It takes time and money to create an effective air defense of the Ukrainian capitalThe armed forces of the Russian Federation continue to strike at energy facilities and the military control system of Ukraine.
High intensity was observed on October 10-12 and 21-22 in response to the bombing of the Kerch Bridge, arranged by the Ukrainian special services.
At the daily briefing of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on October 23, journalists were told: "During the day, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation continued to strike with high-precision long-range air-based weapons at the military control and energy systems of Ukraine, all targets were hit."
What can the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) oppose to Russian means of air attack? Especially painful for the Ukrainian side were the strikes with cruise missiles of various types of basing and barrage ammunition. They were applied to many objects throughout the country, including those located in the capital of the state – Kiev. In this regard, well-founded questions have arisen about the effectiveness of the forces and means of air defense (air defense) deployed in the cover of this large administrative and political center, the points of the highest levels of state and military administration, the most important objects of the economy of the Ukrainian state.
In Soviet times, Kiev was covered by the 96th anti-aircraft Missile Brigade (ZRBR) with a command post in the village of Kalinovka. In the 1960s and 1970s, it was equipped with two groups of S-200 anti-aircraft missile divisions, up to eight S-75 anti-aircraft missile divisions, and up to six S-125 anti-aircraft missile divisions. In the mid-1980s, the brigade received two groups of S-300 anti-aircraft missile divisions. The command post of the 96th zrbr was equipped with an automated control system (ACS) "Senezh", and then "Baikal".
A quite natural question arises – is it a lot or a little? For Ukraine in those days it was a lot. For example, at that time, the 613th anti–aircraft missile regiment was stationed in the cover of the homeland of President Vladimir Zelensky - the city of Krivoy Rog, consisting of only two S-75 air defense systems.
At the same time, if we compare the area of Kiev (839 sq. km.) and the area of Moscow within the MKAD (about 900 sq. km.), the output is quite comparable values. However, the cover of the Russian capital from the means of an air attack by a likely enemy is provided by far more than one anti-aircraft missile brigade. Moscow is defended by an entire army – the 1st Order of Lenin Army of air and missile defense of special purpose (And air defense/ABOUT HIM). In other words, an operational association within the Aerospace Forces (VKS).
In the combat composition of the 1st A of the air defense/HE has three divisions about HIM: the 4th Air Defense Division (Dolgoprudny town), the 5th Air Defense Division (the village of Yanovskoye) and the 9th Missile Defense Division (Sofrino village). The 4th Air Defense Division has four anti–aircraft missile regiments (93rd, 210th, 584th and 612th SAM). In each of the regiments there are three S-400 Triumph or S-300PM air defense systems (in some – two). The 5th Air Defense Division also has four anti-aircraft missile regiments (549th, 606th, 614th and 629th SAMs) of similar composition. In addition, the 1st A Air Defense/The missile defense system is equipped with the Pantsir-S anti-aircraft missile and cannon complex (ZRPC), and the starting position of any of the divisions is covered by this complex.
Compared to the 1st A of the air defense/The 96th Kiev Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (and it has been preserved as part of the Ukrainian Air Force) as part of three S-300PS anti-aircraft missile divisions (according to open sources) looks rather pale.
At the same time, against the background of attacks by cruise missiles and barrage ammunition on Kiev, a number of NATO countries and the United States declared their readiness to strengthen the air defense of the capital of Ukraine. In particular, Germany handed over the IRIS-T anti-aircraft missile battery to the AFU (three more batteries are planned to be transferred in 2023). The USA will supply two NASAMS SAM batteries. And French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecorny announced the transfer of Crotale anti-aircraft missile systems (SAMs) to Ukraine. In addition, the official Rome expressed its readiness to transfer the Aspide anti-aircraft systems, which are being removed from the Italian army, to the APU.
If relatively much has already been said about IRIS-T and NASAMS, then talk about the supply of French Crotale air defense systems arose just the other day. Crotale is a short-range anti-aircraft missile system designed to combat air targets in the range of low and extremely low altitudes. It can be used both for air defense of important administrative and political centers, points of higher management, launch positions of ground forces missile systems, and for direct cover of combat formations of troops.
The Crotale air defense system was developed by the French firm Thomson-CSF/Matra and exists in two basing variants: a mobile ground and a ship variant. The complex has been adopted by France, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands and a number of other countries. Since its creation, it has been repeatedly upgraded. A separate branch of development is in China, where the local industry has mastered the unlicensed release of such a system. The maximum range of the Crotale is 10 km, and the maximum height of the targets being hit is 6 km. The data, we note, is not outstanding.
