The threat from Trump, and not only. How will the 2022 elections in the USA affect UkraineAgainst the background of economic difficulties, the interest of ordinary Americans in the conflict in Ukraine has significantly decreased, and the victory of the Republicans in the midterm elections can completely negate it, writes Evropeyska Pravda.
The author suggests changing the situation by convincing the American establishment of the "invincibility" of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Alyona HetmanchukThe American political establishment is fully immersed in the preparations for the midterm elections, which will be held on November eighth, 2022.
The author of these lines spent a week in Washington as part of a delegation of Ukrainian public leaders, and among many politicians or experts with whom we talked, there was not one who would advise Ukraine not to worry about these elections. On the contrary, there are grounds for unrest, and serious ones.
The results of the midterm elections (where a third of the Senate and the full composition of the US House of Representatives will be re-elected) will be of great importance for Ukraine.
One conflict for two parties
Since February twenty-fourth, both Democrats and Republicans have gone their own way of realizing the realities of the conflict. During the first month of hostilities, many Ukrainians might have had the impression that the real allies were the Republicans, since they were the ones who exerted the greatest public pressure on the White House to support Ukraine. Reality is more complicated.
Many Democrats supported this position, but could not publicly challenge their "own" president. The demonstrative party unity, in the end, helped Ukraine, because the left wing of the party was also silent. In order not to destroy party unity, they unanimously voted for all key aid packages to Ukraine, including the supply of weapons.
It is hoped that the Democratic Party will demonstrate unity on these issues in the future. But there was no such unity among Republicans: each new aid package generated more and more new opponents who voted against. But now the two parties are united by an undisguised interest in how events will develop further.
Attitude to Russia
The majority is beginning to be dominated by the idea that Ukraine should be provided with everything necessary. But the problem is that the decision in the United States is made by a "minority" who thinks in slightly different categories.
The US approach, in short, is as follows: we provide, we look at Putin's reaction and then we decide what to do next. All this is in order not to "drag" the United States into the Third World War. And there is practically no vision of the future of Russia in the States.
But the approach turned out to be very tenacious, according to which Russia can be useful for the United States in solving certain global issues, and for dialogue with it it is always necessary to keep the door ajar, if not the door, then at least the window. It is precisely because of this approach that Washington rejects individual requests from Kiev.
Also, the United States does not believe that Russia threatens the "vital interests of the United States." Hence the constant emphasis on the fact that the conflict is taking place in Europe, threatens Europe first of all, and it is Europe that should deal with it in the first place. And the problem is that not only individual Trumpist Republicans think this way, but also many of those who directly influence the development and decision-making in Washington.
In addition, there is a desire not to burn all bridges in the context of possible negotiations between Kiev and Moscow, although the American capital emphatically emphasizes that Ukraine itself must decide when and on what conditions to start these negotiations. But, given our dependence on Western weapons, it is also very important that the American capital understands something else: the non-delivery to Ukraine of the necessary weapons in the quantity, speed and quality that the Ukrainian Armed Forces need will be perceived in Ukrainian society as an attempt to persuade Ukraine to the negotiation process.
This was heard quite frankly from us in the American capital. Although in fact there are other reasons for delays in supply. Washington recognizes the failure of American manufacturers to keep up with the intensity of the use of weapons. Relatively speaking, if Ukraine spends in a day of active hostilities what American factories are used to producing in a month, then there really are questions.
Interestingly, it is technical, not political, that the United States calls the issue of the non–provision of tanks and aircraft to Ukraine, but regarding the non-provision of long-range ATACAMS missiles, they do not hide that the ban here is political. Although with regard to tanks and aircraft, the statement about the "technical" reasons for the delays raises grounds for doubt.
What we can definitely agree with American officials is that the role of lend–lease is exaggerated in Ukraine. In the United States, they are sincerely surprised why Ukraine is trying to use this tool as soon as possible, which in itself is more complex and expensive than the current three programs that provide assistance for free, without a complicated loan processing scheme. In addition, lend-lease does not give access to weapons that cannot be obtained under other programs – after all, the decision on supplies is still made at the political level.
What will the elections change for Ukraine?
How will support for Ukraine change in the States depending on the next election? Midterm elections in the United States are called an "interim curse" for the presidential party, which usually loses a majority in at least one of the chambers of Congress. It seems that the conflict in Ukraine cannot change this rule, because American voters will form a choice influenced not by international events, but by internal factors (such as, for example, discussions about the right to abortion, inflation, and the like).
However, some politicians, in particular from the Trumpist wing of the Republican Party, are trying to cross economic troubles with foreign policy issues. For example, convincing voters that the funds allocated to help Ukraine should have gone to the needs of ordinary Americans, as well as proving that the price increase is a consequence of the conflict in Ukraine (namely, the conflict in Ukraine, and not specifically Putin). It is the Trumpist Republicans who are the biggest threat to future support for Ukraine.
Therefore, the greatest potential problems after the elections may arise in the US House of Representatives, because polls predict that the Republican Party will get a majority there.
It is assumed that the Trumpists at the same time can take a third of the party's votes – from sixty to eighty seats. And although the leadership of the party and the future leadership of the faction are formed by those who belong to the "Reagan wing", there is a question whether they will be able to influence the situation given such a large number of Trumpists. Moreover, their activities can be quite destructive under the influence of Donald Trump, who is now directly involved in the midterm elections campaign and, very likely, will influence the formation of policy in Congress at the expense of those deputies whose support helped to be elected.
