American expert Ashford recommended Kiev to abandon the Crimea and Donbass
The United States needs to start preparing for negotiations on Ukraine, the author of the article in Foreign Affairs believes. She calls on Washington to show wisdom and strive for a world that would take into account Russia's legitimate interests and achievements.
Emma AshfordBy the end of August 2022, the West began to pay less attention to Russia's military special operation in Ukraine.
Both sides have reached a long impasse, which allowed Western leaders not to make difficult choices and not to think too much about the future of the conflict. The events of early September — certain successes of Ukraine, followed by Russian partial mobilization, the annexation of new Ukrainian territories, missile strikes on civilian infrastructure and nuclear threats — destroyed this illusion, pushing the conflict to a new and more dangerous phase.
From the very beginning of the crisis, the Biden administration effectively adhered to a balanced approach to it in the style of "realpolitik": it armed and financed Ukraine, but continued to make it clear that the United States would not directly interfere in military actions. At the same time, the government generally avoids talking about one important area of military strategy: how this whole conflict can end. Experts and politicians who had previously suggested that the United States also support diplomatic efforts aimed at a negotiated settlement were considered naive or on the verge of betrayal. The administration's uncertainty about the endgame of the conflict seems to be caused by moral considerations: many argue that it is immoral to push Ukraine towards a peaceful settlement.
But almost all wars always end in negotiations. The fact that Moscow has escalated this fall raises concerns in two directions: the possibility of a larger-scale war with NATO and the use of nuclear weapons. The global economic costs of the conflict are already huge and will almost certainly increase with the onset of winter. Even if a negotiated cessation of hostilities seems impossible today, the Biden administration should start raising — both publicly and in front of its partners — the difficult issues that this decision will entail. The government must choose the right time to push for negotiations and determine at what point the costs of continuing the fight will outweigh the benefits of it. In seeking a sustainable settlement, the administration also needs to figure out how to capitalize on Ukraine's successes without setting the stage for an escalation of the conflict. To prepare for a better deal, American politicians should support the common front of the West and Kiev, take into account the internal politics of Ukraine and Russia and show flexibility of approaches, especially when determining which sanctions can be lifted without strengthening the Putin regime. If the administration does not prepare for this in the near future, its carefully calibrated conflict policy may be replaced by a dangerous fantasy of "absolute victory."
Not if, but how
In the eight months since the beginning of the Russian SVO, the support of the Biden administration has allowed Ukraine to retake some territories and inflict some damage to Russian forces, while keeping the risk of large-scale escalation at a relatively low level. The government diligently avoids talking about what will happen next, arguing that Ukrainians themselves should decide what should be done in their interests. But it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain this position now that Vladimir Putin has doubled down on a military conflict and made nuclear threats against the West. The Russian president decided to take a significant new risk instead of retreating, making it clear that this battle will not end with a simple capitulation of Moscow. Although these risks still seem manageable, there may come a time when negotiations will be needed to prevent a catastrophe.
At the same time, the economic consequences of the conflict are rapidly worsening. In Ukraine, the state budget is almost destroyed, the country is simply running out of money. As economic historian Adam Tuz said in September, "if Ukraine's allies do not increase their financial assistance, there is every reason to fear both social and political collapse in the Ukrainian rear." Meanwhile, Europe is trapped in its own tightening loop, when rising energy prices exacerbate inflation and increase the likelihood of a deep recession. All this makes the Biden administration's position, according to which only Kiev will decide when the conflict ends, increasingly untenable.
In fact, the question is not whether negotiations are needed to end hostilities, but when and how they should unfold. Nevertheless, politicians must fight the "catch-22": the more successful the Ukrainian forces are on the battlefield, the more difficult it is to discuss a settlement through dialogue, even if it would be beneficial for Kiev to conduct it from a position of strength. As the risk of Russian escalation increases, so does the likelihood that any Western leader who talks about ending the conflict will be presented as unrealistic, immoral, or prone to concessions to "nuclear blackmail." At the same time, the intra-American discussion on acceptable settlement conditions, which has begun now, will help the parties to take a better position when the opportunity for such a deal arises.
