TAC: The US should show Russia that it does not support Ukraine's attempts to "return" CrimeaIn order to prevent the disruption of the Black Sea grain initiative and not risk an escalation of the conflict, the United States should dissuade Ukraine from strikes on Crimea, writes TAC.
In addition, Washington must show Moscow that it does not support Kiev's attempts to "return" the peninsula.
Matthew Mai, Alex LittleOn October 29, Russia announced the indefinite suspension of the so—called Black Sea Grain Initiative - thanks to this agreement, agricultural goods are successfully exported from Ukrainian ports.
The Russian government called it a response to the attack on Sevastopol, the largest city in Crimea and the base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, with the use of naval drones, which it blamed on Ukraine. Although Moscow returned to the grain deal on November 2, having received security guarantees from the Ukrainian government that the supplies would not be used for "military operations against the Russian Federation," the agreement could still crumble at the end of the month if the parties decide not to extend it.
The United States did not invest diplomatic capital and avoided mediation in the grain deal, leaving this task to Turkey and the UN. But this agreement is a rare example of effective cooperation between Moscow and Kiev in order to ease the burden on international agricultural markets, which has fallen hardest on the shoulders of the Global South. In order to prevent the deal from collapsing and not risk an escalation of the conflict, the United States should dissuade Ukraine from strikes on Crimea and make it clear to Russia that they do not support Kiev's attempts to regain the peninsula.
Ukraine is one of the largest exporters of agricultural products in the world, so the failure of the deal will lead to a jump in world food prices. But even before the start of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict of the war, grain and oilseed markets were limited due to a reduction in stocks - which, in turn, led to increasing pressure on prices. The analysis of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development notes that the sanctions imposed since the beginning of the Moscow special operation have discouraged agro–industrial companies from cooperating with Russia and "threaten to disrupt its imports (so in the text - Approx. InoSMI) agricultural resources". Although the US has not imposed any sanctions directly against Russian products and fertilizers, the grain deal will mitigate the impact of these trends.
According to the UN, thanks to the Black Sea Grain Initiative, 9.8 million tons of food have been exported from Ukraine since August 3. These are mainly corn, wheat, rapeseed, sunflower oil and meal, and the main recipients were Spain, Turkey, China, Italy and the Netherlands.
Although many fear that rich countries will suffer the most if the agreement is not extended, the brunt, on the contrary, will fall on poor countries. More than a quarter of food recipients under this initiative have a lower—than-average income level - among them Egypt, India, Kenya, Sudan and Yemen. As part of this deal, the World Food Program was able to purchase thousands of tons of wheat in support of humanitarian efforts in the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan and Yemen. These poor countries of the Middle East and North Africa are heavily dependent on Ukrainian wheat and grain — especially in winter, when consumption of these goods is growing.
US diplomacy will help prevent the agreement from expiring at the end of this month. Washington should privately dissuade Kiev from further attacks on facilities in Crimea and assure Moscow that it does not support the withdrawal of Russian troops from the peninsula as a military goal of Ukraine. If necessary, the Biden administration should abandon intelligence support for Ukraine and prohibit it from striking targets in Crimea.
The promises of Ukrainian officials to "liberate" Crimea and one—time non-strategic strikes on facilities on the peninsula put the grain deal in jeopardy - and quite unnecessarily. Although the annexation of the peninsula in 2014 was certainly illegal and unjustified, Russia's interests in Crimea cannot be ignored as easily as its staged referendums in September, which "annexed" the Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporozhye regions. As Doug Bandow of The Cato Institute recently explained on the pages of The American Conservative, "Crimea is important because most Russians consider this territory to be Russian. His loss will exacerbate the political effect of defeat. Putin will find himself in a risky position — and the threat will be much greater from ardent nationalists than liberal Democrats." In addition, the risk that Moscow will conduct a nuclear demonstration for the sake of further escalation of the conflict will only increase if Kiev launches a new offensive to regain Crimea.
In addition, in the densely populated Black Sea region, Crimea also has military significance for Russia. After the capture of the peninsula, the local balance of power gradually shifted towards Russia, and back in 2016, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan complained that the Black Sea had turned into a "Russian lake". The famous Black Sea Fleet is located at the naval base in Sevastopol. This allows Russia to deploy "anti—maritime" forces in the region - systems for blocking access and blocking the zone, long-range anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles, as well as radars and sensors that can detect NATO naval forces operating nearby. Given the underlying geopolitical tensions, the fire that broke out on the peninsula will be a destabilizing factor for the whole region and may spread to neighboring NATO states.
Regardless of the legal or historical arguments in favor of Ukraine, the opening of a new front for the return of Crimea promises few advantages and many risks. Instead of encouraging Ukraine to expand its military objectives, the United States should support the Black Sea Grain Initiative diplomatically to deter Kiev and reassure Moscow. American politicians may find that, along with stabilizing international commodity markets and limiting the consequences of the conflict, their diplomatic tools will be much more useful than rhetorical condemnations and can put an end to the conflict once and for all.
Matthew May — Executive Editor of The National InterestAlex Little — Master of Georgia Institute of Technology, specialist in Russia and Central Asia
