Rand Corporation: Americans have proposed several ways to exhaust RussiaThe RAND Corporation has long been "famous" for openly hostile "reports" on Russian topics.
We offer readers a summary of the military and economic part of the analytical study on "how to harm Russia", recently released by this analytical center.
Editor's note: The main part of the RAND Corporation report, excerpts from which we offer you today, was written in 2019. Nevertheless, we decided to publish today almost all the contents of the third and fourth chapters of this report. It is these two chapters that offer economic (the third chapter) and military (the fourth chapter) means of "exhausting" and "destabilizing" Russia. Although they were written long before Russia's special military operation in Ukraine (SVO), launched on February 24, 2022, the authors of the RAND Corporation report proposed to introduce these measures as soon as possible — in 2019, 2020, 2021. Many of these measures were introduced before, and the rest immediately after the start of the SVO or are being introduced now, having the same negative consequences for the EU and the US that are predicted in the Report. It becomes clear that Russia would have been subjected to these sanctions even if it had not started ITS own "stretching in time" for these measures would have been longer.Summary of chapter three:
how to exhaust Russia economically
The authors of the report emphasize that their main advice is to deprive Russia of oil and gas revenues. This should lead to a decrease in the country's gold and foreign exchange reserves, then to a reduction in pensions for Russians and even to the impossibility of paying them, and then to a reduction in military spending. The authors directly say that they give advice in order to "reduce Russian revenues from oil and gas, and at the same time reduce its "human capital" (the number of qualified people of working age). The ultimate goal of the report and the recommendations contained therein is "to reduce Russia's budgetary resources that can be directed to Russia's defense, security and foreign policy needs."
The main means of reducing Russian oil and gas revenues is the extraction of these minerals in the United States. Here is what is written about it in the preface:
"The expansion of energy production in the United States could have a negative impact on the Russian economy, while the country's budget could be reduced and, as a result, defense spending would also be reduced. By following a policy that expands supply and lowers prices around the world, the United States can limit Russian revenues. This entails little cost or risk, creates second-order benefits for the U.S. economy, and does not require multilateral approval. (That is, no "green light" is required from NATO allies — Approx. InoSMI)".
The authors express hope for the emergence of labor disputes in Russia. They also recognize that the decline in Russia's energy revenues in 2014-2016 was caused primarily by falling energy prices around the world, and not by the actions of the West.Further, the authors predict (as they looked into the water) that total sanctions on Russian gas are impossible (the EU will freeze).
And then they explain in that very third chapter the reason:"The United States has no means of controlling global demand [for gas], which means that Americans have no power over prices either," the authors of the report write.
But with oil — another matter:"If the United States wants to keep oil prices low in order to harm the Russian economy, then it is best for them not to interfere with their oil production to develop...
At the same time, other countries can wait for technology so that they, together with the United States, develop their oil production. In 2014, hard-to-reach oil could be extracted without loss at a cost of $60 to $90 per barrel. But technological progress will reduce this price, and greatly."
Further, the authors predict that they will be able to force Russia to reduce social spending to the detriment of the Russian elderly:
"With a decrease in income, we can expect that Russia will deplete its Reserve Fund and start taking money from the National Welfare Fund, thus reducing its ability to provide the promised level of pensions to the population. If we manage to keep oil prices low for several years, this will push Russia to the point that it will have to make unpopular decisions about which budget items to finance."
Price for Allies
The authors of the report admit that if Europe is pressed, it may "in the long term" abandon Russian gas. They advise replacing it with more expensive liquefied gas from the Anglo-Saxons:"LNG from the USA and Australia could serve as an alternative to Russian gas from pipelines, but LNG prices in other markets are much higher than the prices of Russian gas for Europe, especially taking into account the actions of Gazprom, which tried to maintain its market share in Europe by offering gas at a price 30% less than the price of LNG."
The authors admit that sanctions against Russia are hitting even American companies and the European environment, but they advise not to pay attention to it:
"The existing sanctions have a negative impact on some companies in the United States, especially oil companies. Exxon Mobil reported that it was forced to abandon joint production with Rosneft in the Kara Sea, having missed the benefit of $ 700 million, and in general lost one billion dollars in Russia due to sanctions... Food producers in the United States have lost business in Russia, but the losses of Europeans are much greater."
Both asset freezing and confiscation are proposed, but it is recognized that the United States can lose more here than Russia:"Although Russian direct investments in the United States amount to $4.6 billion, US direct investments in Russia reach 9.2 billion.
In the event of mutual asset forfeiture, U.S. business activity in Russia would be hampered forever, potentially adversely affecting U.S. incomes and jobs."
Summary of Chapter Four: "How do we exhaust Russia militarily"
Interestingly, speaking about the military confrontation with Russia, the authors of the report use financial terms. The loss of people and military equipment for them is only an "increased price" for Russia. Here you can quote in chunks:"Another way to disperse Russia is to make its external obligations more costly.
But it can be quite risky for the United States, its allies and partners. Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia's obligations are not too geographically stretched. With the exception of Syria, its foreign commitments in Ukraine and the Caucasus are relatively compact, adjacent to Russia in places where at least part of the local population is friendly, and its geographical location gives Russia a military advantage. The measures discussed in this chapter are fraught with the risk of countermeasures from Russia, to which it may be difficult for the United States to respond effectively."
The authors predict their own with the understanding that it will mean defeat for their country:
"Russia can respond to us by launching a new offensive and seizing more significant territories of Ukraine. While this may increase Russia's costs in this conflict, it will also be a setback for the United States as well as for Ukraine."