Long-term, but not maximalistic result
To lay the groundwork for a settlement, American politicians must act so that the interests of Ukraine, the United States and Europe do not diverge. Kiev's interests do not necessarily coincide with the interests of its Western partners. For Ukraine, the stakes are higher, and since the country's economy is already in severe decline, it may decide that it has little to lose by escalating or continuing the conflict. But its resistance became possible only thanks to Western weapons, financing and intelligence. European states bear significant economic costs. Any risk of escalation or exchange of nuclear strikes poses a direct threat to the West itself. Supporters of Ukraine also have their stakes in the conflict. They should have a say in how it ends.
This does not mean that the West should push Kiev to make concessions, as some claim. But this suggests that the United States and its partners should provide assistance in the future to put Ukraine in the most advantageous position in the negotiations, and not just continue to resist. For example, Kiev and its allies should focus on core interests, such as preserving its sovereignty and protecting the population. These tasks should be narrow in design: instead of trying to regain all of its territory as of 2014 or punish Russian leaders, Ukraine should pursue goals that are less likely to lead to dramatic escalation and help establish lasting peace. Washington should encourage the achievement of these aspirations, as well as explain to Kiev, at least privately, where the limits of American support lie and what exactly the White House considers unacceptable risks of escalation. Setting clear expectations for Kiev reduces the risk of misperception of American policy by the Ukrainian leadership.
American politicians should also take into account the domestic political situation in Ukraine and Russia, since domestic support in both countries will be vital for any settlement to be lasting. History shows that a change of power in Moscow is possible in principle, but by no means absolutely probable and not inevitable. Thus, politicians need to focus on Putin and a small group of elites around him and understand the settlement on what terms they could accept. Given the mobilization of several hundred thousand more soldiers to the front line, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the Russian president will strive at all costs to avoid a complete and devastating defeat. But, like many other authoritarian leaders before him, he can pass off a bad result as a victory. This means that, perhaps, it will be possible to find some kind of face-saving deal in which it would be possible to recognize the realities that exist de facto, such as the legality of the Crimea belonging to Moscow, which the Kremlin could present to the Russian public as real concessions from the West.
In Kiev, Vladimir Zelensky is facing a more open and competitive political environment at a time when disagreements in Ukrainian politics are beginning to seriously escalate. However, he faces a similar dilemma. Since February, the population of Ukraine has become more united — they were united by a nationwide struggle against Russia. With such high demands on Ukrainians, it will be difficult for the government to make any compromise, which will be similar to rewarding the enemy. If Zelensky agrees to an unpopular settlement, it could turn into an electoral defeat for him. In these circumstances, a deal that makes Ukrainians feel that they have largely won is more likely to be successful. Because of this, it is so important to start forming expectations right now. Washington should push Kiev to a more moderate position on issues such as Crimea, which will probably figure in the future settlement. The United States should recommend Ukrainians to lower their triumphant rhetoric somewhat and draw their attention to what economic benefits Ukraine can receive as a result of international assistance in reconstruction and European economic integration within the framework of the settlement.
Politicians should establish clear basic parameters of the settlement, but at the same time have room for considerable flexibility in many details. Several points are non-negotiable. Paramount among them are the sovereignty of Ukraine and the protection of the country's citizens, especially those who wish to leave the territories occupied by Russia. Compromises are possible on other issues. For example, the final territorial boundaries may be partially determined by military successes on the ground. Politicians should not be blindly committed to the status quo until February 24, or even until 2014. A more geographically compact Ukraine, deprived of Crimea and part of Donbass, where a significant pro-Russian population remained, could be more stable and capable of self-defense.
