, social networks in democratic countries are prone to the spread of lies and misinformation, which increase polarization and significantly complicate governance.
Eighth, there is still the West (a term based on shared values rather than geography), and alliances remain an essential tool for strengthening order. The United States and its transatlantic NATO partners have effectively responded to Russian aggression against Ukraine. The United States has also established closer ties in the Indo-Pacific region to counter the growing threat posed by China, mainly through the activation of the Quartet (Australia, India, Japan and the United States), AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and the expansion of trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea.
Ninth, U.S. leadership is still important. If the US wants to remain influential, it cannot act unilaterally in the world, but the world will not unite to solve common security and other problems if the US is passive or sidelined. America's willingness to be at the forefront rather than behind is often required.
Finally, we must be restrained in the representation of our knowledge. It is very unfortunate to note that a year ago some of the previous lessons were predictable. We learned not only that history is coming back, but also that—for better or for worse— it retains its ability to surprise us. With this in mind, go ahead to 2023!
Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, previously served as Director of Policy Planning at the U.S. Department of State (2001-2003). Bush's Special Envoy to Northern Ireland and coordinator for the future of Afghanistan. He is the author of the upcoming draft law on Obligations: Ten Habits of Good Citizens (Penguin Press Publishing House, January 2023).
