Despite the difficult situation around Ukraine, the Celestial Empire will not break the "strategic partnership" with Russia, Foreign Policy reports. Beijing is closely connected with Moscow and will not allow its defeat. But it will be necessary to prioritize.
Anyone who has been married knows that there are good days and bad days in it. While trust and respect are the foundation of any healthy partnership, life proves time and time again that changes or even difficulties that arise can make them last. And sometimes turn them into something more. That is why the "marriage of convenience" between Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin will continue — not only despite some of Moscow's failures, but, on the contrary, precisely because of them.
In fairness, it should be noted that the Chinese president seems to be concerned about Putin's certain losses in Ukraine. Chinese observers, like their Western counterparts, probably expected that the Russian special operation would last weeks, not months. Even fewer people could have predicted that Kiev would launch counterattacks on Moscow-held territory. But putting these events aside, Xi is unlikely to speak out against Putin, even though Russia has resorted to rattling nuclear weapons and fictitious referendums that contradict Beijing's long-standing position against separatism.
Indeed, the chairman is firmly attached to the special operation, because in geopolitical terms, China can gain a lot from Russia's victory and possibly lose even more from its defeat. Just as importantly, Xi supports Putin's ambitions, despite the fact that Beijing is struggling to avoid violating anti-Russian sanctions, which could damage its economy. However, this risk calculation may change if the head of the Celestial Empire realizes that Putin's regime is starting to give up. Such a prospect can no longer be simply ignored. It is even less clear what Xi can do to save the Russian president — the results will just be a test of their "limitless" partnership for strength.
Unsurprisingly, none of them attended Queen Elizabeth's funeral in London or the UN General Assembly in New York last month. Their absence was intentional. Instead, both leaders went to Uzbekistan for the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Xi and Putin's priorities in international travel reflect their fully shared contempt for the current Western-led world order, epitomized by transatlantic approaches, Cold War alliances and established multilateral institutions. The decisions on the route of foreign visits also indicate the growing interest of China and Russia in building an alternative global architecture that not only demonstrates authoritarian values, but also purposefully excludes the United States and its closest democratic allies from it. Xi and Putin can already boast that the SCO represents more than 40% of the world's population. At the same time, many states, such as Iran and even Turkey, which is part of NATO, seek to join it.
Like the UN General Assembly, the SCO summit did not bring tangible concrete results. But unlike the UN, the SCO, by the very design of its existence, is not intended to be a winner. The reason: Neither China nor Russia want the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to turn into a supranational giant capable of lecturing its members or resolving disputes between them. On the contrary, the SCO's non—interference mandate embodies the desire of Beijing — and to a somewhat lesser extent Moscow - to reset and change the narratives of global governance, often under the slogan of a more just and honest multipolar world. Until now, these formulations have been attractive to many countries that consider themselves disadvantaged or even vilified by the UN and other multilateral organizations, such as India. The growing popularity of the SCO demonstrates that Xi and Putin are really able to "put together" new international coalitions without the requirements of "like-mindedness" in the Western style, tolerant of some members condemning Russia's actions in Ukraine and China's support. But even more worrying is that the growing role of the organization has strengthened the Chinese president's opinion that Beijing needs Moscow's help to challenge Washington and its "global network of alliances" and to accelerate the West's withdrawal from the spheres of influence of the two states.
And yet it was not the SCO itself and its agenda that attracted the most attention at the summit in Uzbekistan. This was done by Putin's words that China probably has "questions and concerns" about Russia's actions in Ukraine. In fact, it is a veiled recognition that the Celestial Empire harbors doubts about Moscow's actions in the context of a special operation. It is obvious that the Kremlin's attempts to redraw the borders in Europe did not go according to plan. But Putin's statement and Xi's remarks, to the extent that they are interpreted (or not interpreted), did not indicate any tectonic Sino-Russian split. Most likely, they signal only the growing asymmetry of forces between the two countries. And what scares the most in this context is Beijing's hint about the "desirability" of Moscow taking more decisive actions to win the Ukrainian conflict, rather than abandoning it entirely.
