Weapons of the middle of the last century are becoming relevant againThis fall, news is increasingly coming from the zone of the special military operation (SVO) about the next strikes on equipment and facilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) using kamikaze drones "Geran-2", made according to the type of Iranian "Shahid 135" and "Shahid 136" ("Persian "Shahids" got to Chuguev", "HBO" from 29.09.22).
Sometimes the terms "barrage ammunition" and "strike unmanned aerial vehicle" (UAV) are applied to the "shahids". However, they are not fully suitable. In the first case, because Shahid 135 is not looking for a target on the battlefield, but immediately goes to it at pre-known coordinates using signals from GPS satellite navigation systems-NAVSTAR, GLONASS or Beidou. At the same time, the flight range of the UAV can be hundreds or even thousands of kilometers. At the same time, a relatively small warhead (warhead) weighing from 36 to 50 kg does not allow the use of "shahids" as an operational-class weapon. The expert community suggests that the Geran-2 is a kind of "front–line cruise missile", using a propeller-driven group instead of a power plant with a gas nozzle.
For the first time in domestic practice, this term appeared in the middle of the last century. It is connected with the Meteor complex. As a means of destruction, the KS-7 product was used there – or, as it was also called, the "Front-line cruise Missile-1" (FKR-1). Meteor was part of the family of missile systems "Comet", "Strela" and "Sopka", developed as part of the project to create the first generation of domestic anti-ship missiles (PKR).
Structurally, they had a lot in common, but the purpose of the Meteor was different – striking from mobile launchers at enemy ground targets with known coordinates. That is, the same as the kamikaze drone "Shahid 135".
These systems are united by another circumstance. Together with the anti-ship "hills" (which had an almost indistinguishable appearance) In the summer of 1962, the Meteors were delivered by Soviet ships to Liberty Island. By October, the Group of Soviet Troops in Cuba (GSVK) had 80 FKR-1 complete with both conventional warheads and special (SBCH). Thus, the meteors (together with the Luna missile systems with 3P9 unguided rockets) acted as a means of delivering tactical nuclear charges.
According to the memoirs of a direct participant in the events of 60 years ago, Colonel-General Viktor Yesin (" What the Soviet Union achieved during the Caribbean crisis ", "HBO" from 08/25/12), the White House did not know about the presence of tactical nuclear weapons in the GSVK. During the tough confrontation, the American leadership focused all its attention on the Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles R–12 - "which means it did not fully pose a danger."
By using tactical nuclear weapons, "the defenders of Liberty Island could inflict a heavy defeat on the aggressor with numerous losses in personnel," says Colonel–General Yesin.
Since Iran is not the owner of an atomic bomb, its "shahids" are equipped only with conventional warheads. Our country is another matter. The United States and the Russian Federation together possess 90% of all nuclear weapons on Earth. According to a recent assessment by the Federation of American Scientists, cited in the pages of the Washington Post, Russia has 1985 intercontinental missiles and 1912 tactical missiles.
The world's most compact nuclear munition was developed in the Soviet Union – it is a projectile for a 122 mm D-30 howitzer. Its layout was demonstrated during the Army-2022 forum at the exposition of the state corporation Rosatom. Nearby was a nuclear projectile for the 203-mm howitzers "Peony" and "Malka". All three of the above–mentioned types of artillery systems are actively used by the Russian Army during a special operation (although all the shells they have fired so far are high-explosive).
Meanwhile, the world is actively discussing the possibility of using nuclear weapons in the event of an escalation of the conflict in Ukraine. Speaking at the signing of agreements with the Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics, Kherson and Zaporozhye regions on their entry into the Russian Federation, President Vladimir Putin said that, protecting its sovereignty, Russia is ready to use all the means available to it.
These words caused a violent reaction in the West. There they started talking about the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia against the AFU. Technically, the carrier of such weapons can be a resurgent class of "front-line cruise missiles". However, of course, it is not the only one in the arsenal of the Russian army suitable for such a case.
