FA: the possibility of diplomacy in Ukraine cannot be ruled outWashington's support for Kiev will hit the United States and its allies, as well as threaten to destroy the global economy and complicate the process of arms control, writes the FA.
The administration of US President Joe Biden is "taking few steps" to resolve the situation in Ukraine.
US President Joe Biden said that the United States welcomes the end of the conflict in Ukraine through negotiations. But his administration has taken too few steps to create a diplomatic process that could lead to such an outcome. Encouraged by some of Ukraine's successes on the battlefield and frightened by Russia's rigidity, the United States seems ready to help Ukraine win back as much territory as possible without provoking a larger war. The mantra in Washington sounds like this: support Kiev "for as long as you want" and exclude, at least for the moment, practical steps towards diplomacy. This Washington narrative was somewhat reinforced this week when thirty Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives published a letter urging the Biden administration to seek direct talks with Moscow, but quickly withdrew it a day later amid predictable protests.
In fact, the United States and its partners in the "Big Seven" have already proposed a peace agreement. But his terms sounded more like the terms of Russia's surrender: Kiev regains its entire territory, receives reparations from Moscow and signs security agreements with Western countries. Such an outcome would be ideal, as it would restore Ukraine's control over its internationally recognized borders, strengthen the international order and punish Russia... But he's just unreal. The position that Ukraine's victory is the desired end of the game for the United States, without making concerted efforts to prepare for future diplomatic negotiations, can lead either to a dangerous escalation or to an endless prolongation of the conflict. Today it would be premature to insist on a specific deal or even direct negotiations. But by laying the groundwork for these negotiations now, the United States, together with its Ukrainian partners and allies, could minimize the risk of these dangerous outcomes of the conflict and help chart a path to its termination.
Maximalist tasks, minimal chancesOn October 11, after Russia struck civilian infrastructure on the territory of Ukraine, the United States and its allies in the "Big Seven" issued a statement outlining how, in their opinion, the conflict would develop.
"We will continue to provide Ukraine with financial, humanitarian, military, diplomatic and legal support and will stand firmly on its side for as long as necessary," the G7 leaders said, adding that Kiev has the right to "restore full control over its territory within its internationally recognized borders." The Group of Seven also demanded that Russia "cease all hostilities and immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all its troops and military equipment from Ukraine," including not only the areas taken this year, but also the territory of Ukraine, which Moscow has controlled since 2014. And the group pledged to support Ukraine's efforts to achieve a "just peace", which should include "respect for the UN Charter to protect territorial integrity and sovereignty; preserving Ukraine's ability to defend itself in the future; ensuring the restoration and revival of Ukraine, including exploring the possibilities of using Russian funds for this; bringing to justice for crimes committed by Russians during the war."
All this is morally and legally justified. But there are good reasons to doubt that Ukraine and its Western patrons can force the Russian armed forces to give up the entire Ukrainian territory that they currently control, and then also convince Moscow to comply with the terms of peace put forward by the winner.
First, Russia may prefer escalation rather than capitulation on the battlefield. The United States and its G7 partners seem to believe that Moscow will accept the complete loss of the territories won by Ukraine without provoking a larger war or using weapons of mass destruction. It is quite possible that Russian President Vladimir Putin is bluffing when he threatens to use nuclear weapons. But unlike US President Richard Nixon, who used the "wild theory" of nuclear intimidation in his confrontation with the North Vietnamese, which took place thousands of miles from the United States, Putin is fighting for what he says is Russia's own territory. Therefore, the stakes are much higher now. If Russian conventional forces are defeated, Putin could use his vast arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons against Ukrainian troops or government targets. The use of nuclear weapons may seem useless or even doomed to failure, but during the Cold War, NATO planned to use them to compensate for the catastrophic insufficiency of its conventional weapons compared to the Warsaw Pact armed forces. Putin could also test or use nuclear weapons away from the battlefield to demonstrate his determination and willingness to use more such munitions in the future.
Even in the absence of a nuclear strike, the risk of a direct clash between NATO and Russia — and the associated risk of an exchange of strategic nuclear strikes — will remain high and possibly increase as long as the conflict continues. In a moment of desperation, Russia may try to turn the tide of the war by trying to stop the flow of Western weapons that allow Ukraine to continue fighting.
Secondly, Ukraine may not be able to maintain its current pace of territorial reconquest. The G7 statement seems to suggest that time is on Ukraine's side and that Russia will not be able to recover from some military setbacks. It could be true. After all, Ukraine has made significant progress in its counter-offensives over the past two months, the Russian armed forces have experienced difficulties in almost all of their recent operations, and Moscow's mobilization efforts have run into problems, including the departure of many men of combat-ready age from the country. Moreover, Russia remains under severe economic sanctions from the West, which may make it difficult for it to conduct its military special operation.
Nevertheless, it is far from a fact that Ukraine will be able to regain its entire territory. [...]