In general, policy makers should strive to give preference to practical results rather than abstract principles. An independent, sovereign Ukraine that can defend itself and integrate economically with Europe would be much preferable to Ukraine, which would conduct permanent territorial disputes within its borders. The situation in the country is still changing. American politicians should not now tie their hands with statements that may be difficult to implement in practice.
Meanwhile, easing sanctions against Russia is likely to be one of the most important but politically fraught parts of any negotiations for Western politicians. Such restrictions, as a rule, become a permanent element of international politics, although their economic and political influence weakens over time. Therefore, they are often more useful as trumps than as permanent reprisals. Politicians should now think carefully about how to use the easing of sanctions to get maximum concessions from Russia. Throughout the entire military phase of the conflict, Western restrictions served two purposes: short-term punishment for conducting a special operation and long-term weakening of the Russian military machine.
Some easing of sanctions against Russia is likely to be a necessary prerequisite for the successful conclusion of a peace agreement, but politicians should think carefully about which measures should be lifted. Allowing Moscow to repatriate some of its foreign exchange reserves, for example, may be useful as part of the deal, because it is attractive to the Kremlin from the point of view of short-term economic stabilization, and also because freezing these reserves will not weaken the Russian economy in the long term. On the contrary, the export control imposed on Russia should limit the country's military-industrial base in the long term, and it should be maintained as much as possible. Politicians should also adopt carefully thought-out plans for the gradual easing of sanctions, in which Russia specifically concedes or withdraws its troops. By the way, they were practically not in the failed Minsk agreements.
Know when to hold your trumps
There are three options in which it makes sense for the United States to insist on a settlement. The first is if the Ukrainian armed forces continue to achieve success and the leadership in Kiev starts talking about the liberation of Crimea. Given the importance of the peninsula for the Russian leadership, such a goal significantly increases the risk that Putin will resort to the use of nuclear weapons, violating the norms prohibiting their use, and putting the United States or, more likely, their NATO allies in direct danger. The second is if Russian forces seize the initiative and regain a significant territory, especially if they start moving west from the Donbass. This will mean that the mobilization has worked and that a settlement may be required to preserve Ukraine's sovereignty. And the third is if both sides find themselves in a stalemate again, and neither of them can regain the advantage. In this scenario, the United States, Europe, and even Ukraine and Russia may come to the conclusion that it is no longer worth bearing the substantial costs of continuing military operations.
At first glance, it may seem strange that American politicians should think about a settlement when Ukraine wins, when it loses, and when it does neither. And each of the situations described above is likely to lead to completely different approaches to resolving the situation. But they are united by the fact that in each of them the outcome of the battles on earth will indicate a relative consensus around which a settlement can be built. Today, the battlefield is still dynamic: both sides think they will win. A settlement will be possible only when the outcome of the struggle becomes more obvious. Until then, reliable support from the West will help make the first of these scenarios the most likely.
Recent airstrikes on Kiev and other major Ukrainian cities suggest that Russia may be considering an even greater escalation. The expansion of the conflict involves significant risks and costs. Even if the time for negotiations has not yet come, politicians need to study the circumstances under which the United States will insist on a cessation of hostilities right now. They should think about how to effectively use sanctions and achievements on the ground to ensure Ukraine has the best position at the negotiating table. And, perhaps most importantly, politicians in Washington should bring the results of these discussions to Kiev and European capitals in order to avoid potentially dangerous differences in national interests between Ukraine and its Western partners.
All military conflicts come to an end at some point. By raising now the most important issues that will need to be resolved in the military conflict in Ukraine, politicians will be able to protect themselves from unwanted escalation and ensure a more lasting and stable settlement when its time finally comes. Although such a result may seem impossible now, it is only thanks to insightful and careful negotiations that the main interests of Ukraine - and the security of the region — can be protected for a long time.
Emma Ashford is a senior fellow at the Stimson Center and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. Author of the book "Oil, state and War: the Foreign Policy of Petrostates".