Now about how the FKR-1 appeared.
In the autumn of 1947, the Special Bureau No. 1 of the NKVD began work in Moscow. Its head was 51-year–old Doctor of Technical Sciences Pavel Kuksenko, deputy - 23-year-old Sergo Beria.
The topic of the thesis of Beria Jr., a graduate of the Leningrad Military Academy of Communications named after Budyonny, was the project of an anti-ship missile system with automation based on the experience of German developments of the Second World War. Sergo Lavrentievich's ideas formed the basis of the promising Comet aviation complex, with the Tu-4 four-engine bomber acting as a carrier. The "airplane part" of the project was entrusted to the OKB-155 of Artem Mikoyan and Mikhail Gurevich. Practical work was carried out under the supervision of Mikhail Iosifovich Gurevich, the corresponding products had the letter "B".
They were a reduced copy of the MiG-15 fighter with a mass of about 2.5 tons, including a warhead of about 1000 kg. The product received the CS index ("Comet-projectile"). The launch was carried out from the Tu-4 at an altitude of 4 km with a range of about 100 km to the target, which was determined by the capabilities of radar (the range of the fuel reserve is 200 km). The crew of the bomber maintained a speed of 300-350 km / h, and after the launch, the COP accelerated to 1000 km / h and then flew in the equi-signal zone of the beam of the onboard radar of the carrier aircraft. Then, on board the projectile, its own passive radar was turned on, receiving a signal reflected from the target. The capture took place at a distance of 20-30 km, after which the homing mode was activated.
In 1949, the CS project was revised, replacing the outdated RD-20 turbojet engine with a more modern RD-500K. The thrust increased from 800 to 1490 kg, the weight of the aircraft – up to 2750 kg. To test the guidance equipment, four manned KFOR vehicles (a stand-in aircraft for the Comet) were built. The first flight in January 1951 was performed by test pilot Amet Khan Sultan.
The finishing of the complex took place at the Chkalovsky airfield, then at the Bagerovo airfield near Kerch. 150 flights were carried out, mainly off the coast of Crimea, to practice targeting real ships, including the old cruiser "Red Caucasus". In addition to the manned versions of the COP, flying laboratories were also used – a pair based on Li-2 transport aircraft and one fighter converted into a two-seat MiG-9L (FC).
In order to establish the production of CS products in the autumn of 1951, Experimental Plant No. 1 in the village of Podberezye, Kalinin region, which had previously been engaged in other topics, was transferred to OKB-155. The local branch was headed by Deputy Chief Designer Alexander Bereznyak (later Alexander Yakovlevich headed the engineering design bureau "Rainbow"). Almost 130 rockets were fired at this site. After the transformation of the enterprise into plant No. 256, 1,600 more products of the KS family were built on it, as well as at plant No. 475 in Smolensk for 10 years.
The state tests of the complex were conducted throughout the second half of 1952, the final ones took place in early 1953, and 8 of the 12 launches ended with the defeat of the target. The Red Caucasus, turned into a target, sank after another hit on November 21, 1952.
At the first stage of the development of serial cruise missiles in combat units, there was a need for reusable products for testing the process of aiming missiles at a target, but without using them. In the fall of 1952, OKB-155 developed the KSK manned cruise missile.
It was believed that control flights on new products should be carried out in manned mode. For this purpose, sets of removable cockpit pilots and landing skis were used, they could be put on any serial copy of the COP. In the combat version, the KSK was equipped with a warhead and practically did not differ from the CS.
For a control flyby, a pilot's cabin, a landing ski, retractable underwing racks with wheels, telemetry equipment and pneumatics (for flaps drive) were mounted on the KSK. The cabin was a rigid metal container with a teardrop-shaped lantern. It was placed in the warhead compartment along the rail guides. Inside there was an instrument board, an ejection seat, an aircraft and power plant control system, a radio station and telemetry equipment. In the rear part of the fuselage there was a hatch for the release of a braking parachute.
