FA: The US intends to draw France into a confrontation with ChinaThe meeting between Biden and Macron promises to be difficult, writes the FA.
The former needs the support of the latter in the imminent struggle with China, and at the same time with Russia — through him he wants to create a united front.
How France and the United States could strengthen their alliance.When French President Emmanuel Macron made his first state visit to Washington in 2018, he was in the midst of a fleeting political romance with US leader Donald Trump, but the transatlantic alliance was in chaos.
The French leader, a well—known advocate of both multilateralism and pragmatism, has set himself the task of convincing Trump to stay in the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran and maintain a significant American military presence in northeastern Syria. Neither of these things happened.
Macron's second state visit on December 1, 2022 will take place in a completely different context. It will take place a year after the public quarrel between France and the United States over America's new security partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom, known as AUKUS, which cost Paris an expensive submarine deal with Canberra — and will take place during the resumption of transatlantic unity after the start of the Russian special operation in Ukraine. Today, the leadership of the United States in Europe is confirmed, while the primacy of France (and Germany) is questioned. The center of gravity of the continent has shifted to the east, to the borders of NATO, pushing aside in the list of priorities the main security problem of France — jihadist terrorism emanating from the Middle East and the Sahel region of Africa. Macron was re-elected president in April, but lost his parliamentary majority. And, like most heads of European countries, he faces a winter of discontent due to high energy prices and the impending recession.
Macron's reception at the White House can be seen as a gesture of benevolence on the part of US President Joe Biden. He and the French leader have made efforts to restore mutual trust after the "bomb" with AUKUS, but their administrations still disagree on vital economic and strategic issues. Since Macron's last visit to Washington, the world has undergone a number of serious changes — from a global pandemic to the resumption of conflict in Europe and the dangerous rapprochement between China and Russia, which now force the United States and its allies to adjust their partnership relations. In addition to addressing pressing issues such as the lack of energy and the conflict in Ukraine, Biden and Macron must make sure that the US-French alliance is ready to solve more serious tasks: to provide opportunities for Europe to deter an aggressive Russia, and to reform international institutions so that they become more inclusive, effective and sustainable in the face of in the face of challenges such as the rise of China, climate change and technological threats.
More than NATO
Russia's special operation in Ukraine, combined with the rattling of nuclear weapons, emphasized that NATO remains "the foundation and important structure of Europe's collective security," as Macron's government put it in a national strategic review published in November. After many years of striving to strengthen the "European defense", France has come to terms with the fact that its credibility as a military partner depends on closer participation in NATO. It has increased its military presence and capabilities in the Baltic States and is now the "main country" for NATO's forward presence in Romania, coordinating the training and operations of Allied troops stationed there. Nevertheless, some of France's biggest concerns about the continent's defense have not disappeared behind the reassuring shield of U.S. security guarantees. Europeans, for example, still disagree on what a stronger "European foothold" within NATO should mean in practice, and how to respond to threats from an increasingly assertive China. These are precisely the differences that are spreading Washington and Paris in opposite directions.
The conflict in Ukraine has exposed the dangers of Europe's excessive dependence on the United States in security matters. Due to limited military reserves and budget constraints, the countries of the region want more than they can provide military support to Kiev. In September, EU High Representative Josep Borrel warned that the union's military reserves were severely "depleted" and that many European countries were struggling to replenish their arsenals. According to the Kiel Institute, of the almost 39 billion euros allocated for military assistance to Ukraine as of October 3, almost 28 billion euros came from the United States.
France still hopes to convince Europe to take more responsibility for its own defense — not only by creating a "made in Europe" military capability, but also by conducting more autonomous military missions. After the AUKUS dispute, Biden issued a joint statement with Macron, stressing "the importance of a stronger and more capable European defense ... that complements NATO." A little more than a year later, Macron is looking for evidence that the war in Ukraine does not refute this statement, but confirms it. At the same time, its target audience is more Europeans than Americans. To bring the idea to life, a shift in mentality will be required: the States will need to recognize that Europe's dependence on America, although it is a source of leverage for them, does not meet the long-term interests of the country. In this regard, Washington will have to support clearly European-led initiatives that make them less dependent on the United States, including on their industry. For example, he should contribute to the EU's efforts to create a common defense procurement mechanism, and not try to limit the ambitions of this mechanism just because it excludes the American military-industrial complex.
The Ukrainian conflict has already demonstrated how NATO and the EU can complement each other. Although NATO played a crucial role in deterring the Russian special operation outside Ukraine, it did not become the driving force of direct military support for Kiev. Special initiatives such as the US-led Ukraine Defense Contact Group coordinate most of the military support, while the EU participates in aid delivered through its European Peace Foundation and military assistance mission. Such results of successful cooperation should contribute to closer cooperation between NATO and the EU, which has long been discussed in Europe and which, according to France, can no longer be postponed.