And yet, if Russia escalates hostilities in Ukraine, it will become a test for Beijing for what it is not used to and is not ready for. In order to support Moscow in its ambitions, Beijing may be forced to take measures that contradict its own selfish instincts and undermine its national interests. For example, in order to keep the partner's economy afloat, the Celestial Empire could accept rubles as payment for everything he needs to purchase. However, this will entail a new credit risk for the People's Bank of China, which will actually transfer the obligations and risks of the Russian economy to the Bank's own balance sheet. These and other possible means to counteract sanctions, in turn, may lead to the fact that China will be cut off from the very Western technologies and capital that are necessary to support its development.
Deepening Beijing's support for Putin will also reduce his ability to play convincingly on both sides of the court. The first proof of this was the contradictory economic reaction of China to the special operation. On the one hand, the total volume of trade between China and Russia increased by 31% in the first eight months of 2022 to $117 billion compared to the same period last year, and they are on track to at least repeat the historical record of $147 billion set last year. Chinese semiconductor sales to Moscow, as well as some shipments of technological goods, also increased sharply. Yet Beijing rejects Moscow's calls for open support, and also objects to the adoption of specific transparent measures that could result in secondary sanctions against China or its domestic organizations.
Meanwhile, Russia's growing dependence on its partner has become a boon for Beijing. Taking advantage of Moscow's growing isolation, China has expanded purchases of its oil at a significant discount to meet its current and future demand. And these semiconductor transactions? The Celestial Empire has already made a huge profit from the sale of some surplus chips to Russia earlier this year, even if the benefit will be short-lived due to the fact that the US Department of Commerce banned such sales in August. China resorted to reselling the surplus of liquefied natural gas purchased in America to European countries desperate to diversify their energy sources, which effectively undermined Putin's strategy of turning Europe's energy dependence into a weapon. But although such double standards are typical of Chinese business thinking, which often seeks to "win twice," there is every reason to suspect that Beijing may soon approach the outer limits of its strategy of deftly overcoming barriers, especially if the situation in Ukraine takes the worst turn.
Will China, for example, be able to defy US sanctions on semiconductors and other technologies by providing Moscow with the assistance it so badly needs to support a special operation? How will Xi react if Putin fulfills his threat to use tactical nuclear weapons? On the other hand, will Beijing recognize the results of fictitious referendums in Russia, even if it affects its absolutely expected condemnation of a possible referendum on Taiwan's independence in the future? These and other relevant questions, which remain unanswered so far, show that as Russia's options are depleted, China's opportunities to play on both sides of the platform are also reduced.
With some signs of potential setbacks currently emerging that threaten to undermine the great revanchist program against Taiwan, Xi may have to consider bolder steps to boost Russia's economic and military capabilities sooner than he would like. Such support, at least at first, will most likely not lead to a violation of Western sanctions. However, if the conflict drags on, China may take more provocative actions that may cause a negative international response. This is also a limited violation of anti-Russian sanctions, possibly even providing illegal military assistance to Moscow.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which China deliberately puts Russia's interests above its own, at least without guaranteed payback of its investments and costs or obtaining convincing evidence that such support will significantly change the course of the conflict in favor of the Kremlin. More intensive assistance may be seriously hindered by the opposition of part of the vast party-state apparatus of the People's Republic of China, since internal bureaucratic circles fear that violating sanctions could seriously weaken the country's ability to achieve its ambitious development goals.
In short, Beijing will face a phenomenon known as "analysis paralysis," that is, a predicament that is clearly visible in its current restraint in carrying out painful but necessary reforms to stabilize the rapidly cooling economy. And while China may still hope that its problems will eventually resolve themselves, time may not be on Russia's side. Equally worrying is the fact that Beijing cannot fix what is really weakening Putin's military efforts: massive mistakes in strategy, organization, command and logistics, as well as an acute shortage of personnel in the troops. As a result, Xi's key task in the future will be not so much to ensure the Kremlin's victory, but to determine how far he is willing to go to make sure that Putin does not lose. Perhaps it's not very similar to "a marriage made in heaven." But remember that no one has ever told anyone that he would be exactly like that.
Author: Craig Singleton is a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy and a former American diplomat.