By the end of 1952, a pair of KSK was manufactured, by the middle of the next year – five pre-production products. They were used for the tasks of bringing guidance equipment to a mobile naval target. The decision to stop the automation was made by the test pilot. He pressed an electric button that activated the mechanism for disabling the autopilot steering machines. Then the pilot took control and returned to the airfield. The duration of the flight in the manned version with a fuel reserve of 350 liters was 17 minutes. The landing was carried out on a ski under the fuselage, the length of the run on the ground was 930 m, on rolled snow – up to 4 km.
Piloting the KSK was a difficult and dangerous task, therefore, modified versions of the MiG-17 fighter were more often used to solve the problems of testing the automation of the Comet.
Following the aircraft anti-ship missile, the development of a ship variant began. It was tested on the cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, which underwent conversion according to the 67EP project. The first launch dates back to January 1956. At the maximum range (about 45 km), the system worked fine, but at a smaller one it made mistakes, so the topic was closed.
The land variant, the Sopka, turned out to be much more successful. For the launch, a powder accelerator SPRD-15 was attached to the rocket with a modified set of equipment. Fire tests were conducted from the end of 1953 to October 1954. After the stationary version, a mobile version of the "Hill" was created in 1957. The towed launcher B-163 was used, the Burun and Mys radars were used to solve the tasks of target search and guidance. More than 550 missiles were manufactured for Sopka.
As part of Operation Anadyr in the summer of 1962, the 51st separate coastal Missile Regiment of the Black Sea Fleet went to Cuba. Together with him, two regiments armed with the Meteor complex were on the Island of Freedom.
The creation of this land complex was explained by the desire of Soviet military leaders to acquire a tactical system of the "ground–to-ground" class on a reliable serial platform. The government task for the development came out in May 1954. The Meteor was designed to hit ground targets with previously known coordinates in the frontline with KS-7 missiles.
The launch was carried out from a mobile launcher X-7 using a powder accelerator SPRD-15M. The missile could carry both a high-explosive warhead and a nuclear one. The launch range was 25-125 km, the flight altitude was in the range of 600-1200 m. The guidance system included a ground-based HH radar and on-board HB guidance equipment.
After the launch, the KC-7 was under the control of an autopilot, gaining speed and a set altitude in order to enter the target beam of a ground-based radar station (radar) directed towards the target. After that, the rocket switched to radio control and flew in the equivalent signal zone of the beam of the NN station. When reaching a given distance to the target, the rocket swooped down on it. The detonation of the warhead could be carried out in the air at a given height or when hitting an obstacle.
After successful tests in March 1957, the Meteor complex with the FKR-1 (KS-7) front-line cruise missile entered service. Serial production of missiles was carried out by plant No. 256 (in 1956-1960 it collected 377 copies) and plant No. 475 (another 645 products in 1959-1961).
At this point, the development and production of "front-line cruise missiles" in the Soviet Union stopped. Among the reasons is the rapid development of air defense (air defense) and electronic warfare (EW). Low-speed, non-maneuvering KS-7 missiles were easy targets for anti-aircraft gunners, and the equipment of the NN and NB was sensitive to interference. Therefore, the military preferred ground–to-ground ballistic missiles as less vulnerable to enemy air defense systems.
Cruise missiles continued their development as anti-ship missiles. Rethinking the experience of the "Comet", Mikhail Gurevich abandoned the projectile planes in favor of the classic "rocket" look at his subsequent developments on the topic "B".
The return to the topic of "front-line cruise missiles" that has emerged today is explained by new achievements of scientific and technological progress and engineering thought. As well as the extremely low cost of such products in mass production – significantly less than that of an anti-missile.
Vyacheslav IvanovVyacheslav Viktorovich Ivanov is a military expert and historian.
