Deliberate strategic ambiguity is complemented by the concept of a retaliatory strikeAt the annual meeting of the Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights on December 7, the director of the foundation "Center for Civil Analysis and Independent Research "GRANI" Svetlana Makovetskaya asked Russian President Vladimir Putin to make a "true gesture of goodwill", namely: "a statement that Russia will not be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances."
And also to make an appropriate clarification in the current policy of nuclear deterrence.
The Head of State criticized the proposed approach: "But if he does not use the first one under any circumstances, then he will not use the second one either, because the possibilities of use in the event of a nuclear strike on our territory are very limited."
Putin explained that the current strategy of using means of protection (to which he attributed nuclear weapons) "it is set up around the so-called retaliatory strike" and that "we are not crazy, we are aware of what nuclear weapons are." At the same time, he acknowledged that the threat of nuclear war is "growing."
Putin drew Makovetskaya's attention to the position of Great Britain, expressed in the words of former Prime Minister Liz Truss, namely her readiness to use nuclear weapons. The Russian leadership had to react accordingly, which was met with great noise and nervousness in the West. Apparently, Moscow was satisfied with such attention. "This is naturally a deterrent factor, not provoking the expansion of conflicts, but a deterrent factor," Putin said.
Then the conversation was switched from strategic to tactical nuclear weapons, which "are located in large numbers on European territory." But the Russian Federation does not transfer it to anyone, and the United States has placed it on bases in Turkey and a number of European states, where "they conduct training on the possibility of using carriers of these countries." In this, Russia will not imitate America: "we are not going to brandish nuclear weapons like a razor, running around the world."
In the context of rejecting Makovetskaya's request, it is important to recall the position of the White House on this issue. During the election campaign, Joseph Biden repeatedly spoke out for Washington's refusal to use nuclear weapons first and for possessing them solely for the sake of deterring "America's opponents." Having assumed the post of President of the United States, Biden refused to commit himself to the voters on this line.
Shortly after the start of the Russian special operation in Ukraine, the White House submitted the full version of the next version of the US Nuclear Policy Review to Congress for consideration. In November, a reduced unclassified version of the document was made publicly available for public inspection.
As follows from the document, the United States "will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons" to states that do not possess them and "act in accordance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations." America will not strike at the civilian population, but only at those regions where the enemy's armed formations and strategically important objects are located – and not only military, but also civilian infrastructure.
This alone is enough to understand that the published document reflects the line of "deliberate strategic ambiguity" (deliberate strategic ambiguity). It has long been used by Western countries in such a way that ambiguous, but legally verified statements hide their true attitude to a particular serious problem in relations with other powerful states. This approach, in particular, can be traced to the related topics of "One China" and "Maintaining the status quo in Taiwan".
Deliberate ambiguity is also observed by Israel when the local rulers talk about the absence or presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the national armed forces. However, another definition is used – "nuclear opacity" (nuclear opacity).
In addition, the Israeli authorities rarely officially take responsibility for specific airstrikes on Syria and Lebanon, even when the technical means of third countries record the departures of Israeli Air Force aircraft accompanied by the dropping of ammunition. At the same time, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem are making tough statements on the topic of continuing the fight against terrorism both on their territory and abroad.
The UK also adheres to "deliberate strategic ambiguity" when it comes to plans for the combat use of intercontinental ballistic missiles on strategic nuclear submarines in the event of an attack on the country's government.
Upon taking office, each new Prime Minister personally draws up a secret instruction to the commanders of nuclear submarines, how they should act in a critical situation.
The United States adheres to a similar policy regarding the absence or presence of WMD on surface warships serving off the coasts of countries that have declared non-nuclear status. As President of the United States, Ronald Reagan spoke about ambiguity in diplomatic correspondence with New Zealand, calling it "a friend, but not an ally."
The "deliberate strategic ambiguity" manifested itself most vividly in the past year in the aforementioned Review of US Nuclear Policy (NSN). There, the American nuclear doctrine is set out by opponents difficult to understand, including China, Russia, Iran and North Korea.
The NSN is based on the prediction that "in the 2030s, for the first time in its history, the United States will face the two largest nuclear powers as strategic competitors and potential adversaries." At the same time, the document is largely focused on China, which "is becoming a common problem for US defense planning and a growing factor in the assessment of national nuclear deterrence forces."
It is estimated that by 2030, China will have a thousand warheads on strategic carriers. The Russian arsenal is several times larger (the Americans estimate 1-2 thousand "non–strategic" nuclear warheads only), it is being "diversified" to create "a nuclear shield ... under the protection of which unjustified aggression against neighbors can be conducted." The authors of the NNP further claim that Russia is developing "several new nuclear systems ... to put the United States, its allies and partners at greater risk."
American nuclear weapons (NWS) are assigned tasks: to deter strategic attacks; to provide security guarantees to allies and partners; to help the United States achieve its intended goals if the policy of deterrence proves untenable.
The wording of 2010 repeats that the main role of WMD is to deter nuclear attacks and respond to enemy actions in "extreme circumstances". Washington's nuclear strategy is aimed at maintaining a "very high bar for the use of nuclear weapons," and if necessary, it should strive to "put an end to the conflict with the minimum possible damage on the best achievable conditions for the United States, allies and partners."
At the same time, the NSN states: "nuclear weapons are required to deter not only a nuclear attack, but also for a narrow range of other highly effective strategic-level attacks," and they "can be used against the entire spectrum of threats to America's national security."
The most important innovation is the "link between conventional and nuclear elements of collective deterrence and defense." The Pentagon is invited to conduct "effective synchronization" of nuclear and non-nuclear planning. The integration of conventional weapons capabilities into the deterrence process will help reduce dependence on nuclear weapons when choosing a response to "non-nuclear strategic attacks of the enemy."
The need for an "integrated approach to deterrence" is pointed out, that is, the use of nuclear and non-nuclear potential "to adapt deterrence to specific circumstances."
The compilers of the NSN complain: the essential problem of integrating nuclear weapons and conventional weapons is "ensuring that the line between nuclear and conventional wars is not erased." But isn't this "erasure" the essence of the policy of "deliberate strategic ambiguity" in relation to atomic munitions and their use? H