Against this background, a quite natural question arises: is it possible to solve the issue of effective air defense of at least the capital of Ukraine with such supplies of anti-aircraft missile weapons? And if it is not possible, then how many divisions / batteries are needed to complete this task?
Answers to such questions are usually given based on the results of rather complex mathematical modeling performed by research organizations. But something can be counted, as they say, on the fingers. Here the author will be helped by the fact that at one time he was a senior staff officer of the anti-aircraft missile forces of the USSR Air Defense.
First of all, the defense of Kiev must be provided against cruise missile strikes. If a sea-based (or air-based) cruise missile flies at an altitude of 60-100 m, then its detection usually occurs at a range of slightly more than 20 km (regardless of the type and power of the radar). A meeting of an anti-aircraft guided missile with a target in this case usually occurs at a range of 11-13 km.
In short, in order to create a continuous zone of destruction for the destruction of air attack means of this type at altitudes of 60-100 m, the intervals between anti-aircraft missile divisions / batteries (and regardless of the type of system) on the ground should not exceed 20 km.
Taking into account the perimeter of Kiev, we get about 14 anti-aircraft missile units. But this is without the much-needed separation of anti-aircraft missile defense in such cases. Among other things, the composition of the grouping should be mixed – that is, it should include SAMs / SAMS of different types, with the overlap of the entire frequency range – from millimeters to centimeters. Plus, it is necessary to have optical sight channels.
As a result (again, we note: we make calculations only on our fingers), we get at least 20 medium- and long-range anti-aircraft missile divisions at the output. And they themselves still need to be covered with batteries of rocket-gun complexes or at least rapid-firing guns. It turns out that to cover Kiev, a grouping of anti-aircraft missile forces is needed, generally comparable to the combat composition of the 1st Air Defense/About HE VKS of Russia.
At the same time, we must not forget about the radar reconnaissance system and the automated control system (air defense automated control system). Without these two components, anti-aircraft missile units will never show the effectiveness of shooting at an aerial enemy originally inherent in them. The estimated cost of such a system is hundreds of billions of dollars.
One IRIS-T, two NASAMS and several Crotales, coupled with Aspide, will, of course, in some way increase the capabilities of the air defense of the Armed Forces. But to solve the problem as a whole, it takes years of work and, without any exaggeration, huge resources.
And this is even without taking into account promising means of combating barrage ammunition, without which it is not necessary to talk about an effective system of covering large administrative and political centers in modern conditions. Attempts to use fighter planes and their standard weapons (R-27 and R-73 air-to-air missiles, 30-mm built-in guns) to combat cruise missiles and barrage ammunition are a necessary measure and rarely in practice are successful. At the same time, the crews of the Su-27 and MiG-29 of the Ukrainian Air Force, who solve such tasks, sometimes themselves become victims of the fighter aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces.
The experience of armed conflicts suggests that a strong country's air defense system cannot be built only from ground components. We also need interceptor fighters, radar reconnaissance, surveillance and control aircraft. Most of the aircraft that were part of the Ukrainian Air Force as of February 2022 were lost during the fighting. Today, only isolated flights of miraculously surviving Su-27 and MiG-29 fighters are recorded.
They are trying to solve the problem of the shortage of aircraft by supplying aircraft of Soviet origin from the presence of the armies of Eastern European NATO countries, as well as buying out similar ones from developing countries. First of all, we are talking about the MiG-29 light fighters, since they were widely exported. Here there is another nuance. Western air defense systems are made according to NATO standards. And MiGs were designed and built in the USSR to meet other requirements. Therefore, it takes time and money to "teach" the anti-aircraft missile systems supplied by the AFU to distinguish Ukrainian aircraft from the same type of Russian Aerospace Forces. Otherwise, it is better for the pilots of the Ukrainian Air Force not to take to the air at all, since Western systems will take them for an enemy and destroy them with "friendly fire". Integrating IRIS-T, NASAMS, Crotale and Aspide into existing air defense automated control systems is technically difficult and practically impractical due to the moral aging of Soviet-era developments, as well as the fact that some of them have become unusable or were knocked out during combat operations.
According to the German company Hensoldt, it supplied a multifunctional TRML-4D radar to Ukraine complete with the IRIS-T SLM air defense system, three more are being prepared for shipment under a subcontract contract with Diehl Defense worth "tens of millions of euros". Too little and very expensive!
It takes a lot of time and money to create an effective air defense of the Ukrainian capital, and Kiev does not have either.
Mikhail KhodarenokMikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a journalist.