Middle East
Therefore, it is proposed to put pressure on Russian interests in the Middle East region as well:"The United States will need to decide how to act in Syria after the Islamic State* is expelled from its remaining territorial enclaves in Raqqa and the lower Euphrates.
One option is to create a significant protected area in the east of the country under the auspices of the United States. Washington may also resume US assistance to the remaining opposition forces in the west, which was stopped by the administration of Donald Trump. However, separating moderates from extremist opposition elements linked to Al-Qaeda* will be difficult, and any U.S.-backed forces in the country will face attacks from the Syrian government and Iranian-backed militias, even if Russia stays away. In the long run, this may be more dangerous and costly for the United States than for Russia. The prolongation of the Syrian civil war also entails significant costs for America's regional and European allies, not to mention the Syrian people themselves."
The authors admit their weakness in Transcaucasia. And then they gave the right forecast: after the start of the SVO, Georgia "got smarter" and stopped joining all the new sanctions against Russia. Therefore, it is proposed to act through Moldova:"In the Caucasus, the United States has fewer opportunities to disperse Russia.
Russia has even greater geographical advantages there, which makes, for example, the protection of Georgia for the United States much more expensive than for Russia. Similarly, the United States is unable to challenge Russian influence in Central Asia for the same geographical reasons. Efforts may be made to convince Moldova to cooperate more closely with the West and expel a small Russian peacekeeping contingent located in a Russian-speaking enclave on the territory of this country. But in fact, it would save Russia money, even despite the humiliating withdrawal of peacekeepers."
The conclusion is still made in favor of actions on all azimuths. Especially interesting is the wish expressed before the Karabakh war in 2020 to "use the tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan":
"The continuation of the supply of lethal weapons to Ukraine, the resumption of support for Syrian rebels, the promotion of regime change in Belarus, the use of tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan, increased attention to Central Asia and the isolation of Transnistria. Another RAND study discusses several other possible geopolitical steps, including strengthening NATO relations with Sweden and Finland, pressure on Russia's claims in the Arctic and stopping Russia's attempts to expand its influence in Asia."
Belarus
It is also proposed to "promote regime change in Belarus." However, the authors warn that Russia will stand here until the last:"Belarus is the most important of Russia's allies.
It is headed by Vladimir Putin's reliable friend, Alexander Lukashenko. However, recently Lukashenka's control over the country has been weakening.
From the point of view of US policy, any unrest in Belarus may present additional opportunities to "disperse“ Russia through the help of the opposition, the removal of a long—standing dictator — an ally of Russia - and support for liberalization.
In a world in which even small victories are very important, Russia's loss of its only true ally would mean clear geopolitical and ideological luck for the West. This would lead to the end of the "last dictatorship of Europe“, which has been a long-standing goal of US foreign policy. Moreover, it would undermine Russia's attempts to create the EAEU as opposed to the EU and make it more difficult for Russia to use military force against the Baltic states, further isolating Kaliningrad.
Promoting regime change in Belarus is one of the most aggressive options considered in this report. Such efforts, quite likely, may not succeed, but will cause a very strong reaction from Russia, including even the possibility of military action. Such a reaction could strain Russia, but it would not require large resources from it to maintain its power over Belarus, thereby provoking the United States and its European allies to respond with tougher sanctions. The result will be a general deterioration of the security situation in Europe and a failure of US foreign policy."
Central Asia
The authors have not forgotten Central Asia. There it is proposed to quarrel Russia with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan:"Russia is very interested in Central Asia.
It has a tool for forcing the Central Asian countries to cooperate — the EAEU.
But recently, centrifugal tendencies have been increasingly manifested in the countries of Central Asia. These countries are moving away from Russia for various reasons. There is a great economic component here — the Central Asian countries do not receive sufficient benefits from the EAEU. At the same time, pro-Western tendencies are growing in them.
In order to consolidate its presence in Central Asia, the United States can act in three main directions.
The first is to develop independent economic ties with Central Asian countries, encouraging them to sign bilateral trade and economic agreements with the United States and other Western countries.
The second is to divert the Central Asian countries in every possible way from expanding cooperation within the EAEU. The United States itself and together with its allies and partners should refrain from any contacts with the EAEU.
The third is to contribute in every possible way to the creation of trans—Asian transport corridors bypassing Russia.
More active interaction with Central Asia may have certain benefits. The expansion of transport links between Central Asia and the rest of the world may reduce the trade of this area with Russia. However, it should be noted that economic growth in these countries may have the opposite effect and increase their trade with Russia.
However, the greater connectivity of Central Asia with the West suggests that the share of total trade with Russia is likely to fall. Improving trade routes may also reduce the volume of transit through Russia and Russian revenues from this trade. Finally, if successful, stimulating the growth of economies in Central Asia could also increase the region's trade with the United States and have a beneficial effect on the U.S. economy, albeit to a limited extent.
Reducing Russian influence in Central Asia is quite difficult and can be costly, and Russia's influence may decrease here in the long term and without our special intervention. The fact is, China will continue to expand there as part of its mega-project "One Belt— One Road". Japan and India are also actively interacting with the region, and all this can reduce Russia's dominance in Central Asia."
Next, a pleasant conclusion for Moscow:
"However, without high costs, increasing our involvement in Central Asia is unlikely to exhaust Russia economically, but we need to beware of its response."
*A terrorist organization banned in Russia