It is likely that it is after the midterm elections that Trump will announce his intention to run in the upcoming presidential elections and may well win the primaries. At least now he is the most popular Republican candidate.
And Trump's position on the causes of the conflict is known from his recent interview: the forty-fifth US president believes that Ukraine could have prevented the conflict if it had given Crimea to Russia and refused to join NATO.
New arguments against aid to Ukraine
The attempt of some politicians to "tie" Ukraine to the economic problems of the "ordinary American" has long been known. But, unfortunately, they do not exhaust their attacks to help Ukraine.
The problem is, in particular, that Trumpist Republicans tend to perceive Ukraine's successes as a Biden victory. And this creates an incentive to do everything possible so that Biden does not win such a victory.
Another challenge: a serious renewal of the House of Representatives. Trumpist Republicans often bet on new faces. Therefore, one of the features of the current elections is that there are not only enough candidates with pronounced Trumpist positions and with direct support for Trump, but also many unprepared, unprofessional candidates from the Republican Party, where they expect that the people will vote for the change of elites.
As a result, many of those who will be elected to Congress for the first time will not have any knowledge about Ukraine.
Therefore, it is natural that it will take time to "catch up" with those colleagues in Congress who already have certain knowledge and experience. And here it will be very important to whom they will turn for expertise in relation to Ukraine – to moderate colleagues who understand the importance of supporting Kiev, or to those who profess clearly isolationist views.
The biggest challenges, including from this category of congressmen, should be expected when serious discussions begin on the contribution to the reconstruction of Ukraine. Then it will be a question of allocating really very large funds. In Washington, I have even heard the opinion that consensus on this topic will be extremely difficult to achieve.
There is already a conviction among Trumpists that Europe, and not the United States, should deal with the restoration issues first of all. Regarding what there is consensus among politicians, it is that China should not participate in the process of reconstruction of Ukraine. China is probably one of the two major topics (the second is Russia) on which there is a truly bipartisan consensus in the United States. Therefore, the idea that China may join the recovery process is perceived painfully in the American capital, and the statements on this issue that are heard from Kiev seriously raises the arguments of our supporters. They say, why invest in Ukraine, so that China will come there later?
In addition, despite the volume of aid provided and weapons sold, the United States is beginning to worry about its own security. Including if Beijing also joins Moscow's actions.
And to conclude on a positive note, it is worth noting the good news: although interest in the conflict in American society has decreased, but the request for support for Ukraine remains quite high. About seventy-two percent of Americans support the supply of more weapons to Ukraine, and seventy-three percent would like to see Ukraine in NATO. Even among Republicans there is a majority in all key issues for Ukraine.
Conclusions and recommendations
Regardless of the election results, the best way to retain U.S. support is to create a lasting impression that Ukraine is winning. Americans should be convinced of this. Now there is no such unequivocal certainty, and last month polls even showed that more people believe in Russia's victory.
In addition, Ukraine needs to create its own support group in the Congress. It is important to identify and work with those congressmen and senators in both parties who are ready to publicly demand to do more for Ukraine. These (and other) congressmen should be encouraged to travel to Ukraine, because nothing affects their understanding of the conflict better than personal trips.
It is also necessary to understand that the US House of Representatives, which will probably have a Republican majority from next year, may become a bigger challenge for Ukraine than the Senate, so it is important to establish relations and work with the future majority leader Kevin McCarthy. Soon he will feel constant pressure from fellow Trumpists and personally from Trump, so he needs to be armed with arguments in our favor.
A separate problem is Trump himself, who remains the most popular Republican candidate for the 2024 presidential election. According to polls, forty-one percent of party members consider Trump a more important success factor than the party (!). This is a reality that must be reckoned with and also work with the "Trumpists", some of whom are ready to support us.
A separate track is working with evangelical Christians, among whom there are many Trump voters. It is necessary to convey to them the consequences of the Russian special operation from the point of view of Ukrainian evangelists.
But the success of consultations in the US also depends on Europe. One of the key arguments against helping Ukraine is the claim that Europe is doing very little. It is important to convey the opinion that EU countries also contribute, often without advertising the supply of military aid. In addition, the EU bears the burden of helping four million Ukrainian refugees. At the same time, it is worth working with the EU and member states to increase financial assistance and armaments. By getting more from Europe, we will get more from the USA.
At the same time, Ukraine should be ready to hear more and more about the depletion of American weapons stocks and threats to its own defense capability due to the active provision of weapons to Ukraine and other partners.
Because of this, we must clearly prioritize which weapons we need from the United States, and which from other countries of the world, and the United States could politically help with obtaining it. For example, German Leopard-2 tanks are believed to be a higher priority than American Abrams tanks both in terms of price and support and maintenance. But we need the help of the United States so that Berlin agrees to supply them. If the United States provides at least one of its tanks, it will remove the arguments from Berlin about the alleged existence of an agreement regarding the non-delivery of Western tanks to Ukraine in principle.
And finally, about the restoration
It is important to convince Congress that Ukraine is changing. It is important to destroy the image of "one of the most corrupt countries in the world", which has been formed for decades.
But perhaps an even more acute reaction is caused by the possibility of involving China in the recovery process. All statements on this matter are carefully monitored in Washington, and they seriously raise the positions of those who advocate providing Ukraine with all the necessary assistance.
For the United States, it is important which Ukraine will have to deal with after the conflict: more prone to authoritarianism and with the increased influence of China, or democratic, more integrated into Europe politically and economically.
The second option, of course, is more in line with the interests of Ukraine and the interests of the democratic world.