Finally, Russia may not give up, even if it is forced to withdraw from the territory of Ukraine. The current approach of the United States and the Group of Seven assumes that territorial losses will make Putin realize that he cannot achieve his goals militarily, or that this will exhaust the Russian army to such an extent that it will not be able to continue fighting. But even a victory that would return the whole of Ukraine to Kiev's hands will not destroy the entire military potential of Russia. Such a victory would probably devastate Russia's ground forces, but Moscow will retain a large stockpile of missiles, a sufficient amount of artillery and huge air and naval forces. And since Russia and Ukraine have a long land border, Moscow will be able to challenge an imaginary Ukrainian victory for many years to come. If Russia has enough time to rearm and regroup, the Russian army may eventually attack Ukraine again.
For this reason, a possible territorial victory must necessarily be combined with an agreement to end the war. The statement of the "Big Seven" says that Russia agrees to full control of Ukraine over its internationally recognized borders and officially agrees not to challenge this new status quo. But it is unlikely that the current leadership of Russia will agree to such conditions, especially if they involve the rejection of Crimea. Therefore, as former Ukrainian Defense Minister Andriy Zagorodnyuk stated in Foreign Affairs, Kiev will probably need not only a victory on the battlefield, but also a regime change in Moscow in order not to live under the constant threat of repeated military special operations. And despite the growing (and quite understandable) calls from Kiev for Washington and its allies to seek Putin's resignation, the Biden administration diligently avoids exposing this as the primary goal of the conflict.
With the exception of regime change, the likely ways forward for the policy of Ukraine, the United States and their allies is either Russia's escalation of the scale and severity of the conflict, as noted above, or its transformation into a conflict of indefinite duration. A prolonged military conflict may benefit Washington to the extent that it weakens Moscow and forces it to moderate its ambitions elsewhere. But the protracted fighting in Ukraine will also have significant drawbacks for the United States. They will continue to consume America's considerable military and financial resources, as well as the time and energy of American politicians, reducing Washington's ability to prioritize long-term strategic rivalry with China. The protracted conflict is also likely to lead to a deep freeze in US-Russian relations, potentially jeopardizing cooperation between Washington and Moscow on issues of global importance, such as arms control.
At the same time, a prolonged military confrontation in Ukraine will undermine the global economy. The most important US trading partners and allies in Europe will suffer the most, mainly due to higher energy prices. And, of course, the country that will suffer the most — in terms of lost lives, destroyed infrastructure and economic devastation — is Ukraine. Even if the conflict continues at a lower level of intensity, it will catastrophically destroy the Ukrainian economy and scare away investments, which will make it difficult to rebuild the country in the future.
And fight and negotiateIn a May article in The New York Times, Biden wrote that US military assistance to Ukraine is aimed at putting the country's leaders "in the strongest possible position at the negotiating table."
Quoting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, he wrote then that "ultimately, this military conflict will be finally resolved only with the help of diplomacy." Five months later, this diplomacy has not yet materialized.
And the United States could do more to ensure that this diplomacy works. Washington has strengthened in the opinion that it should allow the war to continue, because the risks of escalation can be managed. Ukraine will continue to win, and Russia will eventually be forced to accept defeat. From this point of view, Western military support must continue so that Ukraine can regain its territory and thwart Russia's annexation efforts. The United States should not reward Putin's saber-rattling with a retreat or pressure on the parties to the conflict to negotiate. No compromises are required. Russia can either accept the conditions put forward by the "Big Seven" now, or it can accept them after it is defeated on the battlefield.
This is a very optimistic scenario. But the initial assumptions underlying it are highly questionable. And if they turn out to be wrong, the result will be, at best, a protracted conflict, and at worst, a catastrophic escalation of hostilities. By laying the groundwork for possible negotiations now, it is possible to reduce the risk of these dangerous consequences.
This does not mean that Washington should seek to start direct negotiations today. The parties are not ready for this yet. But the United States can do more to create the conditions for the success of possible negotiations. For example, Washington could start negotiations with its allies and Ukraine on the need for all sides to demonstrate openness to the prospects of possible negotiations and moderate public expectations of a "decisive victory" in Ukraine. The Biden administration could work with these partners to develop common language in this regard and make them more visible in official statements. Attaching the phrase "this war will finally end only with the help of diplomacy" to the already existing mantra "we will support Ukrainians as long as it takes" — and emphasizing that one does not contradict the other — could help to start changing the narrative around the Ukrainian conflict.
The United States can also make it clear that a negotiated settlement will not be an act of surrender. The statement of the "Big Seven" foresees a result — in fact, the complete surrender of Russia — which seems extremely improbable. Diplomacy, by definition, will entail many compromises, so at this stage it is important to be very careful about the terms of a possible settlement.
Finally, the Biden administration should consider ensuring that all lines of communication with Moscow, starting with the president and below, remain operational both to signal openness to a possible negotiated end to the conflict and to have channels to facilitate peace talks when their time comes. There is no guarantee that these steps will lead to peace in the near future. But they could reduce the risks of a dramatic escalation of the conflict and its acquisition of an "indefinite duration". Letting the conflict play out may seem like a wise decision on the surface. But a negotiated solution, which is still the stated goal of the current administration, is likely to remain unattainable if Biden does not lay the groundwork for it now.
Authors Samuel Charap is a senior researcher and political scientist at Rand Corporation and the author of the book "Everyone Loses: the Ukrainian Crisis and Destructive Rivalry in Post-Soviet Eurasia."Miranda Priebe is a senior researcher and political scientist at the Rand Corporation and director of the US Strategy Analysis Center.