Give me a push and I'll follow you
If the French are hoping for a push from the United States in the field of European defense, the Americans are hoping for closer cooperation with France on China. In its quest to surpass Beijing and create a strong coalition to counter its revisionism, the Biden administration is trying to bridge the gap between American and transatlantic priorities proper. The United States is concerned about the impending Chinese invasion of Taiwan — possibly as early as 2027. Washington does not expect a military response from the Europeans, but hopes that Europe will help deter China from using force and impose sanctions in the event of an attack. To this end, the United States needs to continue working with France and the EU to make the region more economically sustainable. For example, by reducing its dependence on trade with China, its technologies and essential materials — such as rare earth elements — and by countering Chinese disinformation. At the same time, Europe should signal to Beijing that it will be ready to take appropriate measures if necessary. Given that transatlantic unity has proven to be such an effective weapon against Russia, Washington cannot afford to lose it in the fight against China.
From this point of view, France is a key partner of the United States. But such a partner is difficult to manage. Although Paris shares many of the United States' concerns about China, it intends to develop a clear national and European policy that avoids automatically agreeing with Washington on its Chinese direction and leaves open the possibility of cooperation with Beijing when their interests coincide. France also seeks to offer the countries of the Indo-Pacific region the so—called third way - to strengthen international rules and protect sovereignty instead of encouraging them to join competing camps. In Europe, Paris was ahead of everyone, reacting to China's "predatory" behavior, insisting on the creation of EU mechanisms to check foreign direct investment in China and combat Chinese practices of "economic coercion". Nevertheless, France considers itself a "balancing power" that rejects the logic of opposing blocs. Paris' caution about opposing Beijing within the framework of NATO and joining Washington-led initiatives that are perceived as directed against China is an obstacle to uniting Europe against the Middle Kingdom.
To break this impasse, France and the United States need to create effective forums to discuss issues related to China. NATO may be one of these forums, but it is not the only one, since the challenge posed by Beijing is not exclusively military. The EU also has a role to play in preparing the continent for possible economic shocks caused by disruptions in world trade. And there are opportunities to expand cooperation between the United States and the European Union in the field of trade and technology, for example, by further expanding the capabilities of the Trade and Technology Council. Without better coordination, France and the United States will face three interrelated risks. The lack of unity and military training will cause aggression from China; disagreements over the degree of separation of Europe from China will result in an uncoordinated policy that could undermine the stability of the Indo-Pacific region; the danger that the United States will feel that they have no other choice but to follow their own Indo-Pacific strategy may force them to to act in the region without Europeans.
In its frenzied competition with China, the United States has achieved an important legislative goal by passing the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, which authorizes huge investments in environmentally friendly enterprises and industries in the United States. But this act, stimulating domestic consumption in America, may lead to an outflow of investment from Europe and risks alienating EU countries from it, fearing a gradual turn of the United States to protectionism. France and Germany are already insisting on similar subsidies for European industry, and Macron even put forward the idea of a law on the priority purchase of European goods in Europe. France loudly complains that it has to pay three to four times more for natural gas than the Americans. What is this but a sign that even at a time of increased transatlantic solidarity, protectionist impulses can cause serious disagreements.
Right-wing populism is now growing on both sides of the Atlantic. Both Macron and Biden are well aware of the political risks that each of them faces. Both can eventually be replaced by leaders who can engage in destructive competition with rivals or cause hostility to partners. So the era of transatlantic unity may not last long. That's why no one wants the global economy to become an arena of "no winners" competition between transatlantic partners even before American voters have a chance to return another "Trump-like" president to office. In addition to finding common ground on China and European defense, Biden and Macron should take advantage of the current opportunity to strengthen ties between themselves and prepare for what may appear on the horizon. One way to protect the alliance from future troubles is to create new bureaucratic mechanisms that are more flexible than established forums such as NATO and the G7. They can be bilateral (US-French strategic dialogues) or multilateral (the European equivalent of the quadrilateral QUAD), but they should create conditions to prevent misunderstandings and promote common strategic goals.
Biden and Macron have a historic opportunity to work for the future. As leaders of two countries with historically similar aspirations, they can do a lot to demonstrate that a democratic world is a better ally for everyone than an authoritarian one. Both agree on the need to solve the problems and grievances of developing countries, and invite them to participate in the defense of universal principles. At the UN General Assembly this year, Macron and Biden made strikingly similar speeches, calling on the rest of the world to resist Russia's special operation in Ukraine and protect the sovereignty of peoples.
Nevertheless, in this competition for the souls of the world, developed democracies such as the United States and France have yet to achieve practical success in order to win over developing countries to their side. From the very beginning of COVID-19, when many rich states were accumulating stocks of masks and other means of protection, Macron insisted on "result-oriented multiculturalism" that could benefit the "global South". And in a speech at the UN climate conference in Egypt in November, he demanded reform of the IMF and the World Bank to promote a global transition to clean energy, supporting the calls of developing countries to make the multilateral financial system more equitable. But such changes can only happen with the support of the United States.
Together, France and the United States can do a lot to reform international institutions in a way that better meets the needs of poor countries in the areas of climate change costs, food security, debt and many other issues. This is not an easy task. But all of this should be an important part of the discussion between Macron and Biden this week if France and the United States want to be prepared for what lies ahead.
Authors: Marie Jourdaine is a researcher at the European Center of the Atlantic Council. She worked in the General Directorate of International Relations and Strategy of the French Ministry of Defense. Celia Belin is a senior researcher at the Center for the USA and Europe at the Brookings Institution.
